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SUMMARY 
The aIm of this thesis is to analyse the effect of unions on investment and 
innovation decisions, both at the theoretical and the empirical level. 
The theoretical analysis deals with the choice of adoption of a new technology 
in the presence of an oligopolistic product market. A duopoly is considered for the ease 
of exposition. Unions are assumed to affect innovation decisions only via wage 
bargaining. The results show that environments where unions have a relatively strong 
(and not very spread) bargaining power tend to harm, ceteris paribus, innovation. If, 
instead, there is enough spread between unions in terms of their bargaining power, so 
that only one firm innovates, this firm is, ceteris paribus, the one facing the less 
powerful union. A firm may be the only one to innovate when facing the more 
povverful union, if this union is relatively more concerned with employment than the 
"rival". In general, environments where unions prize the defense of employment above 
pay rises tend to be more conducive to innovation. These results show the effectiveness 
of the "rent-seeking" mechanism outlined by Grout. Finally, there are cases where no 
firm would innovate should the labour market be competitive (non-unionised), while 
one firm would adopt the new technology, ceteris paribus, when firms face unions. 
The main results of the analysis are robust to the consideration of collusion in 
the product market. The generalisation to a model in which firms choose the quantity 
of capital also confirms the main results. 
The empirical analysis is based on data from a sample of British non-
agricultural quoted companies over the period 1982-89. Data on investment have been 
constructed from the budget data and matched with information on unionisation and 
indutrial relations at the company level. Panel data estimation techniques (mostly 
Random Effects) have been employed. The results show that union recognition has, 
ceteris paribus, a significantly negative effect on the companies' propensity to invest. 
This negative impact is robust to the consideration of product market conditions, but 
seems to be concentrated in the first part of the period under study (1982-85). No 
separate effect on investment is detected for the presence of closed shop arrangements. 
There is evidence that the higher the union density at the company level, the lower the 
investment performance, but the results show also some evidence of non-linear effects. 
Finally, there is some evidence that companies that have partially derecognised during 
the eighties have benefited in terms of investment over the short-run. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trade UnIons play an important role III the economIC life of every 
industrialised country. Even in countries in which membership has contracted (such 
as the U.K.) and where union power has been weakened, the presence of trade 
unions and collective bargaining is still pervasive. Economists have long been 
interested III the impact of UnIons on economIC performance. In particular, a 
considerable amount of work has been devoted to the study of the effect of 
unionisation on wages. It IS now acknowledged that the effect of UnIons on 
innovation, R&D, investment and technical change is also a very relevant matter 
and interest III this area has recently increased. This increased interest reflects the 
recognition that the effect of UnIons on investment and innovation IS indeed of 
crucial importance in the evaluation of the overall effect of unions on firms', and the 
economy's, performance. The aIm of this thesis IS to present some new results 
concermng the effect of umons on innovation and investment, both at the 
theoretical and the empirical level. 
In the past some commentators have believed umons to have an 
unambiguously negative impact on the propensity of firms to innovate and invest. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the existing theory does not provide any such 
clear-cut prediction. Richard Freeman (1992, 158) has neatly summarised three 
ways III which umons can affect innovation, investment and technical change as 
1 
follows: 
"( 1) By raising wages, unions can induce management to introduce new technologies 
more quickly than they otherwise might do. The substitution of technology 
(possibly embodied in capital) for labor can be socially beneficial or costly, 
depending on whether the introduction of that technology would have been optimal 
III any case. 
(2) By capturing the quasi-rents from productivity-increasing investment, unions reduce 
the incentive of firms to invest in R&D and other long-lived forms of capital. 
Because investments in R&D are critical to economic progress, this potential 
impact is important. 
(3) By negotiating work rules or related labor relations policies, umons can encourage 
or discourage the introduction of new technologies. The belief that union work rules 
limit technological change underlies much traditional criticism of unionism on the 
productivity front. " 
On the other hand, empirical evidence on the effects of UnIons on , 
investment and innovation for the U.K also gives rather mixed results and no 
"stylised facts" seem to have emerged so far. Hence the scope, as well as the need, 
for additional studies on the subject. 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of umons on 
investment and innovation IS critically surveyed in Chapter 1. The chapter also 
includes a brief introductory reVIew on the theory of bargaining. The emphasis on 
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bargaining stems from the fact that the thesis concentrates on the effect of unions 
on investment and innovation via wage bargaining between the union and the firm. 
This is referred to as the "indirect effect" of unions in the thesis, as opposed to the 
unions' ability to prevent innovation or technical change from taking place through 
direct workers' opposition. Cases of open opposition to technical change are 
veritable exceptions, although they easily make the news when happening. 
The emphasis on the "indirect effect" dates back to the seminal paper by 
Grout (1984) which is considered as the main reference point for the theoretical 
model of technology adoption in the presence of unions developed in chapter 2. In 
the model firms have to decide whether to adopt or not a new, more productive 
technology. In the Grout (1984) vein the firm bargains with the union over the 
wage. The mam innovation with respect to Grout is the consideration of 
oligopolistic competition in the product market. As a matter of fact, there has been 
m recent years an increasing interest m the study of the links between the labour 
and the product markets. There is now significant evidence, for instance, that 
product market conditions constrain the ability of unions to raise wages above the 
"competitive" level. This work extends the analysis to cover also the choice of 
technology. The obvious question to be asked in this framework is which firm will 
innovate when a new technology is available (assuming a duopoly): the firm facing 
the more or the less powerful union ? The answer depends on which of the union 
effects described by Freeman (the "substitution" effect or the "rent-seeking" effect, 
3 
see (1) and (2) above) is prevailing. More generally, the model analyses how union 
bargaining power and unions' relative preferences over wage and employment affect 
the firm's adoption choice. 
It is worth pointing out that the model does not deal with R&D decisions. 
Firms are instead assumed to choose whether to buy a new technology made 
exogenously available in the market at a given price. Moreover, firms do not bid to 
obtain an exclusive right to use the technology. Hence, unlike some similar models, 
both firms, and not only one, may adopt the new technology. 
Some extensions of the model are analysed III Chapter 3. Firstly, it is 
interesting to assess how the results of Chapter 2 are affected by the existence of 
implicit collusion among firms in the product market. The model is then generalised 
to allow for the choice of the capital stock, i.e. a continuous variable, instead of the 
discrete choice between innovating and sticking to the existing technology. The 
latter extension makes the solution of the model rather cumbersome. As a 
consequence no claim to generality is made for these results. The main purpose of 
this extension is to asses the robustness of the basic model as well as to provide an 
additional link between the theoretical and the empirical part which deals with 
investment, not innovation, decisions. 
An important drawback of the empirical work on the effect of unionisation 
on investment in the U.K. has been the inability to match data on investment at 
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the company (or establishment) level with information on unionisation at the same 
level of disaggregation. In this thesis data on investment, as well as other relevant 
economIC variables, and unionisation are available for a large sample of U.K. 
compames over the period 1982-89. The empirical analysis III the thesis refers to 
investment decisions, rather than the technology adoption decision as III the 
theoretical model, but the predictions obtained from the adoption model carryover 
to the investment case. 
Chapter 4 provides a description of the data, illustrates how a measure of 
investment has been computed from the budget data, and presents some 
introductory descriptive statistics. The econometric analysis IS carried out III 
Chapter 5. In the light of the nature of the data a wide range of questions 
concernmg the impact of unionisation on investment can be investigated. The 
prImary task IS to assess quantitatively how compames recogmsmg unions for the 
purpose of wage barganing fare, ceteris paribus, in terms of investment performance 
relative to non- union firms. A thorough analysis of the union effect on economic 
performance should also take into account, as stressed above, the nature of product 
markets, I.e. the degree of competition as well as its changes during the period of 
interest. Moreover, umon recognition alone provides only a partial picture of 
industrial relations conditions at the company level. The extent of unionisation as 
measured by umon density (conditional on recognition) and the presence of closed 
shop arrangements, and their influence on investment performance are also worthy 
5 
of analysis. Last, but not least, it is very interesting to assess whether changes in 
umon status (such as partial or total derecognition of unions) during the eighties, 
had any effect on investment decisions. Is there any evidence that compames that 
have decided to derecognise umons have experienced ceteris paribus a better 
investment performance in the short run? The answer to this question is clearly of 
some moment, not least m the evaluation of the legislative changes affecting 
industrial relations enforced by the British government during the eighties. 
6 
CHAPTER 1 
THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION 
A CRITICAL SURVEY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aIm of this chapter is to provide a critical survey of the literature 
concermng the effects of unionisation on firms' investment and innovation. Some 
original further developments are also presented. The analysis deals mostly with 
theoretical rather than empirical papers, thereby reflecting the balance of the 
scientific production III the subject. The cornerstone of the literature IS the well-
known under-investment result III the presence of UnIons put forward by Grout 
(1984). Grout's model and related extensions are analysed in section 1.3 and an 
effort is made to elucidate the general intuition behind the result. The section is 
preceded by a brief introduction to the theory of bargaining (section 1.2), since the 
Nash Bargaining Solution is extensively referred to throughout the thesis. 
Particular attention is paid to the distinction between cooperative (or axiomatic) 
and non-cooperative (or strategic) approaches. The latter approach is explicitly 
adopted in the papers analysed in section 1.4 (mainly Moene (1990)) that focuses on 
the effects of alternative industrial relations arrangements, with specific reference to 
the forms of industrial action, on the optimal stock of capital and the choice of 
techniques. A simple model based on Moene (1990) is presented in section 1.5 in 
order to highlight some problems involved with the approach. Attention moves in 
section 1.6 to the effect of unions on innovation, mainly defined as the choice as to 
whether to adopt or not anew, more productive, technology made available in the 
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market. Alternative industrial relations arrangements are again considered, this time 
with reference to the extension of the bargaining agenda, i.e. whether unions are 
allowed to bargain also on the adoption of the new technology or its introduction in 
the production process. Finally, the results of the not very large empirical literature 
on the effects of unionisation on investment and innovation in the U.K. are 
presented (section 1.7). Some remarks on the direction of research on the subject 
(section 1.8) conclude the chapter. 
1.2 THE THEORY OF BARGAINING: AN INTRODUCTION 
§1.2.1 The cooperative approach to the theory of bargaining 
The cooperative approach to the analysis of bargaining dates back to the 
papers by J. Nash in the early '50s (Nash (1950, 1953)). The cooperative approach 
is built around the definition of a set of axioms (or properties) a bargaining solution 
should satisfy in order to be deemed sensible. The outcome is known as the "Nash 
Bargaining Solution". The aim of this section is to present the axioms and describe 
the ensuing solution1 (without proofs). 
The first step is the formal definition of a "bargaining problem". Two 
agents, 1 and 2, are considered, each with the utility function ui( .), i=1,2. The 
1Trus section is based on Osborne - Rubinstein (1990, chs. 2-4), and, to a lesser extent, 
on Binrnore et al. (1986) and Sutton (1986). A very readable analysis of the subject is provided 
by Gravelle-Rees (1992, ch. 14). 
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feasible set, i.e. the set of all agreements the two parties can strike, is labelled A. If 
the parties fail to agree allocation d obtains. Both A and d are defined in terms of 
quantity. By moving to the analysis in terms of utility the "utility pay-off set" can 
be defined as 
The utility in the case of disagreement IS ui( d), I 1,2. Let's also define u 
The definition of a "bargaining problem", denoted by (U,u), requires that: 
(a) U is a closed, bounded and convex set; 
(b) the disagreement outcome, d, belongs to the feasible set, i.e. u E U; 
(c) cooperation can be mutually beneficial, I.e. u * (u1 *, u2 *) E U exists such 
The parties are only interested in the outcome of bargaining and the utility 
they get from it. They are not concerned with the procedure used to obtain a given 
result. The axioms (or properties) upon which the "Nash Bargaining Solution" is 
based are the following. 
(1) PARETO EFFICIENCY. If (sl' s2) is the solution of the bargaining problem 
(U,u), then there is no u E U such that ui > si' i = 1,2, and ui > si for at 
least one of the parties. 
(2) INVARIANCE TO LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS. The solution of the 
bargaining problem is not affected by positive linear transformations of the utility 
10 
functions. Therefore the solution of the bargaining problem (U,u) is the same as the 
solution of the problem (V,v) if v· and u· obey v· = a· + 13· ·u· 13· > 0 In 
t t t t t t t • 
utility terms, if (sl' s2) is the solution of the problem (U,u), then (vI *, v2 *), with 
v/ = ai + f3 i · si , i = 1,2, will be the solution of (V,v). 
(3) SYMMETRY. A bargaining problem is said to be symmetric when (u1,u2) E U 
if and only if (u2,u1) E U, i.e. if the utility-payoff set is symmetric with respect to 
the 45° line, and if u 1 = u 2. In such a situation it is deemed sensible to require that 
in the solution both parties receive the same share: sl(U,u) = s2(U,u). 
(4) INDEPENDENCE FROM IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES. Let's assume that 
the following two bargaining problems are compared: (U,u) and (U*,u) where 
U* C U. If the solution of (U,u) is defined as s(U,u) and it follows that s(U,u) E 
U*, then s(U*,u) = s(U,u). The axiom requires the behaviour of the parties to be 
consistent. If the choice is restricted due to the elimination of some alternatives that 
were not chosen as a solution before, then the solution must stay the same and it is 
unaffected by the irrelevant alternatives. 
The Nash theorem states that there is a unique solution to the bargaining 
problem (U,u), denoted s(U,u), that satisfies axioms (1) to (4). The "Nash 
Bargaining Solution" is defined as 
(1.1) 
subject to 
where (u1 - u 1) . (u2 - u 2) is known as the "Nash product". 
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Osborne and Rubinstein stress that none of the aXIOms IS redundant. 
Alternative solutions with respect to (1.1) arise if one of the properties is removed2. 
An interesting solution obtains when the axiom of symmetry (3) is removed. In such 
a case it is possible to show that the solution that satisfies the axioms of Pareto 
Efficiency, Linear Invariance, and Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives for the 
bargaining problem (U,u) is 
subject to ul > uland u2 > u 2 with 
This solution is known as Generalised (or Asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution. 
The Nash solution, (1.1), clearly obtains when QI = l 
No mention is made in the Nash solution (1.1) of the bargaining ability of 
the parties insofar as this ability is not captured by the very definition of the 
problem (U,u). Therefore in a symmetric problem the Nash solution maximises the 
product of the parties' deviations from the "reservation" utilities (u 1 ' u 2). The 
Generalised or Asymmetric solution can be thought of as arising from the 
consideration of different bargaining abilities between the two parties. This 
difference is captured by the value of the parameter QI. 
The Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution can be applied to the case of 
bargaining over the wage between a umon and a firm III the following way. The 
2 An interesting solution, not analysed here, IS provided by Kalai and Smorodinski 
(1975). 
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union is assumed to have M members and the utility function 
(1.3) D = w· L + (M - L) . w 
where L = employment, w = wage, and w = wage outside the firm. The firm 
maXImIses the profit II = f(L) - w· 1. In case of disagreement Do = w· M and 
IIo=O. If a defines umon bargaining power, then the Generalised Nash Bargaining 
Solution, w*, is given by 
(1.4) w* = argmax [(w - wo)' Lr~· [f(L) - W. 1]1-0' 
W 
§1.2.2 The strategic approach to the theory of bargaining 
Two main criticisms can be addressed to the cooperative approach. 
1. It seems reasonable to think of bargaining as a process in which the parties 
exchange offers and counter-offers. 
2. There are costs involved in the bargaining process, for instance the cost arising 
from the delay in reaching an agreement. 
Both these elements are not analysed in the cooperative approach. 
From the early '80s strategic models of bargaining have been developed 
based on the idea that parties exchange offers. The seminal contribution to this 
literature IS Rubinstein (1982). The aIm of this section IS to describe the 
assumptions underlying the model and provide the mam results (without proof). 
The implications for the analysis of union-firm bargaining will also be presented. 
Finally, the cooperative approach will be compared with the strategic analysis 
13 
(§1.2.3) with a particular attention to the implications for wage bargaining. 
RUBINSTEIN MODEL. Let's assume that two players, 1 and 2, are faced with the 
problem of bargaining over the division of a unit of surplus. The set of feasible 
agreements is therefore defined as 
where xi is the share accruing to player i (i=I,2). 
Bargaining is modelled in the way described in figure 1.1. Player 1 starts 
with an offer in period 0, i.e. with a proposal about how to share the unit of surplus: 
He will get Xo and the other player will obtain the rest of the "cake" (see figure 1.1). 
Player 2 either accepts the offer, so that the game is over in period 0, or rejects the 
proposal and makes a counter-offer in period 1. Player 1 will evaluate the offer 
made by 2 and will either accept it or reject it, and so on. Thus player 1 makes an 
offer in even periods (0, 2, 4, ... ) and replies YES or NO to offers made by 2 in odd 
periods (1, 3, 5, ... ). The symmetric holds for player 2. The game has an infinite 
horizon. 
Let D denote the failure to reach an agreement, i.e. the situation 
characterised by an infinite sequence of rejections to every offer made by the other 
party. Each player can suggest whatever feasible sharing of the surplus when he has 
the right to make an offer irrespective of the history of past offers. Each player 
knows all the offers made in the past by both parties. Finally, the surplus to be 
divided is not affected by the length of the bargaining process. 
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The description of the players' preferences is crucial. The outcome of 
bargaining can be denoted by (x, t), where x is the share accruing to player 1, I-x 
the share received by 2, and t is the period when agreement is reached (t E T). 
Each player is assumed to possess a preference ordering, represented by 
">-" 
- , 
defined on the set of feasible outcomes (X x T) U D. This ordering is assumed to be 
complete, reflexive and transitive. The following additional assumptions are made. 
Al. For each player failure to reach an agreement represents the worst possible 
outcome: 
i = 1,2 v (x, t) E X x T 
A2. Monotonicity: 
(x,t) >-i(y,t) <=> xi>Yi \/x,y EX, Vt E T 
A3. Players are temporally impatient. The sooner a given agreement is reached, the 
better. Therefore 
(x, t) >- i (x, s) if t < s V t, sET, x E X x· > 0 t 
A4. The preference ordering is continuous. 
A5. Stationarity: 
(x, t) >- i (y, t+l) <=> (x,O) >i (y, 1) 
V t E T V x, Y E X 
The following utility function satisfies assumptions Al to A53: 
30sbOlne and Rubinstein (1990) add an assumption on the nature of the losses arising 
fr d I . hing the agreement This assumption is not needed for the results obtained om e ays In reac . . 
below. 
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(1.6) u.(X.) = b·t ·X· t 1 t 1 
where b; defines the discount factor cor player I (O<l.: <1) Th It 
• l' U i . e resu s presented 
below are derived usmg this functional form (for a more general analysis see 
Osborne-Rubinstein (1990, ch. 3)). 
The definition of the players' strategies is the remaining crucial element of 
the model. A strategy for a player specifies an action for each node where that 
player is supposed to make a choice, I.e. either the definition of an offer or the 
acceptance/rejection of an offer made by the counterpart. A strategy specifies an 
action for each possible history of the game up to the node where the player is 
making the choice, including histories that are ruled out by previous choices of the 
players. 
Once players' preferences and strategies have been defined the equilibria of 
the game can be analysed. N ash equilibria will be considered first. It is easily seen 
that every feasible division of the surplus between the two players at period 0 
represents a Nash equilibrium. Thus Nash equilibrium does not restrict the solution 
in a sensible way. This result can be shown by considering the following strategies 
for players 1 and 2 that can be called "intransigent" 4. In each period player 1 offers 
a division of the "cake" that gives him xl and he accepts an offer made by 2 only 
if he obtains at least xl. Similarly, player 2 offers the division (xv 1 - xl) and 
accepts an offer made by 1 only if she receIves at least 1 - xl. As a result an 
4For the rest of the section player I is treated as ~ale and player 2 as female. 
16 
equilibrium arises at period 0 when player 1 suggests the division (xl' 1 x) 'th 
- l' WI 
X I > 0, which is readily accepted by player 25 . 
The notion of Nash equilibrium does not represent an appealing solution for 
the game. Moreover, it is also easily shown that there are conditions such that it is 
not credible for a player to stick to an "intransigent" strategy as seen above. Let's 
assume that player 1 offers a division that gives him X and that he accepts an offer 
made by 2 only if he gets at least x. On the other side, player 2's offer gives her 1-
X, and she accepts an offer by 1 only if she receives 1 - x. Let's now assume that 
player 2 has to evaluate at period t the offer ( X + f, 1 - x - f) made by player 1. 
This possibility stems from the way strategies are defined in the game. If player 2 
rejects l's offer and makes her own counteroffer she will get 1 - x at time t + 1. If 
instead she accepts the offer she will get 1 - x - f at time t. Based on the utility 
function u(xi,t) = 6/ ·xi introduced above, it is easily verified that when O<f«l-
x) . (1-62) player 2's threat to stick to an "intransigent" strategy is not credible. 
A solution which reqUIres threats to be always credible, i.e. that the 
solution IS a Nash equilibrium for every subgame, is the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Let's consider the following strategies for the players. Player 1 offers 
x*= (Xl *, X2 *), i.e. a division of the "cake" such that he receives Xl * and the other 
player gets x2 *, and accepts an offer made by 2 if and only if he receives at least 
Y I *. Similarly, player 2 offers y* = (y 1 *, Y 2 *) and accepts an offer by 1 if and only 
50sborne and Rubinstein (1990) show that there are also Nash equilibria where the 
agreement is reached after period O. 
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if she receives at least x2 *. It is now determined under which conditions on x* and 
y* these strategies are credible. 
Let's start with player 2. An offer x made by player 1 at period 0 with 
X2<X2 * is credibly rejected by 2 if (x, 0) -< 2 (y*,I), V x2 < x*. Continuity 
(assumption A4) then reqUIres that (x*, 0) -< 2 (y*, 1). On the other hand, 
(x*,O) >- 2 (y*,I) holds, otherwise player 2 is better off rejecting l's offer (and 
proposmg y* which will be accepted by player 1 next period). Therefore 
(x*,O) '" 2(y*,I). If the utility function u(xi,t)=8/. Xi is used, this condition can be 
written as 
* c * x2 = u2' Y2 (1. 7) 
A similar argument for player 1 gives 
(1.8) 
The solution of the system of equations (1.7), (1.8) and 
(1.9) 
(1.10) 
provides the values of the offers III the strategies defining a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. These are as follows: 
(1.11) 
(1.12) 
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Moreover these strategies represent the only subgame perfect equilibrium for 
the game (see Osborne - Rubinstein (1990, 45-48) for a proof). Thus player 1 offers 
d· . . . dOh . h' 1 - 62 a IV1SlOn at peno t at gIves 1m 1 6 6 . This offer is readily accepted by 
- 1· 2 
player 2. If the discount factors is the same (61 = 62 = 6), player 1 receives 1 ~ 6' 
whereas player 2 gets 1!6. This outcome shows the existence of a first-mover 
advantage: Player 1 offers first, by assumption, and gets a bigger share of the 
surplus. If the discount factor is the same for both players, the only asymmetry in 
the model arises from the "right" to make the first move (offer). It has been shown 
(Binmore (1987)) that as the time gap between offers and counter-offers becomes 
small the solution tends to be symmetric. More specifically, if .6. is defined as the 
time gap between two offers 
The characteristics of the solution depend crucially on the relative 
impatience of the bargaining parties. The player who is more patient will receive a 
bigger share of the "cake". 
The model now described can be extended to take into account the fact that 
players may quit the bargaining process thereby obtaining an exogenously given 
level of utility. In such a case it is said that an "outside option" is available. For 
instance player 2 may have the choice to leave each time she rejects an offer made 
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by 1. The availability of this choice acts as a threat imposed on the other party. As 
such the threat needs to be credible: The utility gained leaving the barganing table 
has to be greater than the utility to be reached as a result of bargaining. The 
availability of such threat increases the share obtained by player 2 in the solution 
(see Osborne - Rubinstein (1990) for a proof). 
§1.2.3 Relation between the axiomatic and strategic approaches 
Much attention has been devoted to the determination of strategic 
foundations for the cooperative Nash solution described above (see §1.2.1)6. A very 
relevant related problem is how to correctly interpret the disagreement outcomes 
(u 1 , u 2) in the Nash solution (see (1.1)). Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski (1986) 
(but see also Sutton (1986) and Osborne - Rubinstein (1990, chap. 4)) tackle the 
problem by defining the following two games which incorporate some slight 
modifications with respect to the model described in the previous section. 
GAME A. A Rubinstein type game is assumed where players are not time 
impatient. It is also assumed that in each period there is an exogenous probability q 
that the game will end with an outcome, g say, disliked by the players. For 
instance, a third party intervenes and forces a settlement. In this game it is the 
threat of an exogenous interruption of the bargaining process (and not impatience) 
which motivates the players to reach an early agreement. Binmore et al. (1986) 
6The "Demand Game" (Nash 1953) was an ear~y attempt by Nash himself at such 
foundation. 
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show that as q ---+ 0 the subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the Nash solution 
(1.1) for the bargaining problem (U, u) where U is suitably defined on the basis of 
the set of feasible outcomes and u = (u l (g), u2(g)) 7. 
GAME B. A Rubinstein type model is now considered where offers and counter-
offers are exchanged with a time gap of ~. Binmore et al. (1986) show that as 
~---+O the subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the Nash solution of the 
bargaining problem (U*, u*) where U* is suitably defined and (ul *, u2 *) = (0, 0). 
Games A and B represent alternative strategic foundations for the use of the 
Cooperative Nash solution. The specific form of the maximand in the Nash problem 
varies according to whether the force driving the agreement is the threat of an 
exogenous interruption of bargaining (game A) or temporal impatience (game B). In 
the former case u I and u 2 in solution (1.1) reflect the utility players receive when 
the game is interrupted (outcome g arises). Therefore u l = ul(g) and u 2 = u2(g). 
For the latter case Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, 89) suggest that "the 
disagreement point should correspond to an outcome H with the property that each 
side is indifferent to the period in which H is received". In the specific case of union-
firm bargaining over the wage, for instance, "it might be appropriate to let H be the 
outcome in which the profit of the firm is zero and the union members receive a 
wage that they regard as equivalent to the compensation they get during a strike". 
In both cases it is not accurate to identify the disagreement point (u I ' u 2) with the 
7u can be set equal to (0, 0) without any loss of g~nerality. 
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"outside option", i.e with an outcome parties can choose to impose as a solution. 
The "outside option" represents instead a constraint imposed on the Nash solution. 
In the case of bargaining between the union and the firm workers may have the 
"outside option" of being hired in another firm (or sector) with the ensuing wage. 
This wage level represents a constraint for the Nash solution. If the umon IS 
assumed to be a wage maxImIser with no concern for employment, the Nash 
solution can be written (assuming symmetry) as 
(1.13) w* = argmax (w - wo)· (II - IIo) 
w 
subject to w > w 
where Wo = solidarity-fund in the event of a strike 
IIo = 0 (there is no production if a strike is called) 
and, as above, w = wage outside the firm 
This expression can be compared with solution (1.4) presented above. 
1.3 NON-BINDING WAGE CONTRACTS AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
§1.3.1 The "Grout mechanism": The basic model 
Grout (1984) represents the seminal paper in the literature about the effects 
of unionisation on firms' investment decisions. According to Grout wage 
agreements between the firm and the union can be either binding or non-binding: 
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The consequences of each scheme in terms of investment choice are then analysed. A 
union-firm wage contract is said to be non-binding when the union can renege on 
the contract without incurring any direct loss or penalty. Conversely, in the case of 
binding contracts, the union, as well as the firm, is committed or obliged to stick to 
the contract terms for the specified period. As a result, a binding agreement can be 
thought of as a "long-term" decision of the same kind as the choice of the optimal 
combination of productive inputs. It makes sense therefore in the formal model to 
assume that, m the presence of binding contracts, negotiation over the wage takes 
place simultaneously with the firm's choice of capital and employment. On the 
other hand, the presence of non-binding agreements can be modelled by assummg 
that wage bargaining takes place after the optimal quantities of capital and labour 
have been chosen. 
Grout (1984) analyses the consequences of the two types of wage agreements 
presented above on the firm's investment decision. Wage bargaining is modelled 
according to the cooperative version of the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution. 
The benchmark for the evaluation of the results is the situation where no UnIons 
exist in the labour market (i.e. a competitive labour market). The outcomes with 
binding wage agreements will be considered first8 . 
BINDING WAGE AGREEMENTS9 . The union is assumed to be "rent maximiser" 
8What follows is a simplified version of Grout (1984). Unlike Grout it is assumed that 
both employment and capital are set by the firm in the first stage (instead of having employment 
set along the labour demand curve). The results from Grout (1984) are not affected by this 
assumption. 
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with the utility function U = (w - w) . L where w = wage and L = employment, and 
w = competitive (or alternative) wage. The firm's production function is given by 
Q = f(K,L) where K = capital stock and fk>O, f[>O. Perfect competition prevails in 
the product market lO. The product price is set equal to 1. 
With binding wage agreements there is no distortion in the choice of inputs 
with respect to a competitive labour market. As a matter of fact, it is in the interest 
of both the union and the firm to maximise the size of the "rents" to be divided in 
the wage bargaining. The firm's profit is defined as 
II=p·Q-w·L-r·K where r = cost of capital 
and, using the assumptions above, 
= Q - w· L - r· K - (w - w)· L 
(1.14) =Q-w·L-r·K-U 
Therefore II + U = Q - w· L - r· K. Hence each party (and especially the firm) has 
an incentive to maximise the quantity II + U which is divided on the basis of the 
relative bargaining power parameter. As a result, the choice of inputs made by the 
firm is efficient, i.e. the same as under perfect competition in the labour market: 
(1.15) 
(1.16) QZ(K*, L *) = w 
The relative union bargaining power of the parties (the parameter Q' in the 
9See also De Menil {1971} for this part of the analysis. 
10The capital market is assumed to be competitive: 
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Generalised Nash Solution (1.4)) only affects the way in which the "rents" I1+V are 
divided between the union and the firm. The higher the union bargaining power, the 
greater the share accruing to workers and the smaller the share obtained by the 
firm. 
NON-BINDING WAGE CONTRACTS. The presence of non-binding wage contracts 
can be dealt with by assuming a two-stage model. In the first stage the firm chooses 
the quantities of capital and labour in order to maximise profits, and in the second 
stage the union and the firm bargain over the wage according to the Generalised 
Nash Bargaining Solution. The firm takes into account the outcome of wage 
negotiation in the second stage when deciding the optimal choice of inputs. 
The second stage is analysed first. Grout assumes that both parties are able 
to prevent production from taking place. If this happens workers can receive w 
outside the firm, while the firm suffers a loss of r· K since the cost of capital has 
already been sunk. For the ease of exposition the capital is assumed to be 
completely firm-specific so that the possibility of resale is ruled out. Therefore in the 
second stage the solution of wage negotiation is given by 
( 1.17) max [(w - w)· Lr"· [f(K,L) - w· L - r· K - (-r· K)]l-O: 
w 
and, taking logarithms, 
(1.18) max a ·log(w - w) + (1 - a) ·log[f(K,L) - w· L] + constant 
w 
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The first order condition is: 
(1.19) 
Thus, 
(1.20) 
a 
w-w 
(l-a)·L 
- f(K,L) - w· L 
The wage is increasing in the quantity of capital, in the competitive (or alternative) 
wage w, and in union bargaining power, a. When Q' = 0 the model reverts to the 
competitive case: w = w. When a = 1 the union "reaps" all the rent, w . L = f(K,L), 
and II = o. 
In the first stage the firm maXImIses profits by choosing the optimal 
combination of K and L, "seeing through" the solution of wage bargaining. Hence 
the firm maximises II = f(K,L) - w· L - r· K, or, from (1.20), 
(1.21) II = (I-a)· f(K,L) - (I-a) . W· L - r· K 
The first order conditions are given by 
( 1.22) 
(1.23) f - r k - -1-
-a 
With non-binding wage agreements the quantity of capital chosen by the firm is 
smaller then in the competitive case (provided a > 0). Moreover, the quantity of 
capital decreases as union bargaining power increases. 
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The model can be extended to include the case where the capital is not 
completely firm-specific. If this is the case the capital can be sold off and a fraction 
, 
say p, of the original cost can be recouped. Therefore the "disagreement payoff' for 
the firm is now given by ITo = - (1 - p). r· K where p (0 < p<l) measures firm-
specificity of capital. The case analysed before obviously entails· p = O. It is 
reasonable to think that the optimal stock chosen by the firm will depend inversely 
on the degree of firm-specifity (given union bargaining power), i.e. it will depend 
directly on p. 
The result obtained in the presence of non-binding wage contracts is based 
on the fact that the firm is not willing to engage in a specific investment because of 
the fear of being at the mercy of the opportunistic or predatory behaviour on the 
part of the union. Once the capital has been installed, the union will be in the 
position to obtain increased wages, the more so the more the firm is "locked in" by 
the specificity of its capital. Since the firm realises the fact that in such a case the 
union will skim most of the rents accruing from capital expansion, the incentive to 
invest is reduced or eliminated altogether. 
The sort of mechanism described above IS known III the literature as the 
"Hold-up problem" (Williamson (1975), Tirole (1988, 21-27) and Milgrom-Roberts 
(1992, 134-40)), an issue of "Post-contractual opportunism". If, when devising a 
contract, the party that will engage in a specific investment believes that he/she will 
not be able to obtain the expected rents because of the possibility of opportunistic 
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behaviour of the other party, then there is no incentive to enter the contract and 
operate the investment. For instance, a worker will be reluctant to invest in training 
which is firm (or task) specific, if he/she believes that by so doing his/her 
"bargaining power" towards the firm will be reduced. 
A different interpretation (but somewhat complementary) of the model put 
forward by Grout will be presented in §1.3.3 with reference to a dynamic setting. 
§1.3.2 The "Grout Mechanism": Extensions 
The model presented in the prevIOUS section has been extended by Grout 
(1985) and by Manning (1987) on the basis of the approach known as "sequential 
bargaining". In this framework it is assumed that the union and the firm bargain 
not only over the wage but also over issues such as capital and employment. 
In Grout (1985) the union and the firm bargain in the first stage over the 
quantities of inputs, capital and labour, to be employed. The wage is bargained 
over in the second stage. In both stages the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution is 
adopted and it is assumed that the relative bargaining power of the two parties is 
the same irrespective of the issue bargained over. Therefore the parameter a in the 
Nash solution is the same both in the first and the second stage. Grout (1985) 
establishes that the predictions of the model presented in §1.3.1 are robust to this 
extension: The quantity of capital is lower than in the competitive case and 
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increases in union bargaining power cause the capital stock to be reduced. 
Manning (1987) further generalises the model by resorting to the more 
realistic assumption that union bargaining power is not the same whatever the issue 
bargained over. It should be noted, though, that Manning, as well as Grout, does 
not explain how the union can be involved in the process of negotiation over the 
capital stock. This remark has to be coupled with the scepticism about the 
hypothesis that unions are able to directly bargain over employment. 
In Manning (1987) the outcome of the union-firm bargaining over capital 
and employment solves (using the same notation and the same union's utility 
function as in §1.3.1) 
( 1.24) rna x q ·log[(w-w). L] + (l-q) ·log[f(K,L) - w· L - r· k] 
k,l 
where q = union bargaining power over capital and employment. 
The second stage of the model (wage bargaining) solves 
(1.25 ) max p ·log[(w-w). L] + (l-p) ·log[f(K,L) - w· L] 
w 
where p = union bargaining power over the wage. 
The model is solved by obtaining the wage as a function of p, K, and L 
from the second stage, and by entering this solution in the optimisation problem of 
the first stage. Some manipulations show that first order conditions for the solution 
(K*, L *) are: 
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(1.26) fl(K*,L *) = w 
(1.27) fk(K*,L*) _ r = r.p·[f(K*,L*) -w·L*] - q·[f(K*,L*) - w·L*- r·K*] 
(l-p) . [f(K*,L *) - w . L *] - q . r . K* 
Efficient allocation of resources requires fl r which obtains if and 
only if 
( 1.28) p. [f(K*,L *) -w· L *] = q . [f(K*,L *) - w· L *- r· K*] 
Since r > 0 the efficient (or competitive) solution cannot be reached whenever 
p=q>O, the case when umon bargaining power is the same in both stages. This 
represents the result in Grout (1985) described above. The situation where p = q is 
quite clearly a special case. Condition (1.28) shows that an efficient allocation of 
resources is not incompatible with the union being able to appropriate some of the 
rents in the bargaining process. But a necessary condition for such result is that 
q>p, i.e. union bargaining power in the negotiation over capital and employment is 
greater than union bargaining power in the negotiation over the wage. For instance, 
if a Cobb-Douglas production function is adopted like 
(1.29) with {3>0 8>0 (3+8<1 
it can be easily shown that if the union bargaining power parameters p and q obey 
the following relationship 
(1.30) 
then "sequential bargaining" determines an efficient (competitive) solution. 
Manning stresses that overinvestment (with respect to the competitive 
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solution) can also arise when the value of q is sufficiently large compared to p. The 
intuition for this result is the following. In the limit case when q, union bargaining 
power over capital and employment, is 1, it is up to the union only to determine the 
capital stock and the employment level. The union does so in order to maximise its 
utility and if the wage is increasing in the quantity of capital it IS in the union~s 
interest to push the capital stock above the "efficient" level. 
Grout's underinvestment result has also been questioned in a Monopoly 
Union framework by Anderson and Devereux (1988). Anderson and Devereux refer 
to a noncooperative game whose strategy variables are the capital stock and the 
wage rate for the firm and the umon respectively, employment being determined 
along the labour demand curve. Which of the players is strategically dominant is a 
crucial feature of the model. Strategic dominance means ability to commit itself to a 
given irreversible investment (on the part of the firm) or to a given wage rate (on 
the part of the union). Being strategically dominant (or Stackelberg leader) 
coincides with being the first mover so that the dominant union case parallels the 
existence of binding contracts and the dominant firm case parallels the reverse 
situation. Thus in the latter case the firm chooses the capital level in the first stage, 
the union determines the wage in the second, and the firm sets employment in the 
third. 
Having derived the reaction functions for the players, Anderson and 
Devereux show that if the firm is the Stackelberg leader (i.e. if contracts are not 
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binding) undercapitalisation arIses when the union's reaction function is upward 
sloping in the wage - employment space (the converse obviously holds). A horizontal 
reaction function implies efficiency. However, it is difficult to provide an intuitive 
explanation of this result in a nontechnical wayll. 
§1.3.3 A dynamic extension 
Van der Ploeg (1987) extends the analysis of the effects of unionisation on 
investment decisions to an intertemporal setting. The analysis is based on Grout's 
distinction between binding and non-binding wage contracts. In his basic model Van 
der Ploeg assumes that the wage is set according to the Monopoly Union hypothesis. 
Therefore the firm and the union do not bargain over the wage as in Grout (1984, 
1985) and Manning (1987)12, but the umon chooses the sequence of wages III the 
knowledge that the firm will then set employment along the labour demand curve. 
As far as the firm side IS concerned, Van der Ploeg employs a standard 
infinite-horizon model of investment with convex adjustment costs and capital 
depreciation. The product market is assumed to be perfectly competitive with the 
product price set equal to 1. The firm chooses the quantities of capital and labour. 
Therefore the maximisation problem of the firm is: 
11 A counter-example to the inefficiency outcome in Grout (1984) is provided by 
Devereux and Lockwood (1991) in the context of a general equilibrium model with overlapping 
generations. 
12Van der Ploeg analyses wage bargaining in one of the extensions of the model. 
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(1.31 ) 1000 max e-rt[f(k,l) - w ·1- q. i - 1jJ(i)]dt I, i 
subject to 
k=i-8·k k(O) = 0 
with fl > 0 fk > 0 fll < 0 fkk < 0, constant returns to scale 
and l/J(O) = 0, sign (l/J') = sign (i), 'IjJ" > 0 13 
where i = investment, k = capital stock, 1 = employment, q = cost of capital, 8 = 
depreciation rate, r = discount rate. 
On the other side, the umon maXImIses an intertemporal "utilitarian" 
objective function 
(1.32) 
with u' > 0, u" < 0 m > 1 
where m = union membership (exogenously given). Union membership has no effect 
on the first order conditions. 
In order to solve the model optimal control techniques must be applied to 
problem (1.32) adding as constraints the first order conditions from problem (1.31) 
(because of the Monopoly Union assumption). This solution is known as "open loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium" where the firm represents the follower. Van der Ploeg 
shows that the optimal wage sequence chosen by the umon IS time inconsistent. 
13 Assumptions on 1/;( . ) reflect convexity of adjustment costs. 
33 
Therefore if w*( r,u) defines the optimal wage for period r as of period u, then t 
and s exist such that 
w*(t,s) =/; w*(t,O) s > 0, t > s 
If wage agreements are not binding it is in the union's interest in period s to choose 
a wage level for period t that is different from the optimal level chosen for period t 
at period O. Van der Ploeg (1987, 1472) stresses that without binding wage 
agreements "there IS an incentive to renege for the umon, because by announcing 
the intention of demanding low wages in the future it can persuade the firm to 
invest in a relatively large capital stock. Once the machines are installed, the union 
has an incentive to cheat and to claim higher wages than promised". 
In the absence of long-term contracts a time consistent solution in which 
union's strategies, i.e. wage sequences, are credible is computed using the "dynamic 
programming solution" that determines what is known as "Feedback Stackelberg 
equilibrium". Van der Ploeg shows that under this solution wages are greater and 
capital and employment lower than under binding contracts thereby confirming the 
results obtained by Grout (1984). "The reason is that in the absence of binding 
contracts the trade union is unable to convince the firm that it will stick to a 
strategy of low wages" (Van der Ploeg (1987, 1473». On the other hand, without 
binding contracts and an infinite horizon reputational equilibria can sustain the 
. I I t· 14 optima so u lOn . 
14Thls analysis is a direct application of Barro-Gordon (1983) model. 
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1.4 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ARRANGEMENTS AND CHOICE OF 
TECHNIQUES 
§1.4.1 Types of industrial action and choice of techniques 
Grout (1984) and related extensions analyse the effect of union-firm wage 
bargaining on the firm's investment (or capital) decision. In these papers bargaining 
IS modelled according to the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution. Grout focuses 
m particular on the comparIson of the outcomes arIsmg from binding and non-
binding wage agreements. Moene (1990) has further analysed the effect of 
alternative systems of industrial relations on the choice of techniques. More 
specifically, Moene aims at comparing "soft" (or "collaborative") forms of industrial 
action during wage negotiations, such as "go-slows" or "work-to-rule", with more 
drastic forms such as strikes, in terms of their effects on the choice of techniques15. 
To this purpose Moene, unlike Grout, explicitly adopts, the non-cooperative version 
of the Generalised Nash Solution. 
The sequence of moves in Moene (1990) mIrrors Grout (1984). The model 
features two decision stages. In the first stage the firm chooses capital and 
employment, in the second the firm and the umon bargain over the wage. Unlike 
Grout Moene assumes that the union is only interested in the wage received by its , 
15The alternative types of industrial action are analysed more thoroughly in Moene 
(1988). 
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members. All workers are also assumed to be union members. The firm's revenue 
function is: 
(1.33) R = R(K,L) with Rk > 0 R[ > 0 Rkk < 0 Rll < 0 
Moene assumes that the revenue function is homothetic in such a way that it can be 
rearranged as 
( 1.34) R = <1>(L . g(k» where K k= Land <1>' > 0 g' > 0 gil < o. 
The second stage is solved first. The Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution 
is given by: 
subject to 
where Wo and ITo define the "inside options" for the umon and the firm, 
respectively, and wb represents the "outside option" for workers. 
The first order condition is 
( 1.36) a (1 - a) . L w - w 0 - <1> - W· L - r . k . L - ITo 
and therefore 
(1.37) 
Thus the profit can be written as 
(1.38) 
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Moene analyses the results which obtain in the following cases: 
a) the union can call a strike during wage negotiations; 
b) the union can resort to either "go-slows" or "work-to-rule" but not to a strike 
during negotiations. 
The values taken by the "inside options" w a and ITo differ in the two cases. 
It IS important to stress that, as typical with applications of Rubinstein (1982) 
model, the forms of industrial action described above represent the threats the union 
can address to the firm during the negotiation. These threats are not carried out in 
equilibrium. An immediate agreement is instead reached and no industrial action is 
taken under the general assumptions in Rubinstein (1982). 
When the strike represents the form of industrial action available to the 
union the values of the "inside options" are the following: 
(1.39) and ITo = -r . k . L 
where z = per capita union solidarity-fund (z IS exogenously given). Using these 
values in the definition of profit (1.38) gives: 
(1.40) IT = (l-a).[4>(L·g(k)) - z·L] - r·k·L 
The firm maximises profits by choice of k and L. The first order conditions for a 
maximum can be rearranged to give: 
(1.41) (l-a)·z H(k) = r 
where H(k) = marginal rate of substitution between K and L (made positive) 
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(1.42) H(k) 
oR 
oL g(k) 
oR = g'(k) - k 
ok 
with H'(k) > 0 
I t can be easily seen that as Q', umon bargaining power, increases the 
optimal capital/labour ratio decreases. This result is at variance with the traditional 
VIew (supported by Marx, among others) according to which as workers' militancy 
grows capitalists will respond by choosing more capital-intensive production 
techniques. In Moene (1990) the union bargaining power, Q', depends not only on the 
relative temporal impatience of the parties involved, as In Rubinstein (1982) (see 
§1.2.2), but also on how many periods the umon is able to commit to a strike. A 
stronger umon will therefore be able to commit to longer strikes thereby 
determining a reduction in the optimal capital/labour ratio. 
When "go-slows" and "work-to-rule" are the available form of industrial 
action, Moene assumes that the umon will determine a reduction In output by a 
fraction 1 - A suffering only a partial loss in the wage (the fraction 1 - 7 is lost). In 
the case of "work-to-rule" Moene assumes that the wage cannot be reduced, so that 
7 = 1. The values of the "inside options" can therefore be written as follows 
(1.43) ITo = A·<I> - r·w·L - r·k·L 
with A < 1, 0 < 7 <1 and w being the wage at the beginning of negotiations (the 
wage determined in the previous contract which is valid until a new agreement is 
reached). 
The profit can be written as 
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( 1.44) n = [1 - a· (1 --\)]. <I>(L. g(k)) - T· w· L - r· k· L 
First order conditions are 
(1.45) H(k) = T ~ W 
This condition does not depend on a, umon bargaining power. Unlike the case of 
strikes, variations of bargaining power do not affect the optimal capital/labour ratio 
if "go-slows" represent the form taken by industrial action. Moreover, if T· w > 
(1- a) . z16, the optimal capital/labour ratio will be larger with "go-slows" than 
with strikes. This outcome is also interesting. The most collaborative17 system of 
industrial relations determines a greater capital intensity of techniques with respect 
to more drastic forms of industrial action. 
§1.4.2 Extensions: Different types of workers and different types of capital 
Moene has extended his model to account for the existence of two different 
types of workers. To this purpose it can be assumed that only a subset of the 
workforce, for instance the skilled workers, is able to form a union and thereby 
bargain with the firm over the wage. The remainder of the workers do not un ionise 
and receIve the alternative wage wb (the "outside option"). Both types of workers 
are necessary (together with capital) for production to take place. The profit can 
thus be written as follows 
(1.46) 
16This is likely to apply in the "work-to-rule" case when r = 1. 
17 Insofar as it is less prone to disruptions of production. 
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where L} and L2 are the unionised and non-unionised workers, respectively. 
Moene assumes that during the negotiation with the umon representing 
workers L} the firm is able to temporarily lay-off only a fraction c of the non 
unionised workers. The values of the "inside options" for the problem can therefore 
be written as: 
The profit is then given by 
( 1.48) 
and 
r . K] 
1 - 0: 
The assumption stated above does not imply that the firm keeps on producing 
during a strike by relying on the non-unionised workers~ but only that wages must 
be paid to some of these workers. 
From the analysis of the first order conditions Moene concludes that as 
umon bargaining power becomes larger L1 and K increase while L2 decreases. 
Moene (1990, 316) thus claims that the increased union bargaining power does not 
bring about a substitution of non-unionised workers for unionised ones: "As long as 
it is optimal to have some militant workers it is profitable to have relatively many 
to prevent them from reaping most of the rent because of the high average 
d .. <])" pro uctlvlty L . 
} 
Moene (1989) represents another extension of the basic model. In this case 
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labour is homogeneous, but two types of capital can be defined according to whether 
capital is a substitute or a complement for labour in the production function. These 
two types of capital differ in the sign of the cross partial derivatives in the 
production function X = f(L,K1,K2). If capital is complement to labour (denoted by 
K1) then a~~~ > O. As a consequence, demand for labour is increasing with K1, 1 
for any given value of the wage and K2. The opposite applies to K2 which is 
substitute to labour. Wage bargaining is modelled as In the prevIOUS model, but 
employment IS now determined by the firm along the labour demand curve 
according to the "Right-to-Manage model". Both types of capital have the same 
pnce. 
Moene shows that the optimal input combination chosen by the firm has 
Kl * > K2 *. There is no distortion in favour of the type of capital which is 
substitute for labour: "As a matter of fact this equipment (K2) would increase the 
average productivity of the remammg workers such that the equilibrium wage 
increases" (Moene, 1989, p. 381). 
1.5 CHOICE OF PRODUCTIVE INPUTS AND WAGE BARGAINING: A 
SIMPLE MODEL 
In this section a new model is developed and the results are compared with 
Moene (1990). The model includes the assumption that not all workers are union 
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members. Union density is assumed to be exogenously gIven. There are no other 
sources of heterogeneity among workers. The purpose of the model is to analyse the 
effect of both union bargaining power and union density on the optimal choice of 
capital, employment and the capital/labour ratio. A simple specific form will be 
adopted for the production function in order to highlight that· the choice of 
productive inputs made by the firm IS also aimed at influencing the outcome of 
wage bargaining with the umon. More specifically, as umon bargaining power or 
umon density increase, solutions may arIse where employment is greater and the 
capital stock lower than in a competitive labour market. The Generalised Nash 
Bargaining Solution adopted by Moene (1990) is such that the firm will choose the 
aforementioned combination of capital and labour so as to keep the wage at the 
alternative (or competitive) level. The very strong nature of this result casts some 
doubts on the relevance of Moene's model. 
The sequence of moves is assumed to be the same as in Moene (1990) and 
Grout (1984). Therefore in the first stage the firm chooses the quantities of capital 
(K) and employment (L) in order to maximise profits. In the second stage the firm 
and the union bargain over the wage with the outcome being given by the 
Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution. As seen above the wage is thus 
(1.49) w*=argmax [U(w) - Uo]o. [new) - IIO](l-O) 
w 
subject to U(w) > U(w) O<a<l 
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where U( .) = union's utility function and IJ(·) = firm's profit 
The model is based on the following assumptions: 
1. The analysis concerns a single firm. The market for capital IS perfectly 
competitive with the capital prIce defined by r. Once the capital has been bought, 
the firm is assumed to be unable to resell it (at whatever price)18. 
2 Th .. .. h 19 
. e umon IS wage maXImlser so t at U = w . In the event of a strike workers 
receIve a per capita solidarity fund equal to z. It is assumed that z is a fraction <P 
(0 < <P < 1) of the alternative (or competitive) wage, w20. 
3. In the models presented above union bargaining power has been "measured" by 
the parameter Q' in (1.4). There are solid grounds, though, for believing that, 
additionally, umon density represents a valid indicator of the union's ability to 
influence the outcome of wage negotiations. The non-cooperative approach to wage 
bargaining suggests that union density (labelled b in the model) matters because it 
affects the "inside options", particularly on the firm's side. Those who refer to the 
cooperative approach (see Svejnar (1986), for instance) believe instead that union 
membership can be treated as a determinant of union bargaining power: the larger 
unionisation, the greater the value of Q' in the Nash solution. This approach has 
been employed in empirical research aimed at establishing the determinants of union 
power with Q' being treated as the dependent variable. 
18See below for the assumptions relating to the product market. 
19The "median-voter" model with "seniority rule" for lay-offs, for instance, brings about 
this objective function (see Oswald (1985)). 
20See below (assumption 4) for the definition of w. 
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The model assumes that the firm is able to produce even if a strike is called 
by resorting to its non-unionised workers. The "inside option" for the firm is thus 
obtained as (assuming also that all union members go on strike21 ) 
(1.50) ITo = R(K, (l-b)·L) - (l-b).wo ·L - r·K 
where R(K,L) represents revenues (R[>O, Rk>O) and Wo is the initial wage which is 
received by non-union workers. 
4. It IS assumed that In the initial situation the wage is at the competitive level, 
wo=w. The initial situation matters in the definition of the "inside options". As a 
consequence, the model can be thought of as an analysis of the changes brought 
about by a move from a competitive labour market to wage bargaining between the 
union and the firm. 
5. Labour costs incurred by the firm for every worker exceed the wage by a fraction 
jL. This assumption refers to the existence of additional costs (see hiring costs, or 
other forms of institutional effects) in such a way that in the "inside option" the 
firm is bearing costs also for the workers on strike. 
6. The form of industrial action considered in the model is the strike. 
As a result of assumptions 1 to 6 the following can be defined and employed 
in expression (1.49). On the union side: 
(1.51) U(w)=w Uo=z where z = ¢. w is the solidarity fund 
On the other hand, the profit is defined as 
21 Alternatively, S could be thought of as the proportion of workers prepared to strike. 
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( 1.52) II(w)=R(K,L) - (1+11) . w . L - r· K 
In the light of (1.50) and assumption 5 the "inside option" for the firm is 
IIo=R(K,(1-8) . L)-w. (1+11) . (1-8) . L-I1' W· 8· L-r· K 
( 1.53) = R(K, (1-8). L) - W· (1+11-8). L - r· K 
The solution of (1.49) using (1.51), (1.52) and (1.53) gives the outcome of wage 
bargaining as 
(1.54) w*= Q R(K,L) - R(K,(1-8) . L) _ ( 8) 
-1 -. L + 0:' W· 1 - - + (1-0:)' z 
+11 1+11 
The alternative wage workers obtain quitting the firm (the "outside option", w) acts 
as a constraint for the solution. In the first stage the firm chooses K and L in order 
to maximise profits taking into account that in the second stage w = max(w*, w). 
The model has been solved using a Cobb-Douglas production function (see 
(1.29)). Revenues can then be written as 
(/3+0) . (1-~) < 1 
where TJ = price elasticity of demand (made positive) with TJ>l. 
It is acknowledged that the choice of this specific functional form IS 
restrictive. The purpose of this choice is twofold: 
a) to emphasize the exposition of the results; 
b) to make clear, unlike Moene's papers, the strategic nature of the choice made by 
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the firm when determining the inputs' quantities. As a matter of fact, the choice 
made in the first stage is also aimed at influencing the outcome of wage bargaining 
in the second stage. This element is not captured when assuming, as Moene does, 
that the "outside option" constraint (w > w) is never binding. The firm may 
instead find it profitable to set the inputs in such a way that the bargained wage is 
kept at the same level as the initial wage. To this purpose it is worthwhile stressing 
that with a Cobb-Douglas production function as in (1.55) the outcome of wage 
bargaining, w*, is decreasing in the quantity of labour. 
The main results of the analysis are the following22• 
If some conditions are met the initial (competitive) solution for wage, 
employment and capital stock (as well as output and profits) survives the 
introduction of wage bargaining. The conditions are the following: 
(1.56) 
where c = 1- (1_<5)° and p = a .(1 -1!j1) + (I-a)· ¢ (1.57) 
Therefore the solution differs from the competitive one only if ceteris paribus the 
parameter describing union bargaining power, a, is above the threshold determined 
by conditions (1.56) and (1.57). The two cases where all the workforce is un ionised 
(<5 = 1) and not all workers are unionised are treated separately. The former 
situation is referred to as "closed shop", the latter as "open shop" . 
22The solution of the model when the Cobb-Douglas revenue function (1.55) is adopted 
. t d' the Appendix where it is assumed that 1/17 = 0, i.e. perfect competition in the )s presen e )n -
product market. 
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CLOSED SHOP. In this case the model is very close to Moene (1990). It is assumed 
to start that no solidarity fund exists (¢ = 0) and that the firm is incurring no 
additional labour cost on top on the wage (J.L = 0). Hence from condition (1.57) c = 
1 and p = O. It is easily seen that the initial competitive solution applies for Q' < (J, 
where (J is the elasticity of output with respect to employment in the production 
function. For values of the union bargaining power above (J the solution differs from 
the initial (competitive) one, but the wage is still set at VI. Table 1.1 shows some 
numerical examples. For values of Q' above .4 employment rises first and then 
declines, and the same applies to output and profits, whereas the capital stock 
decreases monotonically and so does the capital/labour ratio. The latter result is 
thus in line with Moene (1990) (see subsection 1.4.1). 
If all workers are unionised (8 = 1) the wage can be pushed above w only 
either in the presence of positive "hiring costs", J.L > 0, or when union members 
receive a solidarity fund, ¢ > 0 (or both). This result is shown in table 1.2, where 
Jl=.1 and </>=.2, and in table 1.3, where J.L=.2 and ¢=.5. The behaviour of 
employment, capital stock, capital/labour ratio mirrors table 1.1, but for Q' > .4 the 
wage increases with union bargaining power. 
The results markedly differ when a "Right-to-Manage" model (Nickell-
Andrews (1983)) is used. With such model the wage monotonically increases with 
union bargaining power starting from the competitive level (w = w when Q' = 0) up 
to the situation in which, for Q' = 1, the union receives all the rents. The "Right-to-
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Manage" model represents a special case of the model presented above arising when 
<p = 1, i.e. when the "inside option" for unionised workers is the same as the 
competitive (initial) wage. In this case the bargained wage is always above w, for 
a>O. Employment, production, capital stock, profits and capital/labour ratio 
decline as a becomes larger, while the wage increases. 
OPEN SHOP. In this case the main interest is in the effects of changes in umon 
density upon the solution of the model for alternative sets of parameters (see tables 
1.4 and 1.5). In table 1.4, where a = .8 and J.l =.1, the increase in union density 
does not affect the initial solution for values of b below .65 (approximately). Above 
this threshold output and employment increase first and then drop, while the wage 
is unaffected (w=w). Profits, capital and the capital/labour ratio decrease 
monotonically. In table 1.5 it is assumed that a = .5 <p = .25 J.l = .1. In this case 
the initial (competitive) solution still applies for values of b below .9 
(approximately). When b is above .9 the wage stays at w, while employment 
increases and the capital stock decreases. 
The analysis of the closed and open shop cases presented above shows that 
Moene's VIew that increases in union bargaining power do not tend to bias the 
choice of techniques in a capital-intensive direction can be supported, but some 
qualifications need to be made. 
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1.6 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND INNOVATION POLICIES 
Sections 1.3 to 1.5 have been concerned with the effects of wage bargaining 
on the choice of capital stock (or the level of investment) for a single firm. The 
following new features are introduced in this section: 
a) Oligopoly is assumed to prevail in the product market. For the sake of the 
argument a duopoloy is analysed with an homogeneous good being produced. 
b) The analysis focuses on the innovation decision, i.e. the firm's choice concerning 
either the adoption of a more productive technology newly available in the market 
or the determination of the amount of R&D expenditure. 
The maIn purpose of the papers surveyed in this section IS to determine 
how the asymmetries In unionisation across firms In the same industry affect the 
innovative performance. The following question appears to be of particular interest: 
If a non-unionised firm faces a unionised firm which one will adopt a new 
technology or will spend more in R&D ? This question is tackled by Tauman and 
Weiss (1987). A related question is which firm will innovate (or spend more in R & 
D) when both firms in the market are unionised but union bargaining power differs 
across firms. This question is analysed in a series of paper by A. and D. Ulph (1988, 
1989, 1991, 1994). More specifically Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989) analyse whether 
unions are able to impose delays on the innovation process, a topic deemed to be 
very relevant with reference to the introduction of new labour-saving technologies 
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based on microelectronics during the eighties. 
§1.6.1 The effects of unionisation on the adoption of a new technology: Tauman and 
Weiss (1987) 
Tauman and Weiss' (1987) starting point is that if a firm bargains with a 
umon over the wage two opposite effects can arise as far as the propensity to 
innovate is concerned. On one hand, the higher wage paid represents an incentive 
for the firm to substitute capital for labour. On the other hand, the reduction in 
profits may undermine the ability to invest III new technologies, especially if they 
are characterised by huge fixed costs. 
Tauman and Weiss refer to a duopoly. One firm is assumed to be unionised 
with the wage determined according to the Monopoly Union model, while in the 
other workers receive the competitive wage (w). As in Grout (1984) (see §1.3.1) the 
union's utility function is given by U = (w - w). 1. Labour is assumed to be the 
only variable input. Production possibilities are entirely summarised by average 
labour productivity. Tauman and Weiss assume that in the initial situation both 
firms are endowed with the same technology which has productivity Q', and that a 
"superior" technology is made exogenously available in the market with 
productivity j3 (f3 > Q') and a given adoption cost. 
Taumann and Weiss aIm at determining which firm will adopt the new 
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technology when it IS made available. The following two sequences of moves are 
analysed. 
A. In the first stage the union determines the wage and the firm decides whether to 
adopt the new technology or not. These choices are made simultaneously. In the 
second stage the firm sets the quantity to be produced according to Cournot 
assumptions. As far as the non-unionised firm is concerned, on the other hand, the 
wage is given by wand only the firm makes choices. Taumann and Weiss show that 
a subgame perfect equilibrium exists where only the un ionised firm adopts the new 
technology, {3. For this to be the case market demand for the product needs to be 
sufficiently large23 ceteris paribus. Conversely, no asymmetric solutions can be 
obtained where only the unionised firm innovates if the new technology is 
"'drastically superior" to the existing one (roughly, if the ratio between {3 and a is 
sufficiently high). 
B. If it is assumed that the determination of the wage on the part of the umon 
follows the innovation decision made by the firm, then no equilibria can result such 
that the unionised firm is the only one to innovate. Hence the two assumptions 
under A and B lead to conflicting outcomes. As Taumann and Weiss stress "Wages 
are determined after the choice of technology when a change in technology is very 
costly, while the cost change in the wage contract is relatively small. This would be 
applicable in industries in which the costs of installment are large and innovations 
231n a sense that is made precise in the article. 
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are infrequent. A simultaneous choice IS applicable to industries m which 
technological change occurs frequently, the cost of adoption is relatively low, and 
hence the horizon of a given technology is short" (Taumann and Weiss (1987, 486)). 
§1.6.2 Wage bargaining and innovation decisions: Ulph and Ulph 
In a senes of papers A. and D. Ulph (1988, 1989, 1991, 1994) analyse the 
effects of various systems of industrial relations on the firms' propensity to innovate 
(or to spend in R&D). The industrial relations arr angemen ts under scrutiny differ 
with respect to which issues are bargained over between the firm and the union. In 
the basic case, the firm and the union bargain simultaneously over wage and 
employment, after the firm has decided whether or not to innovate (or the amount 
of R&D expenditure). This case is labelled "Ex Post Bargaining" by Ulph and 
Ulph. But the umon may be allowed to bargain also over issues concernmg 
innovation (or R&D), and not only over the determination of wage and 
employment. Ulph and Ulph devise two such cases. In the first scenario the firm 
decides whether to innovate or not (or the amount of R&D expenditure), but once 
the innovation has been acquired there is bargaining with the union over the date in 
which the new technology will be implemented in the production process. The union 
is then in a position to cause delays in the introduction of a new technology, or in 
the limit, even to prevent innovation from taking place. This arrangement is 
labelled "Post Auction Bargaining" by Ulph and Ulph24• In the other case, the 
52 
decision whether to innovate or not is itself on the bargaining agenda between the 
union and the firm, together with wages and employment. This arrangement is 
labelled "Ex Ante Bargaining". 
Ulph and Ulph believe that the case where the bargaining agenda covers all 
Issues ("Ex Ante Bargaining") approximates the Japanese type of industrial 
relations arrangements. On the other side the two cases where the agenda is 
incomplete better resemble the U.S. ("Ex Post Bargaining") and European, 
especially UK, ("Post Auction Bargaining") systems of industrial relations. 
In the rest of this section the outcome of the two arrangements where the 
agenda is incomplete are compared ("Ex Post" vs. "Post Auction" bargaining) with 
specific reference to Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989). Then "Ex Ante" and "Ex Post" 
bargaining will be briefly analysed based on Ulph and Ulph (1991). The purpose of 
these models is to assess how the extension of the bargaining agenda affects the 
propensity to invest starting from the basic case of "Ex Post" bargaining. Grout's 
(1984) result that propensity to invest is reduced as union bargaining increases 
provides a benchmark for the analysis. Two main features separate the models here 
surveyed from Grout (1984): 
1. As in Tauman and Weiss (1987) two firms are assumed to compete in the 
product market according to Cournot assumptions. Each firm bargains at least over 
wages and employment with a union. Bargaining is completely decentralised in the 
24The reason for the name will be clear below. 
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sense that it takes place at firm level and no link or collusion exist between the two 
unions and firms in the bargaining process. Bargaining is modelled according to the 
Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution. Union bargaining power is allowed to differ 
across firms but it is the same irrespective of the issue bargained over within each 
firm. The latter assumption is very drastic and unrealistic. Equally, it is difficult to 
understand how the union can affect the innovation choice in the way described by 
the Nash Solution. 
2. In Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989) innovation is defined as the availability of a new 
technology, a patent for instance, which is more productive than the technology 
operated by the firms in the initial situation. Firms bid to obtain an exclusive and 
infinite license over the new technology with an auction type mechanism. The firm 
with the highest bid gets the license. One firm only is thus able to innovate. 
The union facing firm i (i = 1,2) has a "utilitarian" objective function with 
the following specification (variables have been introduced before): 
(1.58) U. = L.(w. - w)l-m 1 1 1 
First the outcomes with "Ex Post Bargaining" and "Post Auction Bargaining" are 
compared. The main results are the following. 
EX POST BARGAINING. The results in Grout (1984) are robust, in general, to the 
extensions, particularly the consideration of an oligopolistic product market. 
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Therefore an mcrease m umon bargaining power lowers the ability of the firm to 
win the auction for the new technology. The case where workers are not risk averse 
is considered first (m = 0 in (1.58)). It is also assumed that firm 1 will obtain the 
new technology should the labour market be competitive. Ulph and Ulph show that 
when unions and bargaining over the wage are introduced a threshold exist, s say, 
for the union bargaining power in firm 1 such that for values above s the firm will 
lose the innovation auction. 
The analysis IS far less straightforward when workers are risk averse 
(O<m<l in (1.58)). Some cases arise where as union bargaining increases the firm 
is then in the position to win an auction it would have lost for lower values of the 
parameter. This outcome is clearly at variance with Grout (1984). A necessary 
condition for this outcome to arise is for the parameter m to be very close to 1 so 
that unions are almost only concerned with employment in their objective function. 
The union bargaining power also needs to be very low. This special case is depicted 
in figure 1.2 (based on Ulph and Ulph (1989)). For a given value of union 
bargaining power in firm 1 (8), as union bargaining power in firm 2 (parameter t) 
increases, a range of values exist such that firm 2 adopts the new technology which 
would not have been adopted for values of t nearer to O. 
POST AUCTION BARGAINING. Under these assumptions the firm that has won 
the auction for the new technology bargains with the union over the date of 
introduction in the production process. Bargaining over the timing of introduction 
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takes place simultaneously with bargaining over wage and employment. As 
expected, bargaining over the timing of introduction takes place only in the case 
when the union is damaged by the adoption of the innovation. This is the situation 
when employment losses more than offset the increase in the wage. Otherwise it is 
in the union's interest to readily accept the new technology. 
Ulph and Ulph show that if the union is very powerful (s > w where a 
a·m' 
is the average productivity of the existing technology) innovation is totally impeded. 
Wages and employment are the same as with "Ex Post Bargaining" under the 
initial technology. Conversely, if the union is not very influential (s < c ;-rm , where c 
is the average productivity of the new technology, with c > a), workers are not able 
to delay the introduction of the innovation. Wages and employment are the same as 
with "Ex Post Bargaining" under the new technology. For the intermediate range of 
values of union bargaining power (s) a delay In the adoption of the technology 
occurs with a length increasing with s. 
In order to compare the two Industrial Relations arrangements described 
above Ulph and Ulph assume that one of the firms extends the bargaining agenda 
thereby switching from "Ex Post Bargaining" to "Post Auction Bargaining". 
Numerical solutions show that there is no evidence that a firm losing the adoption 
race under "Ex Post Bargaining" may win the auction when adoption itself becomes 
a bargaining issue. The opposite outcome very often arises when union bargaining 
power is high: Switching from "Ex Post Bargaining" to "Post Auction Bargaining" 
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would impair the firm's ability to innovate. This result can be easily interpreted. 
Extending the bargaining agenda so as to include the timing of introduction allows 
the union to impose costs to the innovation process through delays in adoption. If 
some conditions are met these additional costs can make innovation unprofitable for 
the firm. A mechanism similar to Grout (1984) is still working although in a 
different context. 
EX POST VERSUS EX ANTE BARGAINING. In a later paper Ulph and Ulph 
(1991) compare "Ex Ante Bargaining" (unions and firms bargain simultaneosly 
over innovation, wages and employment) with "Ex Post Bargaining" (the 
innovation decision is taken by the firm). In this specific model firms choose the R 
& D expenditure. The probability that a firm will "discover" first a new, more 
productive, technology depends on the amount spent on R&D and it is modelled 
according to a Poisson distribution. 
It IS well known that under competitive labour and product markets this 
model of R&D expenditure determines an equilibrium with over-investment 
(Brander and Spencer (1983)). Strategic considerations, i.e. the aim to prevent the 
rival from innovating, imply that the amount of R&D chosen by a firm exceeds 
the quantity that would be chosen solely for the purpose of profit maximisation. 
Under the assumption that m = 0 in the union's utility function (1.58), Ulph and 
Ulph show that with "Ex Post Bargaining" R&D expenditure is reduced with 
respect to a competitive labour market. This result confirms Grout (1984). When 
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~Ex Ante Bargaining" is instead employed, I.e. when also the amount of R&D 
expenditure IS bargained over, the same quantity of R&D IS obtained m 
equilibrium as under competitive labour markets. Ulph and Ulph stress that the 
~short-run solution" ("Ex Post Bargaining") Pareto dominates the "long-run 
solution" ("Ex Ante Bargaining"), with all the gams accrumg to one party, the 
ullIon. As a matter of fact, under "Ex Post Bargaining" the Grout mechanism 
simply "distorts" an initial situation characterised by over-investment m R&D 
thereby freeing resources that were employed for stategic purposes beforehand. 
These rents are then appropriated by the union. 
1.7 THE EFFECTS OF UNIONISATION ON INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION 
IN THE U.K. : A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Interest m the quantitative analysis of the effects of unionisation on 
investment and innovation in the U.K. has risen recently and diverging results have 
emerged so far. This section provides a survey of the papers on the subject. 
Particular attention will be paid to the description not only of the results, but also 
of the data used in these papers. This will make evident that one of the drawbacks 
of the empirical analysis of the effects of unions on investment in the U.K. has been 
the unavailability of data on investment (or innovation) and unionisation (or 
information on industrial relations arrangements) at the same disaggregation level. 
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Denny and Nickell (1992) represent the most important contribution to the 
subject. Two separate datasets are employed by Denny and Nickell. 
(a) A group of 72 3-digit industries merged with information on umon and 
industrial relations arrangements from WIRS 1980 and 1984. The dependent 
variable (investment) is given by the 'Acquisitions of Plant and Machinery' (source 
is the Census of Production). The unionisation measures employed in the 
estimations are the following: manual trade union recognition, manual trade union 
density conditional on recognition, existence of joint consultative commitees, 
existence of pre-entry closed-shop among manual workers. 
(b) A group of 54 3-digit industries from 1973 to 1985. The measure of investment 
and the source are the same as above. U nionisation is now proxied by the 
percentage of workers covered by collective agreements (from New Earnings Survey). 
Denny and Nickell adopt a standard adjustment-cost framework for 
modelling investment coupled with an asymmetric Nash bargaining model of wage 
determination. The main result of their analysis is that union recognition has a 
negative and significant effect on investment25. On the other hand, according to 
Denny and Nickell, union density conditional on recognition has a positive effect on 
investment in such a way that "if there is a union ... it is helpful if as many workers 
as possible are members. The management then need deal only with union 
representatives rather than having to make separate arrangements for a substantial 
25The results now described are particularly clear for dataset (a). 
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body of non-union workers" (Denny and Nickell (1992, 880-81)). As a consequence 
the worst possible case is the situation where a union is recognised but only few 
workers are union members. The impact of union recognition on investment when 
wages and total factor productivity are held constant IS estimated by Denny and 
Nickell at around 23%26. 
Machin and Wadhwani (1991a and 1991b) analyse both Organisational 
Change and Investment using data for 721 private sector establishments from WIRS 
198427. As far as the former is concerned, the question in WIRS relates to whether 
organisational change (for either manual or non-manual workers) has occurred In 
the three years before the survey (1981-84). Organisational change is defined as 
'Substantial changes in work organisation or work practices not involving new plant, 
machinery or equipment'. Machin and Wadhwani also analyse investment decisions. 
Investment IS defined as either 'Conventional Technical Change', i.e. the 
introduction of new plant, machinery, or equipment not incorporating 
microelectronics, or as 'Advanced Technical Change', i.e. introduction of new plant, 
machinery or equipment that includes the new microelectronics technology. As 
above, the dependent variable is dichotomous. 
Machin and Wadhwani find that UnIon recognition has a positive and 
26Denny and Nickell stress that, SInce UIllons tend to increase wages and lower 
productivity, the total effect of uniorllsation will be lower, depending also on the nature of the 
product market. 
27WIRS 1980 does not include any information on adoption of new technologies or 
investment. 
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significant impact, ceteris paribus, on organisational change. Union recognition has 
also a positive effect on investment (both for conventional change and advanced 
technical change), but this result is not robust to the introduction of regional and 
sectoral dummies. Machin and Wadhwani (1991b, 329) are therefore in a position to 
conclude that "unionism has no significant, ceteris paribus effect on investment or 
the introduction of new technology,,28. 
Wadhwani and Wall (1990) use investment data from published accounts 
for 133 UK manufacturing companies, adjusted according to the procedure detailed 
m Wadhwani and Wall (1986), over the period 1972-86. The authors have firm-
specific information on union coverage only at a point in time. Hence industry union 
density is employed to proxy movements of firm-level union coverage over time. As 
for Machin and Wadhwani (1991b) the authors stress that "there is no evidence for 
union rent-seeking behaviour inhibiting investment in union firms ... Increases in the 
unionisation rate have no effect on investment (or, if anything, increase 
investment)" (Wadhwani and Wall (1990, 15)). 
Latreille (1992) analyses the effects of UnIons on the adoption of new 
microelectronic technology in the British private manufacturing sector usmg data 
for 418 establishments from WIRS 1984. The difference between his analysis and 
Machin and Wadhwani (1991a,b) is that the latter focuses on adoption only in the 
three years prior to the survey, while the question in WIRS employed by Latreille 
28Machin and Wadhwani also acknowledge that their data refer to a period (1981-84) 
where unions were particularly weak. Hence the need for results based on alternative data. 
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refers to whether a new technology has ever been adopted (and was currently used) 
in the plant29. Latreille finds a positive and significant effect of union recognition on 
the probability of adoption. This result is robust to the introduction of industry and 
regional effects. Results are also unaffected by product market considerations or by 
the existence of a (pre-entry) closed shop30. Latreille (1992, 48) thus suggests that 
"the relationship between union presence and microelectronic adoption actually 
amounts to something more than simple acquiescence" . 
A recent paper by Menezes-Filho et al. (1995) provides an explicit attempt 
to test the theoretical predictions deriving from the R&D models of Ulph and Ulph 
surveyed in section 1.631 . The following two datasets are used: 
a) Company account data for 469 British compames In the private sector over the 
period 1982-1990 (including information on R&D expenditure) merged with umon 
and industrial relations informations at the company level gathered by the NIESR 
b) Data for 379 establishments from WIRS 199033. 
29The question in WIRS 1984 is the following: "Are you at present usmg the new 
microelectronics technology in any of your production processes here, including computer 
controlled plant, machinery or equipment ?" Daniel (1987, Appendix A, 291-301) includes the 
questions in WIRS 1984 about the use and introduction of new technologies. 
30The existence of a closed shop is insignificant also in Denny and Nickell (1992). 
3IIn the survey of Ulph & Ulph models in section 1.6 attention has been focused on the 
race to adopt a new, more productive technology, made exogenously available in the market, 
rather than the choice of internal R&D efforts made by the firms. The paper by Menezes-Filho et 
al. deals with the latter, not the former. 
32These are the same data sources used in the empirical part of this thesis (see chapters 
4 and 5) but applied here to the analysis of R&D instead of investment. 
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Menezes-Filho et al. show that the simple negative correlation between 
R&D and unionisation turns out to be spurious, being accounted by the fact that 
companies with more non-manual workers (and a greater R&D activity) are less 
likely to be unionised. The authors conclude that "there is no compelling evidence 
that union bargaining has, on average, a detrimental effect on R&D" (Menezes-
Filho et al. (1995, 24)). However, they find support for the existence of a non-linear 
relationship (for both datasets) between union density and R&D intensity. With low 
levels of density unionisation does not hinder R&D activity, but the reverse holds 
for high density. According to Menezes-Filho et al. (1995, 24-25) this empirical 
finding is in line with the predictions of Ulph and Ulph: "Although highly unionised 
enterprises generally invested less, small mcreases m unionisation from a low base 
were positively associated with R&D. There was a hump-shaped relationship which 
could be due to the process of strategic interaction in the product market,,34. 
Addison and Wagner (1994) provide some additional evidence on innovative 
activity. They find a positive association between innovative activity (R&D 
expenditure / gross value added) and umon density for U.K. "low-tech" 
industries35, using cross-correlations based on industry data for 1988. The question 
33The questions on R&D from WIRS 1990 employed by Menezes-Filho et a1. are the 
following: "Is any research and development activity carried out at this establishment ?", and, for 
those who answered Yes, "Roughly, what proportion of total current expenditure is spent on 
R&D?". 
34Menezes-Filho et al. treat union density as a "measure" of union bargaining power. 
See sections 1.5 (assumption 3) and 5.1 for the theoretical and empirical problems involved with 
this approach. 
35See the paper for the definition of such industries. 
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then anses as to whether a causal link can be established. Addison and Wagner 
compare the U.K. data with the relative industry data for Germany. They conclude 
that their evidence does not support the existence of a causal link and that 
~~structural factors may well underpin any such favourable correlation between union 
density and investment in intangible capital" (Addison and Wagner (1994, 94)). 
As this survey confirms, the results are mixed and far from definitive. More 
specifically, no paper matches continuous data on investment (as opposed to 
dichotomous variables on innovation, as in Machin and Wadhwani36, and Latreille) 
with union information at the company or establishment leve137. This type of 
information would prove extremely valuable especially in order to analyse the effects 
on investment of the changes in unionisation and industrial relations during the 
eighties. As Booth (1994, 211) has stressed, "it is clear that substantially more 
empirical studies need to be carried out before the findings ... of the impact of trade 
unions on investment activity acquire the status of stylised facts". 
36Wadhwani and Wall (1990) have company level investment data, but they lack a 
suitable unionisation measure. 
37 Menezes-Fihlo et al. (1995) do so using data on R&D expenditure. 
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1.8 CONCLUSIONS. "DIRECT" AND "INDIRECT" EFFECTS OF UNIONS ON 
INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION 
The underinvestment outcome when a umon and a firm bargain over the 
wage m Grout (1984) represents the reference point for the papers surveyed in this 
chapter. Attempts have been made to extend Grout's framework in order to assess 
the robustness of its predictions38. Cases have been found that suggest outcomes 
conflicting with Grout's mam message. But these models do not go without 
problems either. For instance, Manning (1987) relies on the assumption that unions 
bargain with firms in the way described by the Generalised Nash Bargaining 
Solution not only over the wage and employment, but also over the capital stock. 
This assumption appears troublesome and scarcely realistic. On the other side, the 
contributions from the "Scandinavian School" (mainly K.O. Moene) are extremely 
interesting m pointing out the relevance of the choice between the approaches to 
bargaining theory, but the ensumg results do not seem to represent a clear-cut 
criticism of Grout's outcomes. The most important and promIsmg advance in the 
field has probably been the switch from single firm to oligopolistic product market 
settings in the analysis of innovation adoption in the presence of unions (the papers 
38The general issue of the robustness of the predictions arising from the thoretical 
models of union behaviour when it is assumed that the ex-post substitutability between capital 
and labour is less than the ex-ante substitutability (i.e. when the putty-putty assumption is 
rejected in favour of the putty-clay or putty-semi putty ass~ptions) is not addressed here. See 
Manning (1994) for the analysis of the problem. 
65 
by Ulph and Ulph and by Tauman and Weiss). Once agam, though, the mam 
message from Grout (1984) seems to survive well. 
It has probably been noticed that all the papers analysed in this survey refer 
to the effects of unionisation on investment and innovation through the channel of 
wage bargaining between unions and firms. No mention is made of what can be 
called instead the "direct effect" of unionisation on investment and innovation 
working through workers' resistance and opposition to new technologies. In the 
empirical literature on the subject it is sometimes suggested that the presence of 
ul1l0ns affects the adjustment costs of the firm for the installation of new capital 
(see, for instance, Denny and Nickell (1992) and Van der Ploeg (1987) could also be 
modified in such a vein). No theoretical treatments are available of this "direct 
effect" that seems to be left to the attention of scholars of Sociology and Industrial 
Relations. 
An interesting start on the analysis of this subject has been made by 
Dowrick and Spencer (1994). Dowrick and Spencer provide a detailed analysis of the 
conditions under which the adoption of a new labour-saving technology benefits or 
damages the union, when the product market is oligopolistic. Dowrick and Spencer 
consider alternative assumptions as far as wage determination (efficiency wages, 
Monopoly Union, Right-to-Manage model with Generalised Nash Bargaining 
Solution) and wage bargaining (local versus centralised) are concerned. The 
conditions under which unions favour or dislike innovation are thus determined. 
66 
The analysis of what UnIons can do if they are damaged by the innovation 
goes beyond the scope of Dowrick and Spencer (1994). The analysis of such case 
should take into account that the opposition to the new technology is likely to be 
costly for the workers. They might have to go on strike, for example. A drastic 
opposition to the new technology may also impair the competitiveness of the firm 
relative to rivals III the product market. In general, it appears very difficult to 
assess how opposition to innovation can be organised. For instance, once the 
innovation has been installed and introduced in the productive process, any decision 
taken by the union to oppose the new technology will involve only costs (the loss of 
wages during strikes, for example). These issues should not be overlooked if a formal 
analysis of the "indirect effect" of unions on innovation is to be carried out39. 
39The literature on the reactions to the introduction of new equipments based on 
microelectronics during the '80s in the UK shows that unions have usually not openly opposed 
the introduction of innovations (the well known case of the typografic industry being an 
exception). On the other hand, there is evidence of workers' opposition to new fonus of work 
organisation that did not entail the adoption of new technol?gies. See Daniel (1987), Northcott et 
al. (1985), and Cornfield (1987). 
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FIGURE 1.1 
THE FIRST TWO PERIODS OF A BARGAINING GAME 
OF ALTERNATING OFFERS 
(from Osborne-Rubinstein (1990)) 
-:1 
2 
- YES 
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FIGURE 1.2 
INCREASES IN UNTON BARGAINING POWER 
AND CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
(from (Ulph-Ulph (1990)) 
1 ONLY 
INNOVATES 
s 
2 ONLY 
INNOVATES 
s 1 
For values of the UnIon bargaining power, t, between 0 and t* firm 2 loses the 
innovation race. But, as t increases above t*, firm 2 adopts the new technology. The 
result is based on the assumption that m=.999 in (1.58). 
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TABLE 1.1 
CLOSED SHOP 
(~=e=0.4, p=O, ~=O, r=w=O.l) 
union ellploYllent capital cap/lab. wage output profit 
power(=a) ratio 
0.4 1024.0 1024.0 1. 00 0.1 256.0 51.2 
0.5 1388.9 925.9 0.66 0.1 277.7 46.3 
0.6 1536.0 682.6 0.44 0.1 256.0 34.1 
0.7 1372.0 392.D 0.28 0.1 196.0 19.6 
0.8 910.2 151.7 0.16 0.1 11. 7 7.6 
0.9 324.0 24.0 0.07 0.1 36.0 1.2 
TABLE 1. 2 
CLOSED SHOP 
(~=e=0.4, p=O.l, ¢=0.2, r=~=O.l) 
union ellployment capital cap/lab wage output profit 
power{=a) ratio 
0.1 769.3 846.3 1.10 0.100 211. 6 42.30 
0.4 984.2 800.5 0.81 0.100 228.3 40.00 
0.5 1151. 4 598.7 0.52 0.100 216.4 29.90 
0.6 1046.7 339.6 0.32 0.100 166.0 17.00 
0.7 689.1 127.3 0.18 0.100 94.9 6.40 
0.8 171.8 21.3 0.12 0.124 26.6 1.00 
0.9 7.3 0.8 0.11 0.240 2.0 0.04 
TABLE 1. 3 
CLOSED SHOP 
(~=e=0.4, p=0.2, ¢=0.5, r=w=O.l) 
Unlon employment capital cap/lab wage output profit 
power{=a) ratio 
0.1 592.6 711.1 1. 20 0.10 177.7 32.500 
0.3 803.7 643.0 0.80 0.10 192.9 32.100 
0.4 879.5 410.4 0.46 0.10 167.1 20.500 
0.5 500.0 200.0 0.40 0.11 100.0 10.000 
0.6 224.7 80.9 0.36 0.14 50.5 4.000 
0.7 75.9 24.3 0.32 0.18 20.2 1.200 
0.8 14.9 4.2 0.28 0;25 5.2 0.200 
0.9 0.7 0.2 0.24 0.47 0.4 0.008 
70 
TABLE 1. 4 
OPEN SHOP 
(~=e=0.4, p=0.1, ¢=O, r=i=O.l, .0=0.8) 
density employment capital cap/lab wage output profit 
(=8) ratio 
0.100 769.3 846.3 1.10 0.1 211.6 42.31 
0.650 794.1 845.7 1. 06 0.1 214.2 42.28 
0.700 866.1 837.9 0.97 0.1 220.9 41.90 
0.800 1012.1 785.8 0.78 0.1 229.2 39.28 
0.900 1138.4 646.7 0.57 0.1 222.2 32.33 
0.950 1145.1 499.5 0.47 0.1 200.9 24.97 
0.975 1077.5 373.9 0.35 0.1 174.6 18.69 
1. 000 403.9 47.1 0.12 0.1 51.5 2.35 
TABLE 1.5 
OPEN SHOP 
(~=e=0.41 p=O.l, ¢=0.25, r=w=O.l, 0=0.5) 
density employment capital cap/lab wage output profit 
(=8) ratio 
0.10 
0.95 
1.00 
769.3 
870.7 
1153.9 
846.20 1.10 
837.02 0.96 
557.70 0.48 
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0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
211.6 42.1 
221.3 41.8 
210.5 27.9 
APPENDIX 
The following solutions for capital (K) and labour (L) can arise from profit 
maximisation with the revenue function (1.55) and assuming 1/7]= O. 
1. A solution (K, L) such that w>w*. In this case w=w and 
L = [ e1-fJ. j3fJ J-~-o and 
r(3 . [( 1 + J.L) . w] 1-(3 
K = f3. e -(3-e 
[ 
l-e e F 
re. [(1+J.L). w]l-e 
provided 1 > a· ~ + p (p and c as defined in (1.57)) 
2. A solution (K, L) such that w* = wand 
[ 
j3fJ. (l-p-a. c)fJ. (a.c)l-fJ }-~-O and 
L = r(3. [(l+J.L). w]I-(3. (l-p). (1_8)1-(3 
[ 
131-0 . (l-p-a· c )1-0 . (a. c)O J-~-o 
K= () Ie 
r 1 -(). [(I+J.L)· w] . (l-p)· (I-e) 
3. A solution (K, L) such that w*>w 
[ 
e1-fJ. j3fJ. (i-a· c) }-~-o d L - (3 an 
- r(3 _ [(l+J.L) . w]I-(3 _ pI 
[ 
131- 0 • eO. (i-a· c) J-~-o 
K= () () 
r1- e.[(I+J.L)·W] .p 
provided a-p-c> (l-p)·(l-a·c)·e 
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CHAPTER 2 
UNIONS AND THE ADOPTION OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY 
A MODEL WITH OLIGOPOLISTIC PRODUCT MARKETS 
AND WAGE BARGAINING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As shown in section 1.7 there is a growing empirical interest in the effects 
of unions on the introduction of new technologies1. The evidence stemming from 
this literature is at the moment largely inconclusive. Less attention has been paid to 
the theoretical analysis of the alternative ways through which unions can affect the 
choice of a new technology (but see Tauman and Weiss (1987)) until the work 
recently conducted by Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989, 1991, 1994) in a series of papers2. 
The relation between these papers and the model presented in this chapter will be 
discussed later. The main aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical model 
which captures the effects of unions on the adoption of a new, more productive and 
labour-saving technology in an oligopolistic product market when unions and firms 
bargain over the wage. 
The effect of unions on innovation is undoubtedly a matter of some concern 
well beyond the discussions in academia alone. Furthermore, the question of whether 
the presence of powerful unions tends to inhibit innovation has long been debated. 
In the light of the multiple facets of the subject, it is primarily important to state 
which issues the following model is not going to deal with. 
lSee Machin-Wadhwani (1991b), Latreille (1992), Hirsch (1992) and the papers 
surveyed in section 1.7. 
2See section 1.6 for a survey and a discussion of the findings in both Tauman and Weiss 
(1987) and Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1990, 1991, 1994). . 
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The model IS not concerned with the "direct" effect of umons on the 
innovation choice of the firm3 , i.e. it is assumed that the union has a passive role 
towards the choice of technology. The union effect works instead through wage 
bargaining. Therefore, Issues such as umon resistance or opposition to the 
introduction of a new technology (see Dowrick and Spencer (1994)) are not 
addressed in the model. This stems from the fact that it is the sole responsibility of 
the firm to choose whether or not the innovation should be adopted. Once this 
adoption decision has been taken by the firm there is no way for the union to affect 
the decision: resisting the innovation would only involve losses on the union side. 
Moreover, the model assumes that the umon IS not involved III any way III the 
decision about the adoption. This means that there is no negotiation between the 
union and the firm on whether (or when) the technology should be introduced. 
Negotiation of this type can be found for instance In the analysis developed by 
Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989). In a somewhat different setting from the one presented 
below, Ulph and Ulph argue that extending the agenda of bargaining between the 
union and the firm to include innovation activity - or at least the actual date of 
implementation once introduction has been decided - might result in a loss of 
efficiency, i.e. in new technologies not being introduced that would have been had 
bargaining concerned only wages (and possibly employment) but not innovation4. 
In connection with the above discussion it is worth noticing that the model 
3See the discussion on the "indirect" effect of unions in section 1.8. 
4See section 1.6.2 for a discussion of this result. 
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IS not dynamic. Firms m the model choose simultaneously whether or not to 
innovate and no adjustment costs hinder the introduction of the technology once the 
decision has been taken. In a dynamic setting, once the innovation appears in the 
market (time 0, say), firms would choose in which time period they will adopt (if 
any). This analysis has been developed for the general case by Reinganum (1981)5. 
Since no dynamics are involved in the choice, the model does not cope with the issue 
of unions causing the firm to delay its innovation6 , an issue that has been 
considerered of some empirical relevance in the industrial relation literature. 
Instead, the model deals with the "indirect" effect of UnIons on the 
introduction of a technology. The effect is said to be indirect because unions affect 
wage determination, which influences the firm's innovation decision, without 
explicitly affecting the choice of innovation of the firm. As seen in chapter 1, this 
idea dates back to the paper by Grout (1984) on the effect of unions on investment 
and is widely accepted in the literature. Wage determination and union power are 
modelled according to the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution. 
A relevant feature of the model IS the duopolistic setting. In recent years 
there has been an increased interest in the modelling of UnIon behaviour m the 
multi-firm case7 . Competition between firms in the product market is modelled here 
according to Cournot assumptions, i.e. each firm sets its own quantity taking its 
5See Tirole (1988, ch. 8) for a S1llIlTIlary of this literature and ReinganUIll (1989) for a 
thorough survey. 
6This result can arise in some of the models analysed in section 1.6 (see Ulph and Ulph 
(1988, 1989)). Some limitations of these models are also pointed out in the same section. 
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rival's quantity as given. 
Section 2.2 sets out the mam assumption and the structure of the model. 
The solutions to each stage of the game are worked out m section 2.3. Numerical 
solutions (and their graphical representations) and comments to the results are 
provided in section 2.4. It is important to stress that the behaviour of the model is 
robust to changes in the set of parameters used m section 2.4. Finally, the mam 
conclusions are restated in section 2.5. 
2.2 THE MODEL: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
The analysis of the adoption of a new technology in the presence of unions 
developed in this chapter is based on a three stage game. The decision stages of the 
game are as follows. 
- Stage 1. At the beginning of the period each firm IS endowed with the same 
technology. Once a new, more productive (and labour-saving) technology IS made 
exogenously available to the firms m the industry, each should decide whether or 
not to adopt the new technology. Each firm alms at maXImlsmg profits. The 
adoption choice depends (among other things) on the price of the technology which 
7 Stewart (1990) provides evidence on the effect of product market conditions on the 
union - non union wage differential using establislunent data from WIRS (see section 5.5 for a 
more detailed discussion of the results). On the theoretical side, Dowrick (1989) analyses the 
outcome of wage bargaining between the firm and the union when the product market is 
oligopolistic. 
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IS exogenously gIven. The outcome of this stage is a Nash equilibrium with the 
strategies available to the firms being {innovate, not innovate}. 
Stage 2. Given the technology adopted In the first stage each firm bargains with 
its (firm level) umon to determine the wage level (given the wage In the rival 
firm)B. The outcome of bargaining inside each firm is described by the Generalised 
Nash Bargaining Solution, with the wage settled in one firm depending on the wage 
in the rival firm. The complete solution for the wage in this stage is again a Nash 
equilibrium: the Nash equilibrium in the two Nash Bargaining Solutions (see Hoel 
(1991) and De Fraja (1991) for an example of this type of solution). 
- Stage 3. Finally each firm sets the quantity in order to maximise profits9 In a 
typical Cournot game. 
This setup has some common features with both Dowrick and Spencer 
(1994) and the papers by Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989, 1991). The sequence of moves 
is the same as in Dowrick and Spencer10. However, Dowrick and Spencer are not 
concerned with modelling the choice of innovation. They detail conditions under 
which UnIons will be worse off by the introduction of a new, labour saVIng, 
technology, but it IS beyond the scope of their paper to analyse how UnIons can 
BHence the model assmnes decentralised wage bargaining. 
9Because of the assumptions on the production function (see (2.2)) and the structure of 
the game, setting quantity is the same as setting employment. Since employment is determined 
by the firm along the demand for labour, the model belongs to the "Right-to-Manage" approach. 
I°It seems to have some realistic appeal to structure the stages this way. This is the 
case since the adoption of a new technology can be thought of as being a long-term decision. 
Technologies are also likely to be less flexible than wage settlements (especially if wage 
agreements are non-binding, see section 1.3). 
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actually oppose an innovation they dislike, whether it is credible for them to do so 
, 
and, finally, whether the innovation will be adopted in the first instance by the firm 
if such threats existll . 
On the other hand, the approach in Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989, 1991) 
focuses on the effect of unions on R&D expenditures more than on the adoption of a 
given technology available on the market. Moreover, in Ulph and Ulph's set of 
models there is only one firm able to innovate (for instance, by winning the auction 
which enables it to get the patent). The case where both firms innovate cannot be 
accounted for. It could be argued that the analysis of adoption suggested in the 
model developed m this chapter suits better the understanding of the effects of 
unionisation on, say, computer-based technologies which have been the focus of 
some recent work. 
In the model, firms may differ ex ante, i.e. before the innovation is 
introduced in the market, only according to their union characteristics, remammg 
features being the same across firms. Two union parameters are relevant: 
1. The union bargaining power as described by the bargaining parameter III the 
Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution (Cti say, where the subscript denotes firm i); 
2. The union perceived trade-off between employment and the wage, i.e. the weight 
on wage and employment, respectively, in the union objective function. To this 
purpose a Stone-Geary utility function is adopted of the following form (see, for 
11 See section 1.8 for more on the issue. 
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instance, Pencavel (1985) for the choice of this specific functional form): 
(2.1) U ( 8· 1-8· . = w· - r) t. L . • t t t 
(where r is the "reference" or "competitive" wage, with r>O) 
Many interesting cases are encompassed by this specification12. 
In the model, the values of the parameters 0' and 8 are not restricted to the 
symmetric case (i.e. 0'1=0'2 and 81=82) but any combination can be considered. 
The main aim of the model is to assess the consequences of union power and 
its distribution across firms on the adoption of a new technology in a duopoly. The 
problem can also be stated as follows: for a given combination of union bargaining 
powers (parameters 0'1 and 0'2) and union perceived trade-offs (parameters 81 and 
82) in the two firms, will anew, more productive technology be adopted by both 
firms, by neither, or by one only ? Furthermore, in the case of just one firm 
innovating, which union characteristics are relevant in determining this result ? If 
union power differs across firms, which firm IS more likely to innovate, the one 
facing the more powerful union or the other ? 
As the empirical evidence has repeatedly shown the answer to these 
questions is not straightforward (see section 1.7). Similarly, a priOri intuition 
suggests that the theoretical result is likely to be ambiguous. As a matter of fact, 
when a firm is confronted with a union two forces could drive the choice of 
adoption: 
12See Booth (1994, 105-06). 
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(a) If faced with a powerful union a firm is likely to have higher labour costs. As a 
consequence a heavily13 unionised firm is more willing to resort to labour savmg 
innovation in order to cut its costs. 
(b) The expected rents from introducing a new technology might be (at least 
partially) skimmed by the union via an increase in wage demands. The anticipation 
of this "opportunistic" behaviour on the part of the union might deter the firm from 
innovating (this is best known as the "Hold-up mechanism'~, see section 1.3). In this 
case the prediction is opposed to case ( a). 
The aIm of the model IS to determine which effect IS prevailing and under 
what conditions. Moreover, it is also interesting to determine what happens when 
umon bargaining power changes14. Is there any possibility of an innovation being 
adopted at a given value of a that it wouldn't have been for a lower value ?15 Or, 
might adoption be more likely the more powerful are unions? 
Given the assumptions of the model (which I have outlined above) it is possible 
to determine for every combination (av a2, 61, 62 ) the choice of the firms towards 
the adoption of the new technology. For given values of 61 and 62 a diagram can 
be drawn on the space of union bargaining powers (aI' a 2) which illustrates the 
13Throughout this chapter union power always refers to union bargaining power, as 
described by the parameter of the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution, and never to union 
density. All workers are assumed to be union members in both fIrms. 
14 Although it is diffIcult to think of O'i changing because the parameter is related to the 
relative impatience of the parties involved in wage bargaining if the non-cooperative approach to 
bargaining is accepted. 
15This issue is raised by Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989) and discussed in section 1.6.2. 
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outcome of the innovation game of the first stage (see figure 2.3 for an example). 
2.3. THE MODEL 
This section introduces some additional assumptions needed for the solution 
of the model and describes how the subgame perfect equilibrium for the game is 
obtained. Hence the solution of the model is analysed backwards starting from stage 
3, competition in the product market, and then moving to stage 2 (wage 
determination) and stage 1 (choice of technology). 
§2.3.1 Stage 3. Cournot competition in the product market 
The analysis draws on a number of (simplifying) assumptionsl6: 
AI. The production function for firm i is described by the following expression: 
(2.2) q . = a··L· t t t i=1,2 
where: 
qi = output of firm i, 
Li = quantity of labour employed by firm i 
The parameter ai (the average productivity of the firm) describes the 
technology of the firm. This parameter has a crucial role in the ensuing analysis. 
16 Assumptions Al to A3 ensure the existence of an explicit (linear) solution for the 
In . 3.2 SOIne extensions of the model will be considered, relaxing wages in stage 2. sectIOn 
particular assumptions. 
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A2. Firms produce a totally homogeneous product. 
A3. The demand for the product is assumed to be linear: 
where 
p = price of the product, and A and b are given parameters. 
A4. The technology ai employed by firm i has a cost zi (this assumption will be 
specified more fully later). 
Each firm is faced with the problem of maximising its profits by choosing 
an appropriate quantity, i.e. using Li = ~~, firm i chooses 
t 
(2.4) 
Under Cournot assumptions, first order conditions for profit maximisation for firm 1 
are given by 
(2.5) 
An analogous expression holds for firm 2. 
Therefore, the reaction function of firm 1 is: 
(2.6) 
The reaction function is linear. From the analogous expreSSIOn for firm 2 the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in quantity levels can be derived. In equilibrium, 
(2.7) 
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(2.8) 
See Tirole (1988, ch. 5) for more comments on this very standard result. 
§2.3.2 Stage 2. Wage determination 
Each firm IS assumed to bargain with its local umon over the wage. The 
outcome of wage negotiation is described by the Generalised Nash Bargaining 
Solution as in most of the models of chapter 1. The sequence of moves in the model 
ensures that the solution for the wage lies on the labour demand curve (a "Right-
to-Manage model"). The employment level is implicitly determined in the third 
stage by choosing the quantity to be produced, given the technology in (2.2). 
The union's utility function (2.1) can be rewritten in terms of production 
instead of employment as follows: 
(2.9) 8· 1-8· ( )8. (aql.·)1-8i U i = ( wi - r) t. Li t = wi - r t. 
l 
The Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution determining the wage in firm i 
is solved by choice of Wi as: 
(2.10) max 
w· 
t 
subject to the constraint that the profits of firm i are nonnegative, IIi > 0, 
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where ai is union bargaining power (0 < ai < 1 )17 and values of qi are given by the 
solution to the third stage, (2.7) and (2.8). 
Taking logarithms and labelling the maximand Vi the problem can be 
rewritten as 
m~x Vi = ai· bi . log (wi - r) + ai· (1 - bi ) ·logqi + (1 - ai) ·logqi + I 
(2.11) w· + (1 - ai) ·log(p - a ~ ) + constant 
t 
First order conditions (in the case of firm 1) are given by: 
(2.12) 
This result stems from the fact that p - :: can be rewritten usmg the 
solutions from stage 3 for q1 and q2 as 
(2.13) 1 w 2 wI - -. (A + - - 2· - ) 
- 3 a2 a l 
Rearranging (2.12) and taking into account the non-negativity of profits 
17 The model encompasses the two extreme cases of competitive (non-unionised) labour 
markets, if (l' = 0, and of Monopoly Union, if (l' = l. 
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constraint a solution for the wage in firm 1 can be obtained as follows 
a1 (W2 -1/2) 
= 2 . A + a
2 
-3· (z· b) 
where 
(2.15 ) 
and z is the cost of the technology (see section 2.4.4).18 
If the wage set in the rival firm is below w2 the solution of the wage is set 
so as to ensure that the profit is nonnegative, i.e. ill = 0 for w2 < w2. As a result 
the solution for the wage in firm 1 as a function of w2 has a kink at w2=w2 as 
depicted in figure 2.1(a). 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the unconstrained solution, I.e. 
with positive profits only. The constrained case is analysed in Appendix 2D. 
Equation (2.14) gives the outcome of wage bargaining between firm 1 and 
its local union. The solution depends on the characteristics of the local union in firm 
1 (aI' 61), the type of technology operated by firm 1 (a1), the position of the 
product demand curve (A), the reference wage (r) as well as the wage set by the 
firm and the union in firm 2 and a2, the productivity of firm 2. Therefore equation 
(2.14) can be regarded as a reaction function relating to each value of w2 the level 
18 An analogous expression holds for firm 2. 
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of the wage attained through bargaining III firm 1 according to the Generalised 
N ash Bargaining Solution. 
Figure 2.1 (b) depicts the reaction functions for firm 1 and 2 in the space 
(W I' W 2)· The reaction functions are linear. At w 2 = 0 
(2.16) 
for either a l >0 or r>O. 
It is easily seen from inspection of equation (2.14) that, ceteris paribus, 
a) a more efficient technology adopted by firm 1, 
b) a positive shift in the product demand, and 
c) an increase in the reference wage 
aWl aWl aWl 
shift the reaction function of firm 1 upwards (i.e. aa
l 
>0, aA >0 ,and &>0). 
On the other hand, the adoption of a more productive technology by firm 2 
causes the reaction function of firm 1 to move backwards, ceteris paribus (i.e. 
The comparative statics effects of a change in either umon power (al ) or 
union weight on wage (\) can be derived by means of some algebra. It follows that 
for the relevant range of the parameters. As expected, an increase in either union 
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bargaining power or the weight on the wage in union preferences bring about, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the bargained wage. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the effects of an increase in efficiency in the technology 
operated by firm 1 (an increase in a 1 while firm 2's technology remains unchanged) 
starting from the initial equilibrium Eo. A change in a1 affects both reaction 
functions. As seen before the reaction function for firm 1 is shifted upwards, thereby 
implying, ceteris paribus, a higher level for the wage in firm 1. On the other hand, 
an increase in a 1 reduces the wage obtained by workers in firm 2~ thereby shifting 
the reaction function for firm 2 backwards. The ensuing equilibrium is labelled E1. 
At the new equilibrium the wage in firm 1 which has "innovated" has increased, 
whereas the wage in the rival firm has decreased. 
The solution for the wage determination stage involves finding the Nash 
equilibrium in the Nash Bargaining Solutions derived above for firms 1 and 2. Using 
the same type of reasoning as in the Cournot model (section 2.3.1), the solution for 
the wage in firm 1 is given by 
(2.17) 
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This IS the unconstrained wage solution where both firms gam positive 
Hence the wage in firm i is completely described by the parameters relating 
to the technology (ai)' to unions' power (O'i) and perceived trade-off between wage 
and employment (8 i ) in both firms, to the characteristics of the product demand 
(the intercept A), and to the reference wage (r). 
Two interesting special cases are listed below. 
1. 0'1 = 0 implies WI = r. In this case firm 1 is not confronted by a union and the 
model reverts to the competitive labor market assumptions. 
2. 81 = 0 implies WI = r. In this case the union cares only about employment. As a 
result the wage is squeezed to its minimum attainable level in order to maximise the 
demand for labour. 
Turning agam to the effects of an Increase m efficiency of the technology 
operated by firm 1 equation (2.17) rules out the occurrence of equilibria 
qualitatively different from the one depicted in figure 2.2. If firm 1 only adopts a 
more productive technology (i.e. a1 increases, for given a2), then WI increases while 
w2 decreases. 
19See Appendix 2D for the constrained case. 
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§2.3.3 Stage L Choice of technology 
The choice of the technology the firm will operate in the production process 
constitutes the basic decision made by the firm before competing with other firms 
on the product market and before bargaining with the local union over the wage. 
Each firm chooses its production technology in order to maximise its profits seeing 
through the following stages of the game according to the results depicted above for 
stages 2 and 3. 
A t the beginning each firm is assumed to operate the same technology 
which is labelled ao. Each unit of labour employed by the firm produces ao units of 
output. In order to simplify the analysis it is assumed that the costs for the existing 
technology have already been sunk. Thus, if firm i chooses to operate the technology 
ao, then zi = O. Firms are faced with the choice between the existing technology and 
a new, "superior", i.e. more productive, technology, which enables the firm to 
produce a*= 1" ao units of output for each unit of labour employed (,> 1). On the 
other hand, the new technology does not come free to firms: the cost of adoption is 
labelled z. The cost of adoption, z, is invariant across firm. 
As has been stressed before, this setup fits the case where an innovation is 
exogenously introduced in the market and firms are confronted with the decision 
whether or not to adopt the new technology. The model does not address the 
question of how much firms are willing to spend in R&D activities (or patent races) 
90 
smce the innovation originates completely from outside the firm. The model does 
not prevent both firms from simultaneously innovating as is the case, for instance, 
in the auction model outlined by Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1990) where the firm with 
the highest bid is the only one to get the innovation. 
It is assumed that the choice of the technology is made simultaneously by 
firms 1 and 2. Hence the type of solution arising from this stage of the model is the 
Nash equilibrium of the game where both players (the firms) are endowed with the 
strategies: {Stick to the existing technology, Adopt the new technology}. The aim of 
the model is to analyse to what extent the union characteristics of the firm 
(particularly, union power) determine its adoption policy. 
It can be easily seen that profits, net of innovation costs, for firm i are 
given by the following formula: 
(2.18) 1 ( w j Wi )2 II·=-· A+--2·-
t 9. b aj ai 
Hence the payoff to firm i from operating the technology ai when firm j 
operates the technology aj is given by IIi - cost of innovation, where the cost of 
innovation is equal to either z (if the firm operates the new technology a *) or 0 (if 
the firm operates the existing technology, ao)· 
Therefore, the payoff matrix for the game can be represented as follows, 
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./ 
where ni(ai,a j ) indicates the profits accrumg to firm 1 when it operates the 
technology ai while firm j operates technology aj. 
FIRM 2 Innovation No Innovation 
FIRM 1 
Innovation 
No Innovation 
The following is obtained from the pay-off matrix. 
1. Firm 1 prefers to innovate (in the case that firm 2 innovates) if and only if 
2. Firm 1 prefers to innovate (in the case firm 2 does not innovate) if and only if 
3. Firm 2 prefers to innovate (in the case firm 1 innovates) if and only if 
4. Firm 2 prefers to innovate (in the case firm 1 does not innovate) if and only if 
The expressions <f>k (k=l, .. .4) depend on all the parameters included in the 
wage equation (2.17) (with b, the slope of the demand curve, added) but do not 
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depend on the cost of innovation, z. 
Appendix 2A shows that the following relationships hold (for 1>1): 
- as far as firm 1 is concerned, ~2 > ~1 
- as far as firm 2 is concerned, ~ 4 > ~3 
These conditions simply state that additional profits (net of adoption costs) 
accrumg to the firm from innovating are greater when the rival firm does not 
innovate as well. 
Drawing on these results it is easy to show that the following types of Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies can arise under the conditions on ~ k and z listed below. 
1. Both firms innovate in equilibrium if 
(2.23) ~1 > z (hence ~2 > z) and ~3 > z (hence ~4 > z) 
2. Neither firm innovates if 
(2.24) ~2 < z and ~4 < z 
3. Firm 1 innovates while firm 2 does not if 
(2.25) either ~1 > z (and ~2 > z) and ~3 < z < ~4 
or ~2 > z and z > ~4 (> ~3) 
4. Firm 2 innovates while firm 1 does not if 
(2.26) either ~2 < z and ~ 4 > z 
or ~1 < z < ~2 and ~3 > z (and ~4 > z) 
5. Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies anse, I.e. {I innovates, 2 does not 
innovate} and {I does not innovate, 2 innovates} if 
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(2.27) 
These conditions are employed below to determine which firm (firms) 
innovate, depending on the characteristics (parameters a and b) of the unions they 
face. 
§2. 3.4 The cost of innovation 
The results of the game obviuosly depend on the cost of innovation z (see 
conditions (2.23) to (2.27)) which has been treated so far as a given parameter. This 
kind of approach is obviously not very appealing. The problem arises as to whether 
the cost of innovation can be "endogenised" in some way into the analysis, i.e. 
whether it can be expressed in terms of other parameters of the model. A sensible 
approach can be stated as follows. The cost of innovation might be expressed in 
terms of the maximum price of the new technology a*, z* say, such that both firms 
would adopt the new technology if the labour market were perfectly competitive 
(i.e. without unions)20. The reason this assumption is appealing will become clearer 
in section 2.4. 
If both firms face a competitive labour market in which the cost of labour is 
given by r, the reference or competitive wage, the expression for the profit in firm i 
simplifies from (2.18) to: 
20Note that if the labour market is competitive (i.e. ai 
become identical. 
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0, i =1,2) the two firms 
(2.28) IIc . = _1_. [ A + r . (l _ 1..) ]2 
, 9· b aj ai SInce wI = w 2 = r 
The payoff matrix for the game changes according to the new assumptions. 
For this case Appendix 2B shows that the condition on the cost of innovation, z, for 
a Nash equilibrium where both firms innovate is as follows: 
(2.29) 4 . r . ( ,-1) ( r) z < . A - -9 . b . ao . , ao z* 
assummg A-.L >0 ao . 
If the cost of innovation is just below z* and the labour market IS 
competitive, then both firms will innovate21 . 
Thus the cost of innovation will be represented in terms of its relationship 
with the price z* which is entirely described by the parameters relating to the 
prod uct demand curve (A and b), by the characteristics of the technology (ao and 
,), and by the reference (or competitive) wage (r). It is therefore assumed that the 
cost of innovation, z, faced by the firms can be restated as 
(2.30) z = f3. z* 
Most of the time the analysis will deal with the case f3 < 1, I.e the case 
where both firms would innovate should the labour market be competitive, but 
21rr the cost of innovation is instead set exactly at z*, then three Nash equilibria result. 
Only the case where neither finn innovates does not represent a Nash equilibriUIll. 
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some results also refer to the case where f3 exceeds 1. 
2.4. SOLUTION OF THE MODEL AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
This section describes the solution to the model (full details are contained in 
Appendix 2C) and then provides comments on the results. 
The model has been solved numerically according to the following idea. The 
focus of the analysis is on the effects of union bargaining power in firms 1 and 2 on 
the choice of technology simultaneously made by the two firms. Given the value of 
f3 (i.e. given some assumptions on the cost of the new technology), it is possible to 
determine the areas in the space (aI' ( 2 ) where inequalities (2.23) to (2.27) are 
satisfied, provided values are chosen for all the parameters involved in the model. 
From the knowledge of which inequalities are satisfied for a given pair (aI' ( 2) it is 
then possible to determine the type of solution, i.e. the Nash equilibrium prevailing 
for that combination of union bargaining powers in the two firms. 
As Appendix 2C shows, once the cost of innovation is expressed in terms of 
z* (i.e. in terms of the parameters of the model) conditions (2.23) to (2.27) can be 
rearranged to give quadratic inequalities in either a l or a 2 . The areas where these 
inequalities are satisfied can then be easily drawn in the (all ( 2 ) space. Given 
specific values for the parameters of the model the type of solutions arising as union 
bargaining power in the two firms varies can then be determined by simple 
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inspection on the (0'1' 0'2) diagram. 
According to the method outlined above it is possible to show which of the 
firms will adopt the new technology in the space (0'1' 0'2) of the union bargaining 
parameters for given values of the remaining parameters of the model. 
CASE 1: 61 = 62 . The analysis begins with the case where the relative weights of 
wage and employment in the union's utility function are the same across the two 
firms, I.e. 61 = 62. It is worth noticing that 6i represents the only source of 
asymmetry between the firms in the model apart from union bargaining power. In 
particular, it is assumed as a basic case that 61 = 62 = 1/2. This is known as the 
"rent maximisation" assumption in the literature (Booth (1994, 90)). Figure 2.3 
depicts the solution of the model when the remaining parameters take the following 
values: 
(2.31 ) I = 2, ao = 1, A = 10, b = 1, r = 1, and f3 = 0.8 
Hence the new technology is twice as productive as the original one and its 
price is 20 % cheaper than the maximum price that would allow the firms to adopt 
the technology in a competitive labour market. 
It IS important to stress that the results presented below are robust to 
changes in the values of the parameters III (2.31) that have been chosen only for 
convenience in computations. 
For each pair (0'1' 0'2) of the union bargaining powers figure 2.3 tells which 
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firm/s will be able to adopt the new technology. According to the conditions on cf>k 
and z given above in ((2.23) - (2.27», there are five types of Nash equilibria (the 
functions cf>k = z, k = 1, . .4 , are drawn in the figure). As expected the solution is 
symmetric, i.e. if both firms innovate (or neither does it) for (Q'l' Q'2) = (x"', y*), the 
same outcome arises for (Q'1' Q'2) = (y*, x*). If instead one firm only adopts the 
innovation for the pair (Q'1' 0:(2) = (x*, y*), then only the rival firm will get the new 
technology when (0:'1' 0:(2) = (y*, x*), and vice versa. 
The following properties of the results can be defined. 
PROPERTY 1: When 0:'1 and 0:'2 are relatively high in both firms, neither 
innovates. On the other hand, if there is a discrepancy between the bargaining powers of 
the two unions, the firm faced with the less powerful union is more likely to be the only 
one to adopt the new technology. Finally, if union bargaining powers are not very high 
and not widely spread across firms, then both firms innovate. This result is illustrated 
by figure 2.3. 
PROPERTY 2: The analysis in Tauman and Weiss (1987P2 represents a very 
special case of this model. Tauman and Weiss assume that only one firm is unionised 
and that the wage in this firm is set according to the Monopoly Union model. Hence 
the solution to their model can be checked by inspecting the outcomes in the top 
left hand corner, where (0:'1' 0:(2) = (1,0), or in the bottom right hand corner, where 
(0:'1' Q'2) = (0,1), according to whether firm 1 or firm 2 is unionised. The analysis of 
22See section 1.6.1. 
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this section will show that a Nash equilibrium where only the unionised firm adopts 
the new technology cannot be supported by the model as is expected from the work 
of Tauman and Weiss. 
PROPERTY 3: As the concern over the wage increases In both Unions, the 
region in the space (aI' ( 2) where both firms innovate shrinks, while the region where 
neither firm adopts the technology becomes larger. Figure 2.4 shows the solution of the 
model in the symmetric case where the weight on the wage (15 1 = 152 ) takes the value 
3/4, i.e. both unions are more sensitive to the wage with respect to the basic case 
(where 15 = 1/2). This result is reinforced if the limit case is taken where both 
unions care only about the wage irrespective of the employment level (15 1 = 152 = 1). 
On the other hand, the opposite outcome is obtained when 151 and 152 are allowed to 
decrease. Given the set of parameter values in (2.31) it is possible to show that if 
the unions care almost only about employment levels, i.e. for low values of 151 and 
152 (less than 0.1 approximately), both firms will innovate for every pair (cx 1 , cx2 ). 
This outcome is not surprising because as 15 gets close to 0 for both unions the model 
tends to revert to the competitive labour market case, where both firms would 
adopt at the price. 
An interesting feature of the model relates to the comparIson between 
unionised and competitive labour markets. PROPERTY 4: Situations exist in which 
an innovation would be adopted in a unionised labour market, whereas, at the same price 
of the new technology, no firm would innovate in a competitive labour market. This 
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case is depicted in figure 2.5, where 81 = 82 = 1/2 and f3 = 1.06, so that the price 
of the new technology is z = f3. z* = 1.06x2 = 2.12 (see Appendix 2B). It is easily 
seen from Appendix 2B that at this price of the new technology, i.e at this value of 
f3, no firm would innovate in a competitive labour market (no firm would innovate 
for a price greater than 19/9 given the parameter values in this example). 
Figure 2.5 shows that as umon bargaining powers become very spread 
across the two firms, l.e. when G'1 gets very large while G'2 stays low or vIce versa, 
the firm facing the less powerful umon will adopt the new technology. For the 
remammg values of G'1 and G'2 neither firm innovates. This result coupled with the 
prevlOus analysis confirms that umon bargaining power has a negative impact on 
the innovation decision of the firm VIa a loss m profitability (through the higher 
wages the umon can achieve m case of innovation) and the Grout mechanism 
(outlined in section 1.3). This effect is stronger the more the union is concerned with 
the wage rather than the employment level (see the limit cases where 81=82=1 and 
CASE 2: 81 f= 82, It is now assumed that the values of the weights on the wage 
and the employment in the union's utility function as well as the union bargaining 
power can differ across firms. Figure 2.6 depicts the results of the model for the case 
where 81 = 0.7 and 82 = 0.25. The remaining parameter values are as in figure 2.3 
(see (2.31)). As expected, firm 1 which is faced with the union more concerned 
with the wage, is now penalised in the adoption decision (with respect to the base 
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case, i.e. figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.6 introduces a new feature with respect to the case where 8
1 
=8
2
, 
In the previous analysis there was no evidence of a firm being the only one to 
innovate while faced with the more powerful union. Hence in the case where Ct· > Ct . 
t J 
either both firms would innovate (or none) or only firm j would do so. This result 
does not hold if the values of 8i vary across firms. In the shaded area in figure 2.6 
Ct2>Ct1 but only firm 2 buys the new technology. The result is made clearer in 
figure 2.7 where 81 = 1 and 82 = O. Again in the shaded area Ct2 > Ct1 but firm 2 
only innovates. Hence a new result can be defined. PROPERTY 5: A firm can be the 
only one to adopt the new technology, even if faced with the more powerful unton, 
provided this unton is more concerned about employment than the unton In the rival 
firm. As seen above the concern for employment makes the union less prone to rent-
seeking activities and benefits the innovation performance of the firm. 
The results so far show that an increase in bargaining power of union i has 
either no impact on the choice of the technology of firm i (the equilibrium stays in 
the same region) or a negative effect which means that above a critical level Cti the 
firm is prevented from innovating. PROPERTY 6: There is no evidence for the 
argument suggested by Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989) that an increase in unton power 
might allow a firm to adopt a technology it would have not adopted for lower levels of 
the paramete,23. Given the power of the "rival" union an increase in union 
23See section 1.6.2. 
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bargaining power IS most of the time likely to damage the innovation performance 
of the firm. 
The final step is to analyse what happens to the solution when the values of 
the non-union parameters of the model are changed, i.e. when the "environment" 
changes. This amounts to comparing the decision on innovation made by the firms 
in a situation where product demand is high as opposed to the situation where 
demand is low, or to comparing a situation where the new technology is very 
superior to the existing one as opposed to the case where the difference is small, and 
so on. Throughout this analysis the reference solution is given by figure 2.3 and 
parameter values are changed one at each time. The price of innovation is always 
the same as in figure 2.3 and so are 81 and 82 (= 1/2). 
The case where demand IS higher than in figure 2.3 is taken into account 
first. The parameter A has now a value of 20 instead of 10. Figure 2.8 shows that 
for gIven values of (aI' a 2) a situation of high demand has a positive impact on 
innovation. In particular the regIOn where both firms innovate becomes definitely 
bigger. 
If the competitive or reference wage, r, is increased, the direction of change 
is the same as in the case of an increase in demand. This may reflect, for instance, 
an mcrease of the minimum wage or, more generally, an increase of the reference 
wage in the negotiation. The same result arises if " which gives the ratio between 
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the productivities of the new technology and the existing one, goes up. This is not 
surprising since the firm can now get a greater productivity increase while paying 
the same price for the technology. Finally a result of the type outlined in figure 2.8 
is also ensured by a decrease in b, the slope of the demand curve. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter a model of technology adoption m the presence of an 
oligopostic product market and trade UnIons has been presented. Firms have been 
allowed to differ only with respect to their UnIon characteristics. The new 
technology has been assumed to be more productive and labour saving with respect 
to the existing one as well as exogenously available in the market at a given price. 
The main results of the analysis can be summarised as follows. 
1. Ceteris paribus'24 , both firms adopt the new technology if both UnIons are 
"relatively weak". If both UnIons are instead "relatively strong", neither firm 
innovates. If only one firm innovates it is the firm faced by the less powerful union. 
Hence the "rent-seeking mechanism" suggested by Grout (1984) seems very 
effective. The analysis III Tauman and Weiss (1987) also turns out to be a special 
case of the model. 
24For a given price of the new technology and if both unions have the same relative 
concern over wage and employment, i.e. when finns differ only with respect to union bargaining 
power. 
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2. The firm faced by the most powerful union can be the only one to innovate if and 
only if its union is more concerned about employment than the union faced by the 
rival firm. In general, environments where unions care more about employment than 
the wage are more conducive to innovation. 
3. There are cases (i.e. pnces of the new technology) such that one firm would 
innovate m a unionised labour market, while no firm would innovate III a 
competitive (without unions and wage bargaining) labour market. 
4. There is no evidence for the argument suggested by Ulph and Ulph (1988, 1989) 
that an mcrease m umon power might lead a firm to adopt a new technology it 
would have not adopted with a weaker union. Given the power of the rival union, 
an mcrease m umon bargaining power does not Improve the firm's innovation 
ability. 
The Issue of the robustness of the results to extensions and changes in the 
functional forms will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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FIGURE 2.1( a) 
REACTION FUNCTION FOR FIRM 1 
i 
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FIGURE 2.1(b) 
REACTIONS FUNCTIONS IN THE WAGE SPACE 
/ 
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/ 
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FIGURE 2.2 
COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR A CHANGE IN THE TECHNOLOGY 
OPERA TED BY FIRM 1 
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Eo = initial equilibrium 
El = final equilibrium 
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FIGURE 2.5 
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APPENDIX 2A 
According to the notation introduced in subsection 2.3.3 
(2A.1) <1>1 and 
(2A.2) 
Using the solution for the profit net of innovation cost (see (2.18)) in (2A.1) and 
(2A.2) yields 
(2A.3) 
(2AA) 
firm i and j when the technologies adopted by the two firms are ai and aj 
respectively. 
The solution for the wage turned out to be quite cunbersome (see (2.17)). 
Computation is somewhat eased by the following notation. Let 
(2A.5) 
(2A.6) B 0 = 0'.0 • b 0 • [2 . (2 - 0'. 0) + 0'. .• b oJ t t t J J J 
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(2A.7) 
(2A.8) D· = 2· a·' 8·· [2 - a .' (1 + 8.)J 
ttl J J 
refer to the union characteristics of the two firms. Drawing on this notation the 
solutions for wI and w2 can be entered in <1'>1 and <1'>2 to give 
1>1 = 9\ -{{A + a*\ -[B2-a* -A + (C2 +D2) -r]- a*~K -[B1-a*-A + (C1 + 
+Dl )· rJ}2 - {A + } K' [B2 · a*· A + (C 2 +D2 · ~*). r] - 2 K' [Bl . ao ' A + (Cl + a . 0 ao ' 
(2A.9) 
This expression can be rearranged as follows (using also the definition a* = 
r·(l- ,)·(D - 2·C l ) { ( 
<1'>1 = 2 22 2 • r· (1 + ,) . (D2 - 2· Cl ) + 2· A·" ao ' K + B2 + 9·b·K·, ·ao 
- 2· B l ) + 2· (C 2 - 2· D l )· r} 
(2A.10) 
Rearranging the expression for <1>2 in the same way yields 
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(2A.ll) 
The only difference between ~1 and ~2 is in the third term inside brackets 
(the expression for ~2 has a I added). From (2A.7) and (2A.8) C2-2· Dl can be 
rearranged to give 
(2A.12) 
Hence C2 - 2 . Dl is always positive apart from the case where 0:'1 = 0:'2 = 61 
= 82 = 1 when it takes a value of O. It then follows from I > 1 that ~2 > ~1' By 
symmetry it follows that ~4>~3' 
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APPENDIX 2B 
In a competitive labour market, i.e. with no umons bargaining o,,:er the 
wage, wI = w2 = r. The solution for the profit of firm i (equation (2.18)j<:an thus 
be rearranged to give 
As a result the payoff matrix of the innovation game can be written as 
FIRM 2 Innovation No Innovation 
FIRM 1 
Innovation u,u T, ¢ 
No Innovation </;, T 
where 
u - _1_. ( A __ r _ )2 - z 
- 9.b ,·ao 
T - _1_. [ A + L... (1 _ 2 )]2 - z 
-9.b ao , 
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<P = 9 ~ b 0 [ A + io 0 (~ - 2)f 
1/J = _1_ 0 ( A _ l )2 gob ao 
The following conditions guarantee a unique Nash equilibrium at {Innovate, 
Innovate }: 
(a1) (J > <p 
(a2) T > 'Ij; 
Assuming A > i ,condition (a1) implies 
o 
Condition (a2) implies 
4 o r o (,-1) 
9obo,oao 
(A - _r_) > z 
aoo , 
Since , > 1, a
o
r
o, < io 0 As a result condition (a1) on the cost of 
innovating ensures that there IS a umque Nash equilibrium where both firms 
innovateo 
If the cost of innovation IS 
4 o r o (, - 1) 
9obo,oao 
(A - i) - z*, 
o 
then (J ¢o 
Under this assumption it is easily checked that three Nash equilibria exist in pure 
strategies (ioeo only the case where both firms do not innovate is not a Nash 
equilibrium) 0 
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APPENDIX 2C 
It is possible to show by means of some algebra that the condition (see 
(2.19)) 
where z = (3. z * = (3. 4· r . ( ,-1) . (A _ l) 9·b·,·ao ao 
can be rearranged to give the following inequality, quadratic in a 1 for given values 
of all the other parameters in the model, including a 2 : 
(2C.l ) (N· R + G· Z)· a/ + (G· V - F· Z - N· Q). a 1 + (N· P - F· V) < 0 
where 
N = 4· (3 . (A . ao - r) . , 
and 
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Z = r· (1 + ,) . G - 2· A·,. ao· I - 2· M . r 
where 
Inequality (2C.1) can be used to determine the areas in the space (01' ( 2 ) 
where the condition <1>1 > z is satisfied. The same type of analysis can be applied 
to the condition <1>2 > z (the results are not presented here). Conditions <1>3 > z 
and <I> 4 > Z are then derived by symmetry. 
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APPENDIX 2D 
The wage reaction function of firm I IS gIven by the following expression 
(see (2.14)): 
technology operated by firm 1. 
On the other hand, the profit (net of adoption costs) of firm 1 is given by 
(see (2.18)): 
1 ( w2 wI )2 III = -. A + --2·-9· b a2 a l 
If firm 1 adopts the new technology, a *, the profits are reduced by the cost 
of the technology, i.e. z. 
Analogous expressions can be derived for firm 2 by symmetry. 
From the definition of the profit it IS immediate to see that if no firm 
adopts the new technology, and hence z=O, profits are always nonnegative. 
Therefore, the outcome of wage determination in stage 2 is given by the 
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unconstrained solution (equation (2.17)). A firm can be constrained on the profit 
side only if it adopts the new technology thereby incurring the cost z (z > 0). 
If both firms are constrained in equilibrium, I.e. III 
solution for the wage is given as follows: 
WI = al .{A -3· (z. b)-1/2} 
w 2 = a2 '{A -3· (z. b)-1/2} 
with a l = a 2 = a* (i.e. both innovate). 
(2D.1) 
If firm 1, say~ is constrained in equilibrium but not firm 2, i.e. III = 0 but 
II2 > 0, the solutions for the wage are given by the following expressions: 
and 
(2D.2) 
and firm 1 only is adopting the technology in this case. 
Symmetric results are valid if firm 2 only is constrained. 
A couple of numerical examples are now provided. It is assumed to start 
that the parameter values are given in (2.31) and that 81= 82 = .75. It is also 
assumed that both firms have adopted the new technology. Figure 2D.1(a) shows 
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the region in the ((Xl '(X2) space where firm 1 only is constrained (the area is labelled 
A). Therefore the wage outcome is given by (2D.2) above. In region C firm 2 only is 
constrained and a solution symmetric to (2D.2) applies. Finally, in the remaining 
area, profits are positive for both firms and the unconstrained solution applies. 
Figure 2D.1 (b) applies to the case where firm 1 only has adopted the new 
technology. In region A the outcome of wage determination is given by (2D.2). In 
the remanining area the solution for the wage is the unconstrained one. 
Figure 2D.2 refers to the case where both unions are concerned only with 
the wage (61= 62 = 1) and both firms have adopted the new technology, remaining 
parameters being the same as above. In region D both firms are constrained on the 
profit side (lll=ll2=O) and the wage is given by equations (2D.l). As a consequence, 
for high values of union bargaining power ((X > .858) the wage is not responsive to 
increases in union power. In region A firm 1 only is contrained, while in region B 
firm 2 only is constrained. In the remaining area the unconstrained solution applies. 
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FI G URE 2.D 1 (b) 
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FIGURE 2.D2 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNIONS AND THE ADOPTION OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY 
EXTENSIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter elaborates on the analysis of the effects of unIOns on 
innovation and investment by considering two extensions of the model presented in 
chapter 2. Firstly, the adoption model of the previous chapter is modified and 
extended by considering a concave production function as well as by allowing for 
implicit collusion among firms m the product market (section 3.2). The latter 
extension IS based on the "conjectural variations" approach. Secondly, the discrete 
choice scenano of the adoption game is abandoned and firms are now assumed to 
choose the quantity of capital, i.e. a continuous variable (section 3.3). 
The main purpose of these extensions is to establish whether the findings of 
the basic model of chapter 2 are robust to changes in the assumptions. The effect of 
collusion in the product market on bargained wages is an issue of interest per se (see 
sub-section 3.2.2). As a consequence of the removal of the assumption of linearity of 
the production function, the model turns out to be less tractable with respect to 
chapter 2, smce explicit solutions for the wages in the second stage cannot be 
obtained. As a result only numerical solutions will be used in the analysis of section 
3.2. The results presented below, though, have been shown to be robust to changes 
in the parameter values used. 
As far as section 3.3 is concerned, the analysis of the continuous capital case 
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IS particularly meant to determine the extent to which the results of the discrete 
choice model survive in this more general setting. As expected, the model IS 
computationally rather complicated and agaIn only numerical solutions are 
provided. It IS important to stress that, unlike the results in chapter 2 and section 
3.2, no claim to generality can be made for the results presented in section 3.3. 
3.2 A MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: EXTENSIONS 
The aim of this section is to extend the model presented in chapter 2. Two 
extensions are considered. The assumption of linearity of the production function 
(see (2.2)) is removed and a concave production function is now adopted. Collusion 
among firms in the product market is also analysedl . As a consequence, the analysis 
of this section will focus first on the determination of the extent to which the 
outcomes of the model presented In chapter 2 are robust to the change In the 
specification of the production function, while maintaining the assumption of 
Cournot competition in the product market (sub-section 3.2.1). Secondly, some 
analysis will be devoted to assessing the effect of collusion in the product market on 
the wage outcomes in the two firms (see sub-section 3.2.2). Finally, the effect of 
product market collusion on the choice of the technology will be analysed (sub-
section 3.2.3). 
lIt should be noticed that collusion cannot be properly analysed usmg the linear 
production function of chapter 2 (see (2.2)) since the resulting marginal costs are constant. 
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§3.2.1 Effects of a change in the production function 
The production function of firm i is now assumed to be: 
(3.1) i = 1,2 
where the notation is the same as in chapter 2 and, the technology of firm i is again 
entirely described by the parameter ai. 
The demand for the product is as in equation (2.3): 
The introduction of implicit collusion among firms into the analysis follows 
the "conjectural variations" approach (see Clarke-Davies (1982)). A generalisation 
of the Cournot case discussed in the previous chapter is therefore provided (see also 
Waterson (1984)). 
Let the conjecture of firm i concerning the reaction of the rival firm, j, to 
changes in its output be described by: 
(3.3) where 
The same holds symmetrically as far as the conjectures of firm j are concerned. 
It is easily recognised that when ¢ = 0 the Cournot assumption used in 
chapter 2 is obtained. On the other hand, when <f; = 1 (3.3) amounts to assuming 
perfect collusion between the two firms, i.e. joint profit maximisation, since firm i 
(j) believes that firm j (i) will react to changes in output so as to keep its market 
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share constant. Values of the parameter ¢ in the range between 0 and 1 "represent 
the degree of implicit collusion inherent in the market: lower values of ¢ imply that 
firm i believes that there is some scope for improving its market share; i.e. that 
rivals will not react by as much proportionately. So as ¢ tends to 0, we tend to the 
Cournot case, while perfect collusion is approached as ¢ tends to I" (Clarke-Davies 
(1982, 279))2. 
Drawing on the assumptions concerning the production function (3.1), the 
demand function (3.2) and the conjectural variations (3.3), it is straightforward to 
show that the equilibrium quantities in the product market, i.e. the outcome of the 
third stage of the game, are 
(3.4) 
w2 b.(1-¢)+2· a2 
ql = A· w w 
4(b + a: ) . (b + a~) - b2 . (1 + ¢)2 
(3.5) 
b.(l- ¢) + 2.:1 
1 
q2=A· -4(-b-+~W~I-)-.-(b-+~W~2-)-_-b2~.-(-1-+-¢-)-2 
a 1 a 2 
The Cournot outcomes obtain when ¢ = o. 
The outcome of wage bargaining in firm 1 involves the choice of wI so that 
(assuming profits are positive at the solution): 
(3.6) 
2In Clarke and Davies (1982) the degree of collusion is not denoted by 4>. Hence some 
liberty has been taken with the quotation. 
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Taking logarithms and noticing that, from (3.1), LI = ~I , the solution of 
1 
wage bargaining in firm 1 chooses wI to maximise 
(3.7) 
which can be rearranged as follows 
VI=aI ·8I . log (wI - r) - 2·(1- a I ·8I)·log{4.(b + :; ).(b + :;) - b2 .(1 + ¢)2} 
+ + (1- aI)·log {b.(l + ¢)·[b·(l- ¢) + :;] + 2· :;.(b + 
:;) } + C 
(3.8) 
term independent from wI) 
by noticing that from the solutions of product market competition (3.4) and (3.5) 
(3.9) 
WI w2 WI WI b . (1 + ¢) . [b . (1 - ¢) + ~] + 2 . a 2 . (b + ~) p - a--·qI = A· wI W2 2 2 1 4. (b + ~ ) . (b + ~) - b . (1 + ¢) 
First order conditions for the maximisation therefore are: 
(3.10) 
+ b. (1 + ¢) . [b. (1 - ¢) + :1] + 2. :2. (b + :1) 
1 2 1 
=0 
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A symmetric expreSSIOn holds for firm 2. Equation (3.10) gIves (in an 
implicit form) the wage reaction function of firm 1. Because of the assumption of 
concavity of the production function (see (3.1)) the wage reaction functions are no 
longer linear in the wage of the rival firm as was the case in the basic model of 
chapter 2. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the reaction functions of firms 1 and 2 in the space (wI' 
w2) when firms are identical. The outcome of the wage determination stage IS 
denoted by E. As pointed out above the concavity of the reaction function stems 
from the assumptions on the production function3 . 
§3.2.2 Collusion in the product market and wage outcomes 
Before movmg to the analysis of technology choice in the extended model 
some results are presented concerning the effect of implicit collusion in the product 
market on the outcomes of wage bargaining (the second stage of the game). In order 
to make the analysis more manageable, firms are assumed to be identical. Therefore 
the UnIons m firms 1 and 2 have the same bargaining power as well as the same 
trade-off between wage and employment4 . Hence a 1 = a 2 (= a) and 81 = 82 (= 8). 
3Unreported numerical results show that the wage reaction function (3.10) is shifted 
downwards, ceteris paribus, as the degree of implicit collusion among fIrms (the parameter 4» 
Increases. 
4 As pointed out III chapter 2, fIrms may differ only with respect to their Uillon 
characteristics. 
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Symmetry also implies that the two firms operate the same technology, i.e. a
1 
= a
2 
(= a)5. Furthermore, the following assumptions are made about the numerical 
values of the parameter involved in the model: 
(3.11) b = 1, r = 1, 8 = 1/2 , a = 2 
It is important to note that unlike the basic model of chapter 2 the position 
of the demand curve, i.e. the parameter A, has no role in the determination of the 
wage. 
The numerical values III (3.11) are chosen in order to keep the analysis as 
close as possible to the basic case described in the previous chapter (see the set of 
parameters defined in (2.31)). It is assumed that both firms operate with what was 
defined as the new technology in chapter 2, i.e. that a = 2. The results presented 
below concermng the effect of collusion m the product market on wage outcomes 
refer to the specific set of parameter values in (3.11). But the qualitative description 
of the relationship between implicit collusion and wage outcomes which emerges 
from the numerical example is general and not restricted in any way by the specific 
choice of the parameter values. The same is also true as far as the analysis of 
technology adoption in subsection 3.2.3 is concerned. 
Figures 3.2(a) to 3.2(d) depict the solution to wage bargaining as a function 
of the degree of implicit collusion in the product market, q;, for alternative values of 
5 As was the case in chapter 2, the reservation (or alternative) wage, r, is assumed to be 
invariant across firms. 
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the umon bargaining parameter (0'). The parameter 0', the same for both umons, 
ranges from 1/4 (in figure 3.2(a)) to 1 (in figure 3.2(d)), the case where 0' 0 
gIvmg the competitive solution for the wage, i.e. w = r (hence w = 1 in this case, 
according to the assumptions in (3.11)). The equilibrium wage is the same for both 
firms according to the assumption of symmetry introduced above. An increase in the 
degree of (implicit) collusion among firms, i.e. an increase in ¢;, is associated with a 
lower level of the wage bargained over in the two firms, ceteris paribus (in particular 
for a given union bargaining power)6. For any given level of the wage, collusion 
tends to restrict output and, therefore, employment. In the light of this outcome, 
unions reduce their demands during wage bargaining. 
§3.2.3 The choice of technology in the extended model 
This section IS devoted to the analysis of the adoption decision in the 
extended model. The removal of the assumption of linearity of the production 
function implies that it is no longer possible to explicitly determine the equations of 
the regions in the space (0'1' 0'2) of the union bargaining powers where the different 
Nash equilibria apply according to the technique detailed in the basic model (see 
section 2.4). As a result the outcome of the technology adoption game must be 
evaluated separately for every pair (0'1' 0'2) of interest. 
To begin with it IS worthwhile assessmg whether the removal of the 
6See footnote 3. 
135 
linearity assumption for the production function alone makes any relevant change in 
the qualitative nature of the results in chapter 2. To this purpose it is assumed that: 
- the production function is given by (3.1), 
- there is no collusion in the product market between the two firms (i.e. q)=0) as 
was assumed in the basic model of chapter 2, 
- the numerical values of the parameters are the following: 
(3.12) ao = 1, I = 2, 61 = 62 = 1/2, b = 1, A = 10, r = 1 
It is also assumed that the price of the new technology is z = 27. Hence the model is 
very close to what has been labelled the basic case in the previous chapter (see 
assumptions in (2.31) and figure 2.3). Figure 3.3 depicts the results of the 
innovation decision in the two firms for the set of parameter values in (3.12). It is 
easily noticed that the qualitative nature of the results presented III section 2.4 IS 
not changed when the assumption of linearity of the production function is removed 
in favour of a concave production function. Also the remaining results of the basic 
model carryover in this different setup. 
It IS now interesting to compare the outcomes of the innovation decision 
shown III figure 3.3, where it is assumed that q) 0, with the case where the two 
firms perfectly collude in the product market, i.e. q) = 1. The analysis of the effect 
of the degree of collusion in the product market on the outcomes of wage bargaining 
7 Using the same method as in Appendix 2B it is possible to show that the maximum 
price of the new technology at which both firms innovate in a competitive labour market (i.e.with 
no unions) given the parameter values in (3.12) is z = 3.15 .. Using the notation of the basic model 
(see subsection 2.3.4) this amounts to assuming that {3 = .635. 
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(see the comments on figures 3.2) revealed that a higher degree of collusion IS 
associated with lower equilibrium levels of the wages. As a consequence, the 
existence of collusion in the product market erodes the ability of the Unions to 
extract rents m the wage bargaining process. Hence, in the presence of perfect 
collusion in the product market, the threat of opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
the union when a firm makes a decision on the adoption of a new, "superior" 
technology is not as effective as in the no-collusion Cournot assumptions. For 
instance for the parameter values in (3.12) and ¢ = 1, both firms always adopt the 
new technology whatever the extent of union bargaining power in the two firms. 
This result should be compared with the outcomes in figure 3.3 which is relative to 
the complete absence of collusion. 
The argument can also be reasserted by picking a higher pnce for the 
technology. Let z = 2.5, instead of 2. Figure 3.4 compares the equilibrium solutions 
when ¢ = 0 (part a) and when ¢ = 1 (part b). It is easily seen that the area where 
both firms innovate expands moving from the Cournot assumptions to perfect 
collusion. 
3.3 A MODEL OF CAPITAL CHOICE 
In the model of adoption of a new technology presented in chapter 2 firms 
are faced by a discrete choice. They can either innovate and buy the new technology 
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or stick to the existing technology. In this section the assumption of discrete choice 
is relaxed. In the first stage of the model firms are now assumed to choose the 
quantity of capital, a continuous variable, in order to maximise profits. The solution 
of this stage IS again given by a Nash equilibrium. Assumptions about the second 
and the third stage (wage determination and competition m the product market, 
respectively) are unchanged. 
The analysis of the continuous capital case turns out to be computationally 
rather cumbersome. As a consequence this section concentrates on some numerical 
results for the model. As will be clearer below the findings of the basic discrete 
choice model (and its extensions) are confirmed by the continuous capital case. 
The following assumptions are made about the product demand and the 
production function. Product demand is linear as throughout the rest of the analysis 
(see (3.2)). 
(3.13) 
As in section 3.2 the production function is 
2 
hence L. - qi 
t - K. 
t 
where Ki , the quantity of capital chosen by firm i, simply replaces ai' the 
productivity of the technology. This specific functional form is chosen for 
computational ease. 
The per unit cost of capital is given by q and it is the same for both firms. 
The outcome of the third stage, I.e. Cournot competition III the product 
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market, is 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
This is the same result obtained in the previous section (see (3.4) and (3.5)) 
with ai' the productivity of the techology operated by firm i, being now replaced by 
K/. The comments made above on this result equally apply. 
The outcome of wage determination (stage 2) is obtained by computing the 
Nash equilibrium in the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solutions. The following first 
order conditions for the problem are obtained: 
(3.16) =0 firm 1 
(3.17) =0 firm 2 
8 And assuming that there is no collusion in the product market, i.e. 4>=0. The same 
remark applies to equations (3.16) and (3.17) below. 
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Again these are the same first order conditions obtained above in the 
extension of the discrete choice model with ai being replaced by Ki (i = 1, 2). 
The first stage of the model has the two firms maximising profits by 
choosing the quantity of capital. Hence the problem of firm 1 can be written as 
from (3.14)-(3.15) 
(3.18) 
subject to the outcomes of wage bargaining (equations (3.16) and (3.17)). 
An analogous problem is solved by firm 2. 
The rest of this section decribes some numerical results obtained with this 
model. Some details on the technical aspects of the solution are given in Appendix 
3. 
The case III which the two firms are identical is considered first, i.e. the 
union bargaining power (parameter a) and the weights on wage and employment in 
the union utility function (parameter 8) are the same in both firms. Table 3.1 
presents the results obtained for the symmetric case where 81 = 82 = 1/2 as union 
bargaining power varies. It is also assumed that the following values are taken by 
the remaining parameters of the model: 
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(3.19) A = 5, b = 1, q = 1, r = 1 
Assumptions in (3.19) are maintained throughout the rest of this section. 
Table 3.1 shows that as umon bargaining power Increases (in both firms 
simultaneously according to the assumption of symmetry), mOVIng from the 
competitive solution, 0: = 0, to the Monopoly Union case, 0: 1, the equilibrium 
wage goes up while the optimal quantity of capital shrinks. These are the results 
expected from the analysis of the discrete choice of innovation conducted in chapter 
2. Table 3.1 also shows that as union bargaining power increases employment and 
output decrease, while the product price increases. It can be seen that the response 
of employment and capital decisions to an increase in umon bargaining power IS 
such that the capital-labour ratio increases as 0: increases. This outcome does not 
confirm therefore the results in Moene (1990)9. Moene suggests that his results stand 
as a criticism of the "common sense" VIew according to which increases in union 
power tend to bias the choice of techniques in a capital-intensive direction. The 
results In table 3.1 show instead that in the model presented above the techniques 
operated In equilibrium by the two firms become more capital intensive as umon 
power Increases. 
Finally, table 3.1 shows that, as expected, profits decrease when umon 
power increases and union's utility grows with 0:. 
9Moene's analysis refers to a single firm setting. See section 1.4 for a discussion of 
Moene's results. 
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Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the equilibrium outcomes of the model for the 
cases where the unions are more concerned with employment (namely, 8 = 2/5) and 
for the case where unions are more concerned with the wage (namely, 8 = 3/5) 
respectively. The assumption of symmetry across firms is maintained. It is easily 
seen that the qualitative nature of the results is the same as for table 3.1 10. Thus 
the comments made above still apply. 
The combination of the results In tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 provides some 
information on the effects of alternative umon objectives, l.e. different weights on 
wage and employment In the utility function, on the equilibrium outcomes for a 
given value of union bargaining power in the two firms. First, as union concern over 
the wage increases (from 8 = 2/5 to 8 = 3/5) the bargained wage increases and the 
optimal capital quantity decreases. These results hold whatever the value of the 
union bargaining power parameter a. Hence the predictions of the model of discrete 
choice of technology (see section (2.4)) are confirmed. It is also easily seen that, as 8 
Increases, the equilibrium levels of employment, output and profits decline. The 
output fall determines an increase in the equilibrium product prIce. On the other 
hand, as 8 Increases the optimal capital-labour ratio increases. Hence for a gIven 
umon bargaining power more capital intensive techniques are associated with 
environments where unions are more concerned with the wage. 
lOThe only difference is that uruon utility is decreasing as union bargaining power 
increases for high values of 0' (0'>.8 approximately) when the unions are more concerned wjth the 
wage (8=3/5, see table 3.3). 
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The final part of this section refers to the case where the two firms are not 
identical. The following two cases are studied. 
1. To start union bargaining power is assumed to be the same, but firms differ with 
respect to the relative concern over wages and employment of the unions they face. 
The result for this case are given in table 3.4 where it is assumed that 81 = 1/2 and 
82 = 2/5. The table shows the equilibrium outcomes as union bargaining power 
(same in both firms) varies. As expected the wage is higher in firm 1 which 
confronts the union relatively more concerned with the wage. On the other hand, 
the quantity of capital, as well as employment and thus output, is higher in firm 2. 
The capital-labour ratio is also higher in firm 2 and the same is true for profits and 
unions' utilitiesll . 
2. It IS now assumed that the weights on wage and employment are the same for 
both unions but that union bargaining power is allowed to vary in one of the firms 
holding constant the value of Q' in the other. More specifically, Q'1 is allowed to vary 
while Q'2 = 1/2 and 81 = 82 =1/2. Table 3.5 presents the results for this case. An 
increase in union bargaining power in firm 1 brings about an increase in the wage in 
the same firm and a decrease in the capital quantity associated with a decrease in 
employment (and hence of output) and profits. It is interesting to note that in this 
case the capital-labour ratio in firm 1 decreases as Q'1 increases according to the 
result suggested in Moene (1990), but not uniformly, since for high values of Q'1 a 
llThese results hold irrespective of the value of Q. 
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further mcrease m umon bargaining power causes K11L1 to grow (see the change 
from 0:'1 = .9 to 0:'1 1). Above it was pointed out that simultaneous changes in 
umon bargaining power in both firms result instead in an increase of the capital 
intensity of the techniques operated in equilibrium by the firms (see table 3.1 where 
81 = 82 = 1/2 as in table 3.5). 
The following remarks can be made as far as firm 2, whose bargaining 
power is held constant, is concerned. The bargained wage increases as 0:'1 increases 
and the same is true for the equilibrium capital quantity. Employment in firm 2 is 
increasing in 0:'1 unless 0:'1 becomes very high. Output is uniformly increasing as well 
as the capital-labour ratio. Finally profits increase for values of 0:'1 below .6 
approximately. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the model of technology adoption described in chapter 2 are 
robust to the changes and extensions considered in this chapter. Firstly, the use of a 
concave production function does not bring about any major modification in the 
results. 
Collusion among firms in the product market is then analysed. The results 
show that the existence of collusion facilitates, ceteris paribus, the adoption of the 
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new technology. This result stems from the fact that the bargained wages decline 
with the degree of implicit collusion in the market, thereby making the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the unions less harmful to firms. The effect 
of collusion on wages is a noticeable result on its own. 
Finally, the mam results of the basic model of chapter 2 seem to be 
preserved when firms are assumed to choose the quantity of capital. Increases III 
umon bargaining power negatively affect, ceteris paribus, the stock of capital. No 
evidence is found for a positive relationship between union power and capital levels 
(at least in the available numerical solutions). As expected from the discrete choice 
model, firms tend to have a larger stock of capital when the unions they face are 
more concerned with employment than the wage. Hence the main results of section 
2.4 are replicated in the continuous capital case. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
WAGE REACTION FUNCTIONS 
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FIGURE 3.2 
EFFECT OF COLLUSION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET ON WAGES 
(see (3.11) for the parameter values) 
Note: w = bargained wage, <p = degree of collusion, a = union bargaining power 
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FIGURE 3.3 
(Assumptions: No collusion (</> = 0) and price of technology ( z) = 2, 
see (3.12) for the remaining parameter values) 
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FIGURE 3.4 
(a) 
(Assumptions: No collusion (</> = 0) and price of technology ( - z) = 5/2, 
see (3.12) for the remaining parameter values) 
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(b) 
(Assumptions: Perfect collusion (</> = 1) and price of technology ( = z)=5/2, 
see (3.12) for the remaining parameter values) 
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TABLE 3.1 
(same union power in both firms and 6=1/2 in both firms) 
union power wage capital output labour 
(=a) 
price profits cap/lab utility 
, 
.~ 
0.0 1.000 1. 747 1.206 0.833 2.587 0.541 2.097 0.000 0.1 1.120 1. 736 1.165 0.783 2.669 0.499 2.218 0.306 
0.2 1. 256 1. 719 1.121 0.731 2.758 0.455 2.352 0.432 
0.3 1.410 1. 696 1.072 0.678 2.855 0.410 2.502 0.527 
0.4 1. 584 1. 666 1. 020 0.624 2.960 0.364 2.668 0.604 
0.5 1. 781 1. 627 0.963 0.571 3.073 0.318 2.852 0.668 
0.6 2.002 1. 578 0.903 0.517 3.194 0.272 3.054 0.720 
0.7 2.249 1. 516 0.838 0.463 3.324 0.227 3.275 0.761 
0.8 2.524 1.442 0.769 0.410 3.462 0.185 3.515 0.791 
0.9 2.827 1. 353 0.697 0.359 3.607 0.146 3.774 0.809 
1.0 3.160 1. 248 0.620 0.308 3.760 0.110 4.052 0.816 
Note: for the remaining parameter values see (3.19) 
TABLE 3.2 
(same union power in both firms and 0=0.4 in both firms) 
union power wage capital output labour price profits cap/lab utility 
(=a) 
0.0 1. 000 1. 747 1. 206 0.833 2.587 0.541 2.097 0.000 
0.1 1. 093 1. 738 1.174 0.793 2.651 0.508 2.191 0.336 
0.2 1.192 1.727 1.141 0.754 2.717 0.475 2.289 0.436 
0.3 1. 297 1.713 1.108 0.716 2.785 0.442 2.393 0.504 
0.4 1. 409 1. 696 1.073 0.678 2.855 0.410 2.500 0.554 
0.5 1. 526 1. 676 1. 037 0.642 2.926 0.379 2.612 0.593 
0.6 1. 649 1. 654 1. 001 0.606 2.998 0.348 2.728 0.623 
0.7 1.177 1. 628 0.965 0.572 3.071 0.319 2.847 0.646 
0.8 1. 909 1. 599 0.928 0.539 3.144 0.290 2.969 0.664 
0.9 2.046 1. 567 0.891 0.507 3.218 0.264 3.093 0.677 
1.0 2.187 1. 532 0.854 0.476 3.292 0.238 3.219 0.686 
Note: for the remaining parameter values see (3.19) 
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TABLE 3.3 
(same union power in both firms and 6=0.6 in both firms) 
.,: 
union power wage capital output labour price profits cap/lab utility (=a) 
0.0 1. 000 1. 741 1. 206 0.833 2.587 0.541 2.091 0.000 0.1 1.148 1. 732 1.156 0.771 2.688 0.489 2.246 0.287 
0.2 1. 328 1. 709 1. 098 0.705 2.804 0.433 2.423 0.445 
0.3 1. 548 1. 673 1. 031 0.635 2.938 0.313 2.633 0.581 
0.4 1. 817 1. 619 0.953 0.561 3.093 0.310 2.885 0.103 
0.5 2.149 1. 542 0.864 0.484 3.272 0.245 3.186 0.813 
0.6 2.557 1. 433 0.761 0.404 3.418 0.180 3.544 0.908 
0.1 3.051 1. 282 0.643 0.323 3.713 0.120 3.961 0.981 
0.8 3.668 1. 076 0.509 0.241 3.981 0.068 4.463 1. 020 
0.9 4.401 0.801 0.357 0.159 4.286 0.028 5.035 1. 000 
1.0 5.293 0.439 0.185 0.078 4.631 0.005 5.669 0.862 
Note: for the remaining parameter values see (3.19) 
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TABLE 3.4 
(same union bargaining power with Sl=0.5 and S2=0.4) 
Union power w1 w2 Kl K2 
(=0) 
.. i' 
q1 q2 L1 L2 
0.0 1. 000 1. 000 1.147 1. 747 1. 206 1. 206 0.833 0.833 0.1 1.117 1. 095 1. 679 1. 797 1.141 1.199 0.776 0.800 0.2 1.244 1. 201 1.604 1. 849 1.073 1.190 0.718 0.766 
0.3 1.381 1. 320 1.523 1. 901 1. 002 1.180 0.659 0.732 
0.4 1. 530 1. 452 1. 436 1. 955 0.927 1.168 0.599 0.698 
0.5 1. 690 1. 599 1.341 2.008 0.851 1.155 0.540 0.664 
0.6 1. 862 1. 760 1. 240 2.060 0.772 1.140 0.480 0.631 
0.7 2.046 1. 936 1.132 2.111 0.690 1.124 0.421 0.598 
0.8 2.243 2.128 1. 017 2.158 0.608 1.106 0.363 0.567 
0.9 2.453 2.336 0.896 2.202 0.523 1. 086 0.306 0.536 
1.0 2.677 2.558 0.767 2.241 0.438 1.065 0.250 0.506 
union power p profitl profit2 HILl K2/L2 U1 U2 
(=a) 
0.0 2.587 0.541 0.541 2.097 2.097 0.000 0.000 
0.1 2.660 0.490 0.516 2.163 2.247 0.301 0.341 
0.2 2.737 0.440 0.488 2.235 2.413 0.418 0.449 
0.3 2.818 0.390 0.458 2.312 2.597 0.501 0.526 
0.4 2.904 0.341 0.424 2.396 2.800 0.563 0.587 
0.5 2.994 0.294 0.388 2.486 3.022 0.610 0.637 
0.6 3.088 0.249 0.350 2.584 3.265 0.643 0.680 
0.7 3.186 0.206 0.311 2.690 3.527 0.664 0.716 
0.8 3.287 0.166 0.270 2.804 3.809 0.672 0.746 
0.9 3.391 0.129 0.229 2.929 4.109 0.667 0.772 
1.0 3.497 0.095 0.189 3.065 4.426 0.648 0.794 
Note: for the remaining parameter values see {3.19} 
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TABLE 3.5 
(variable union bargaining power in firm 1 and 02=1/2 and 0=0.6 ) 
unlon power w1 w2 K1 
(firm 1) 
K2 q1 q2 L1 L2 
0.0 1. 000 1. 498 3.389 0.688 1. 732 0.514 0.885 0.384 
0.1 1.184 1. 542 2.961 0.844 1. 569 0.607 0.832 0.436 
0.2 1. 350 1. 591 2.575 1. 016 1. 411 0.699 0.773 0.481 
0.3 1. 502 1. 647 2.226 1. 204 1. 257 0.790 0.710 0.519 
0.4 1. 645 1.711 1.911 1. 408 1.108 0.879 0.642 0.548 
0.5 1. 781 1. 781 1. 627 1. 627 0.963 0.963 0.571 0.571 
0.6 1. 915 1. 859 1. 370 1. 859 0.825 1. 044 0.497 0.586 
0.7 2.048 1. 942 1.136 2.102 0.692 1.119 0.422 0.596 
0.8 2.184 2.032 0.923 2.352 0.566 1.189 0.347 0.602 
0.9 2.324 2.125 0.728 2.605 0.447 1. 254 0.274 0.603 
1.0 2.471 2.222 0.548 2.857 0.335 1. 312 0.204 0.603 
union power p profit1 profit2 Kl/L1 K2/L2 U1 U2 
(firm 1) 
0.0 2.754 0.496 0.152 3.829 1. 789 0.000 0.438 
0.1 2.824 0.486 0.197 3.561 1.934 0.391 0.486 
0.2 2.890 0.459 0.239 3.331 2.111 0.520 0.533 
0.3 2.953 0.420 0.275 3.137 2.321 0.597 0.579 
0.4 3.014 0.371 0.302 2.977 2.568 0.643 0.624 
0.5 3.073 0.318 0.318 2.852 2.852 0.668 0.668 
0.6 3.131 0.262 0.320 2.758 3.172 0.674 0.709 
0.7 3.188 0.207 0.309 2.694 3.526 0.665 0.750 
0.8 3.244 0.155 0.285 2.660 3.910 0.641 0.788 
0.9 3.299 0.109 0.249 2.655 4.317 0.603 0.824 
1.0 3.353 0.069 0.204 2.681 4.741 0.548 0.858 
Note: for the remaining parameter values see (3.19) 
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APPENDIX 3 
According to the assumptions in (3.19) the slope of the product demand 
(=b) is set equal to 1 in this Appendix. 
Profits for firm 1 are defined as 
from (see 3.13) 
(3A.1 ) 
From the solutions for ql and q2 III the quantity competition stage (see 
(3.14) and (3.15)) it is easily seen that 
(3A.2) 
Hence 
(3A.3) 
This expression can be rearranged to give 
(3AA) 
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In the first stage of the game (choice of capital stock) profit maximisation 
an 
for firm 1 implies aK 1 = O. After some manipulations this condition can be written 
1 
as follows 
A2. (KI + wI)' (K2 + 2 .w2)2. [4· (KI + wI)' (K2 + w2) - KI · K2J + KI ·A2 '{(l + 
aWl 2 
+aK ).(K2 + 2·w2) ·[4·(Kl + wl )·(K2 + w2) - Kl ·K2] + 2·(Kl + wl )·(K2 + 1 
(3A.5) 
A symmetric expression holds for firm 2. As seen above ((3.16) and (3.17)) 
the first order conditions for the solution of the wage determination stage are 
(3A.6) 
(3A.7) 
They can be rearranged to give 
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+ 1-~ =0 
h+_l 
Kl 
firm 1 
firm 2 
(3A.8) 
(3A.9) 
where 
A· = 1 + a·· (1 - 3·8 ) l l 1 
B·=1+a.·(1-2·8) Z l 1 i = 1,2 
C· = 1 - a·· (1 - 2·8 ) l l 1 
From (3A.8) and (3A.9) the effects of the choice of capital on the bargained 
. oWl OWl oW2 oW2 
wages, I.e. oK' oK' oK' oK ,needed in (3A.5) and in the symmetric condition 
1 2 1 2 
for firm 2 can be computed. 
Hence solutions for wI' w2' K1, and K2 can be obtained by solving the 
system of equations (3A.8), (3A.9), (3A.5) and the symmetric of (3A.5) for firm 2. 
To this purpose the procedure Findroot in Mathematica has been used to determine 
the numerical solutions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON INVESTMENT FOR BRITISH COMPANIES 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND INTRODUCTORY RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter and the next deal with the empirical analysis of the effects of 
unionisation on investment. The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the data 
used in the empirical work as well as to present some basic statistics obtained from 
the data. Chapter 5 will then focus on the econometric analysis based on a sub-
sample of the data used in this chapter. 
The empirical analysis is based on the merging of companies' budget data 
with the findings from a survey on industrial relations in the U.K. over the eighties 
for the same companies. The two datasets are described in section 4.2. In section 1.7 
it was pointed out that the main drawback of the empirical analyses on the effects 
of unionisation on investment in the U.K. was the lack of sources combining data on 
investment at the firm level with information on unionisation and other industrial 
relations arrangements at the same level of disaggregation. This requirement is met 
by the data used in this thesis which makes the results of the analysis particularly 
interesting. 
No investment variable was originally available in the data. The investment 
measure has then been computed applying a technique suggested by Wadhwani and 
Wall (1986) and based on the information available in the account data. The 
technique is presented in Appendix 4A and the effects of its application on the size 
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and characteristics of the sample are described In section 4.2. In the same section 
some evidence IS provided on the pattern of the Investment/Sales ratio obtained 
from the data across the eighties. Some care is also taken to show that the data are 
representative by comparing the movement in the Investment/Sales ratio In the 
sample with the actual figures for the Manufacturing sector available from official 
statistics. 
Subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 get the empirical analysis of the effects of unions 
on investment started. First, investment performance is compared across unionised 
and non-unionised companies, and then the relationship between union density (and 
relative union strength) and investment performance is analysed. The remarks made 
in these sections should not be overemphasized. The results are based on descriptive 
statistics, mostly comparIsons of means (or medians) across the cross-sections of 
years available In the sample. The results provide some interesting, introductory, 
information about the characteristics of the data, before mOVIng to the regression 
analysis of chapter 5. 
One of the salient features of the union information available in the data is 
that it IS known whether compames underwent a change in their umon status 
(derecognition or recognition, abolition of closed shop, and so on) during the period 
of interest. It then appears natural to divide the sample between the companies who 
did not experience any change in union status l during the eighties and those who 
lIn this chapter changes in union status will refer only to moves (partial or complete) 
towards or away from union recognition. 
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did. Whenever comparisons of investment performance are made III this chapter 
based on umon characteristics, for instance between recognised and non-recognised 
companies, or between unionised companies with a different extent of union density, 
the relevant sample is always that comprising only companies experiencing no 
changes in union status. Descriptive statistics for companies affected by changes in 
union status will be presented in the next chapter, in section 5.9. They are not dealt 
with in this chapter to avoid additional complications to the analysis and because 
of the relatively small proportion of firms that experienced the changes. 
4.2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
The empirical investigation of the effects of unionisation on investment 
carried out III this thesis IS based on British company level data over the period 
1982-89. The dataset merges information from U.K. quoted companies' budget data 
(the source is the Exstat databank) with the findings of a survey on industrial 
relations arrangements and the extent of unionisation at the company level carried 
out by the NIESR III July 19902 • The former dataset contains information on 
economIC variables, such as sales, profits, employment, total wages, financial 
indicators, etc. as well as the set of variables needed for the computation of an 
2The data have been kindly supplied by P. Gregg, NIESR, London. See Gregg-Yates 
(1991) for the analysis of the main findings of the survey. The companies in the survey account 
for about 2.9 million employees (13% of all U.K. employees in 1987), see Gregg-Yates (1991,362-
363). See Gregg-Machin (1991a,b), Gregg-Machin (1992), Gregg et al. (1993), and Menezes-Filho 
et al. (1995) for other papers based on the NIESR survey. 
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investment measure (see below). Each company level variable used in the empirical 
analysis belongs to the Exstat database. Data have been collected for 558 non-
agricultural companies. 
The survey carried out by the NIESR has allowed the matching of the 
budget data with a huge amount of information on the union status and the 
characteristics of industrial relations at the company level. The main aim of the 
NIESR survey is to deal with the changes in the industrial relations arrangements in 
the U.K. across the Eighties. Because of this feature the NIESR survey provides a 
great deal of valuable information for the analysis of the effects of unionisation and 
industrial relations on investment performance in the U.K. during the eighties. For 
instance, it is possible to know whether companies were recognising unions for the 
purpose of wage bargaining at the end of the period (1990), but also whether 
changes towards recognition or derecognition (partial or complete) took place during 
the eighties. Similar information is available for the existence (and related changes) 
of closed shop arrangements, as well as other bargaining issues. The survey also 
aims at temporally locating the changes in unionisation across the eighties. To this 
purpose most of the questions m the survey are spelled out with reference to two 
separate time periods: 1980-84 and 1985-893 . This feature of the data should be 
borne m mind when movmg to the econometric analysis of chapter 5. Another 
important advantage of the NIESR dataset IS that it also provides annual umon 
3Some studies point to a different behaviour in the two parts of the decade. See, for 
instance, Claydon (1989) on union derecognition. 
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density figures at the company level for a large proportion of the recognised 
compames. 
For the sake of simplicity a description of the variables originating from 
the NIESR survey is not carried out here but each time a variable is newly 
introduced into the analysis. Definitions and sources for all variables used III the 
empirical analysis are provided III Appendix 4B. Descriptive statistics for these 
variables are presented in Appendix 4D. 
The budget data do not include a measure of investment. Nonetheless they 
provide the information needed to apply the technique described in Wadhwani and 
Wall (1986). This procedure aims at adjusting accounting data in order to provide 
estimates of gross investment at replacement value4 • The construction of this 
investment measure is described in Appendix 4A. 
The investment variable used III this chapter and the next can then be 
defined ass 
INV = Investment * 100 
Sales 
Hence INV represents investment as a percentage of total sales. 
As a result of the application of the technique some negative values for the 
investment measure (i.e. disinvestment) arose (see footnote 8). Moreover, as a 
consequence of the adjustment technique investment values could not be computed 
4It is important to notice that the capital stock cannot be computed usmg this 
technique, because more, unavailable, information would be required for this purpose. 
SBoth Investment and Sales in this definition are at constant prices (see Appendix 4A). 
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for some companies or for some years within the same company, mostly because of 
the lack of the accounting information needed to carry out the procedure. 
After the computation of the investment measure and the matching with 
the NIESR union dataset, the sample compnses 2148 observations for 365 
companies over the period 1982-19896 . 
Because of the way the dataset has been built (see the comments above on 
the application of the Wadhwani and Wall technique) the panel turns out to be 
highly unbalanced. As a matter of fact the panel includes companies with just one 
observation available up to compames with a continuous record of information for 
every year between 1982 and 19897. Moreover, the panel includes information on 
companies irrespective of whether records are continuous or not. More precisely, out 
of 365 companies 105 have non-continuous records of variable length. The way this 
problem is tackled in the estimation process will be detailed in chapter 5. As far as 
the analysis of the descriptive statistics and cross- correlations in the next section is 
concerned all the available information will be exploited. 
4.3 A LOOK AT THE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
§4.3.1 Investment Performance: Basic Statistics 
Figure 4.1 shows the time pattern of IN V, the investment-sales ratio (mean 
60bservations for years before 1982 are lost because variables such as sales, wages, 
employrn.ent, etc. are not available in the dataset before that year. Moreover, the definition of 
wage in the source underwent a change that would make inconsistent the use of wage data before 
1982. 
7 . h· b t· Nine comparues ave Just one 0 serva IOn. 
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and median) for the whole sample over the period 1982-89. 
It should be pointed out that the median appears a more reliable indicator 
of central tendency for these data than the mean since the latter is more sensitive to 
the presence of a few very extreme values8 . It is easily seen looking at the median in 
figure 4.1 that the investment-sales ratio is fairly stable during the period 1982-86 
and then rises steadily over the period 1986-89. The plot of the mean confirms the 
rise at the end of the eighties, but also points out an increase over the years 1984-
Figures 4.2(A) and 4.3 present plots of the mean and median of the 
investment-sales ratio disaggregated between manufacturing and serviceslO• Since 
companies in the manufacturing sector account for a major share of the sample (see 
table 4.1 and the comments below) it is no surprise that figure 4.2(A) confirms the 
findings of figure 4.1. The only noticeable differences are the following: the mean 
shows a sharp increase in 1984-85 and a marked decline in 1986 as well as a decline 
in the last year of the sample. 
As far as commercial serVIces are concerned, figure 4.3 shows a greater 
variability III the investment indicator with respect to manufacturing. A cyclical 
8 0ver the whole sample INV takes values between -27.45 and 124.9, a range which does 
not appear to be "unreasonable". 
9Note that the two years which provide less observations are the two extremes (1982 
and 1989). 
10Manufacturing is defined as one-digit sectors 2, 3 and 4. See Appendix 4C for the 
definition of the sectors. 
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pattern IS evident over the period 1982-86 and a sharp mcrease then follows from 
1986 to 1989. Figure 4.3 also shows that the mean IS even more cyclical and 
provides no evidence of a lasting "boom" of investment m the late eighties. 
Comparison of data from figures 4.2(A) and 4.3 readily shows that the value of the 
mean of the investment-sales ratio is far higher in the Services than in 
manufacturing. This result holds true for the median only in the second part of the 
eighties (1986-89). 
It is obviously of some interest to compare the investment outcomes in the 
sample with the actual investment performance of the economy, notwithstanding 
the differences m the accounting definition of investment. Data on net capital 
expenditurell from the Business Monitor Series (establishment analysis) can be used 
to this purpose. The data refer to the manufacturing sector only. Figure 4.2(B) 
presents the investment/sales ratio thus obtained. The investment-sales ratio 
increases over the period 1984-85 and even more sharply over the years 1988-89. The 
latter result is especially mirrored by the data in the sample (see figure 4.2(A) 
above). 
Finally, table 4.1 details the composition by sectors (i.e. one-digit SIC 
industries) of the sample12. Almost 2/3 of the companies and of the observations in 
llInvestment or "Net Capital Expenditure" is defined as follows: 
Net Capital Expenditure = value of new building work + (additions - disposals) of land and 
existing buildings + (additions - disposals) of vehicles + (additions - disposals) of plant and 
machinery. 
Source is Business Monitor (Su.m:mary Tables). Data for sales are taken from the same source. 
12See Appendix 4C for the definition of sectors. 
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the sample belong to the manufacturing sector (industries 2, 3 and 4). Just above 
1/4 of the companies and observations come from the commercial services (sector 
6). Construction companies account for about 6% of the data, while just a few 
companies belong to the extraction industry and to the public services. 
§4.3.2 Investment performance in unionised and non-unionised companies 
This section provides some basic statistics relating to the comparIson of 
investment performance in unionised and non-unionised companies. For the sake of 
consistency the comparison is carried out for the subsample of companies which did 
not undergo a change of union status (recognition or derecognition, partial or 
complete) over the period of interest. 
Figure 4.4 compares the median of the investment-sales ratio year by year 
m unionised companies (i.e. companIes recognIsmg at least one union for the 
purpose of wage bargaining) and non-unionised companIes (i.e. companIes not 
recognising any union) across all sectors. It is readily seen that apart from one year 
(1988) figures are higher for non-unionised companies. A similar result is obtained 
using the mean (figures are not reported). 
Figure 4.5 provides a disaggregation by sector of the results by looking at 
the comparison of investment performance for Services. As expected, (unreported) 
figures for manufacturing mirror the findings in figure 4.4. On the other hand, no 
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clear-cut conclusion on the comparIson of investment performance between 
unionised and non-unionised companies can be drawn from figure 4.5 which refers to 
Services. 
In the evaluation of these results it IS important to notice that the large 
majority of the compames m the manufacturing sector are unionised while the 
reverse is true in the Services (see for more on this issue table 5.2 in chapter 5). 
§4.3.3 Union density and investment 
The results In the prevIOUS subsection seem to provide some evidence for a 
gap In investment propensity between unionised and non-unionised compames at 
least for the manufacturing sector. This section further investigates whether there is 
any additional evidence of an effect of union density on investment performance. 
Annual umon density figures are not available for all compames In the sample. 
Hence a sub-sample of the unionised compames dealt with In subsestion 4.3.2 IS 
taken 13. Data agam refer to compames that did not experIence a change In umon 
status during the eighties. 
Table 4.2 shows that union density conditional on recognition (weighted by 
company employment) in the whole sample declines slowly but steadily (from 62.1 
% in 1982 to 58 % in 1988) with a big final jump in 198914 15. The same results are 
13Non-unionised companies are not taken into account even when figures for density are 
available. This is consistent with the fact that the analysis concentrates on the effects of unions 
on investment through wage bargaining. Without recognition, i.e. without explicit wage 
bargaining, it is difficult to see how unions can affect the firin's investment decision. 
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displayed by the unweighted mean and by the median. The table also shows that 
the decline in union density is accompanied across the years by an increase in the 
investment-sales ratio irrespective of whether the median or the mean is looked at. 
The last year of the sample makes an exception (but see footnote 15). 
Table 4.3 provides figures for umon density and investment III 
manufacturing. The comments made above still apply. It can also be noticed that, 
as expected, union density is higher in manufacturing than in the rest of the sample. 
The findings of table 4.2 and 4.3 raIse the question of whether investment 
performance is affected by the degree of unionisation as measured by union density 
at the cross-section level. As a matter of fact, it is particularly interesting to assess 
whether there is evidence that heavily un ionised companies have a different (worse) 
investment performance with respect to less unionised companies. This is carried out 
by splitting the sub-sample of unionised compames between firms with umon 
density above and below 70 %16. 
Figures 4.6(A) and 4.6(B), which refer to the median and mean 
respectively, show some evidence of a better performance for less unionised 
companies especially if the mean is looked at, but no sign of uniform superiority. 
14This jump could be partially accounted for by the sharp reduction in the number of 
companies available in the sample for 1989. 
15In the period 1982-89 union density (= total union memebership / wage earners and 
salaried employees) in the U.K. has fallen from 54.1 to 44.8 % (source: Employment Gazette 
(1991, 338) and Census of Employment). For a survey on the determinants of the fall see Mason-
Bain (1993). 
16Results do not markedly vary if the threshold is changed. 
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The results are confirmed, as expected, for the manufacturing sector (figures are 
not reported). 
The information available m the industrial relations dataset can be 
additionally exploited m order to assess the relationship between the degree of 
unionisation and investment performance. Managers interviewed m the NIESR 
survey were asked to assess whether according to their own judgement umon 
strentgh m their compames had increased, decreased or had undergone no change 
during the eigthiesl7. As mentioned above, the question was actually spelled out 
with separate reference to the periods 1980-84 and 1985-89. Table 4.4 compares 
investment performance (in terms of median of the variable INV) in companies that 
experienced no change in union strentgh, as assessed by their managers, during the 
eighties and m compames that experienced declining umon strentgh. Two 
alternative definitions of "union declining strength" are employed (see DOWN(l) 
and DOWN(2)18 in table 4.4). There is no evidence of a relationship between 
decreased union strength and increased investment. The results for the mean (not 
reported here) corroborate this conclusion. 
17 The question was asked only to managers whose companies 
at the end of the period. 
were recognising unions 
18 According to definition DOWN(I) in table 4.4 union strength is declining if: 
a) union strength was assessed as declining by managers for both periods 1980-1984 and 1985-89, 
or 
b) union strength was assessed as declining in the period 1980-84, but unchanged over the period 
1985-89. 
According to DOWN(2) union strength is declining if one of the two cases in DOWN(I) happens 
or if 
c) union strength was assessed as unchanged in 1980-84, but declining in 1985-89. 
171 
Similarly, while some managers were not able to exactly pinpoint the yearly 
figures of union density in their companies during the eighties, they could assess 
whether union density was decreasing, increasing or stable over the periods 1980-84 
and 1985-89. This information is exploited in table 4.5 to look for evidence of a 
relationship between decline in membership and investment performance19. No such 
outcome seems to anse. Indeed, some evidence points to a better performance for 
companies with unchanged union density. 
§4.3.4 Analysis of correlation 
This section IS mainly concerned with the analysis of correlations between 
the mam variables available m the dataset. Definitions and sources for these 
variables are provided in Appendix 4B. Table 4.6 presents correlation matrices for 
the whole sample of companies (table 4.6(A), 2148 observations2o) and the following 
sub-samples: 
- compames with unchanged umon status during the Eighties (table 4.6(B), 1764 
observations); 
- unionised companies, i.e. recognising unions (table 4.6(C), 1057 observations); 
19In table 4.5 union membership is declining if one of the following has happened over 
the two sub-periods 1980-84 and 1985-89: 
a) union density was declining in both periods; 
b) union density was declining in the period 1980-84, but was unchanged in the period 1985-89; 
c) union density was unchanged during the period 1980-84, but was declining over the period 
1985-89. 
On the other hand density was stationary if there was no change in both periods. 
As a consequence of the above definition of declining membership, the main stress In the 
interpretation of the results should be on the period 1985-89. 
2°In table 4.6{A} all companies are used irrespective of whether changes in union status 
took place in the period. 
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- non-unionised companies (table 4.6(D), 707 observations)2\ 
- unionised companies with unchanged umon status whose annual umon density 
figures are known (table 4.6(E), 811 observations). 
Some evidence exists, as expected, for a positive correlation between 
fi b'l' 22 d' pro Ita 1 Ity an Investment: The sample correlation coefficient, r, is between .16 
and .21 in the tables. On the other hand wages (in levels) and investment-sales 
ratios are inversely related with values of r ranging between -.08 and -.11 over the 
different samples. The sign of the correlation coefficient, although very small, 
accords with the expectations of the theory. 
Profits, In turn, appear to be positively correlated with the liquidity 
position of the company as described by the Cash-Liability ratio (variable CLR), 
with r taking values between .3 and .36. There is also a positive linkage between 
profits and wages that may be claimed as evidence of rent-sharing, but the value of 
the correlation coefficient in the whole sample and in the subsample of companies 
with unchanged union status masks two opposite scenarios for unionised and non-
unionised companies. For the unionised compames there is evidence of a positive 
correlation between wages and profits (r=.21 in table 4.6(C)), while for non-
unionised companies the sign of the relationship is reversed (r=-.05 in table 4.6(D)). 
The positive relationship between wages (in levels) and sales is also sensitive 
21Data in in tables 4.6(C) and 4.6(D) refer only to companies whose union status has 
not changed. 
22profit is defined as (before tax profits/sales). 
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to the umon status of the company, the correlation coefficient being .24 for 
unionised companies (table 4.6(C)), but a mere .03 for non-unionised companies23 
(table 4.6(D)). 
The results III table 4.6 show that sales (in levels) are very strongly 
correlated with total employment (r is always around .9). Finally table 4.6(E) shows 
that the correlation of union density with wage levels and investment performance 
has the expected SIgn but it IS almost not noticeable (r=.08 and r=-.07, 
respecti vely ). 
Table 4.7 mirrors the contents of the tables above but including now annual 
wage growth and annual sales growth among the variables24• As a consequence the 
sample size is reduced. The comments made above for table 4.6 still apply in the 
reduced sample and the following can be added. There is evidence of a positive link 
between sales growth and propensity to invest (r ranges between .19 and .32 in table 
4.7). On the other hand, the coefficient of correlation between wage growth and 
investment is always negative, but extremely small (between -0.4 and -.12). Finally, 
there is no evidence of positive association between union density and wage growth 
(r=-.02 in table 4.7 (E)) 
23The correlation coefficient between wage level and company size, where the latter is 
proxied by total employment, is .08 for unionised companies and -.07 for nou-unionised 
companies. 
24 These two variables are used in the econometric analysis of chapter 5. 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided a description of the data used m the empirical 
analysis. The appealing feature of these data is that information on investment at 
the company level IS matched with information on unionisation at the same 
disaggregation level. Moreover, data are not restricted to a cross-section. 
The method used to obtain a measure of investment from account data has 
been outlined. Some descriptive statistics have been provided which show that the 
data are representative of the pattern of investment and unionisation III the U.K. 
economy in the period. The data have also been used to give some basic statistics on 
the (year by year) companson between unionised and non-unionised firms as well 
as across recognised compames with different extent of unionisation. These simple 
exercIses seem to point to a better performance for non-unionised compames over 
recognised. On the other hand, the results do not gIVe any preCIse result when it 
comes to comparisons within unionised companies (see results for levels and changes 
of union density or umon strength as perceived by companies' managers). A more 
accurate analysis will be carried in the next chapter applying panel data techniques 
to a sub-sample of the data used in this chapter. 
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FIGURE 4.2(A) 
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FIGURE 4.3 
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FIGURE 4.4 
COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
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TABLE 4.1 
-
DISTRIBUTION Of COMPANIES AND OBSERVATIONS BY SECTOR (ONE-DIGIT SIC INDUSTRY) 
SIC sector 
companies 
observations 
year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1 2 3 4 HANOFACT. 5 
(2+3+4) 
6 
5 38 85 106 229 25 100 
7 total 
6 365 
31 248 501 608 1357 147 576 37 2148 
TABLE 4.2 
UNION DENSITY AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
ALL SECTORS (sa~ple size = 811) 
UNION DENSITY INVESTMENT/SALES RATIO 
cases weighted unweighted Eedian lied ian Ilean 
mean mean 
75 62.1 62.1 70.0 0.100 0.156 
95 61.2 59.2 67.0 0.107 0.206 
100 60.6 58.0 65.0 0.110 0.427 
113 60.3 58.0 65.0 0.164 0.506 
115 59.3 58.1 64.0 0.161 0.694 -
116 58.4 58.7 65.0 0.281 0.737 
119 58.1 57.1 63.0 0.486 1.161 -
78 54.2 53.0 58.5 0.282 0.507 
TABLE 4.3 
UNION DENSITY AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
MANUFACTURING 
UNION DENSITY INVESTMENT/SALES RATIO 
cases weighted unweighted lIedian median Jlean 
mean mean 
58 64.6 69.6 71. 5 0.091 0.187 
76 64.9 64.8 70.0 0.094 0.181 
80 63.0 63.1 69.0 0.105 0.458 
91 62.8 62.8 68.0 0.174 0.549 
94 62.0 62.3 67.3 0.153 0.-709 
96 6L1 62.6 65.0 0.218 0.580 
98 60.7 61. 7 65.0 0.470 1.175 
63 57.5 58.6 61. 0 0.322 0.496 
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year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
TABLE 4.4 
COMPARISON Of INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE IN COMPANIES WITH 
DECLINING VS. UNCHANGED UNION STRENGTH (MEDIAN) 
no cases dm-'n(1) cases down(2) cases 
change 
0.169 26 0.276 30 0.347 51 
0.178 32 0.209 38 0.160 64 
0.137 36 0.104 42 0.110 67 
0.375 34 0.017 0 0.125 73 
0.237 38 0.050 40 0.066 71 
0.247 35 0.212 42 0.291 78 
0.586 38 0.340 45 0.427 77 
0.242 23 0.454 28 0.392 49 
Rote: see footnote 19 for definition of DOWN(l} and DOWN{2) 
year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1981 
1988 
1989 
TABLE 4.5 
COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE IN COMPANIES WITH 
DECLINING VS. UNCHANGED UNIOR DENSITY 
no cases decreased cases 
change density 
0.127 47 0.433 27 
0.107 55 0.148 38 
0.128 59 0.109 39 
0.219 59 0.263 40 
0.127 60 0.141 39 
0.359 60 0.348 43 
0.511 62 0.423 46 
0.336 38 0.188 30 
Note: see footnote 20 for the definition of decreased density 
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fABLE 4.6 
CORRELATION MATRICES 
A: TOTAL SAMPLE (sample size = 2148) 
.! 
IRV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP DER CLR 
INV 1. 00 
PROfIT 0.16 1. 00 
SALES -0.01 0.13 1. 00 
WAGE -0.09 0.10 0.08 1. 00 
TOTEMP 0.00 0.14 0.90 -0.05 1. 00 
DER 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 1. 00 
CLR 0.03 0.30 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.02 1. 00 
B: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS (sample size = 1764) 
INV PROfIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP DER CLR 
INV 1. 00 
PROFIT 0.20 1. 00 
SALES 0.00 0.09 1. 00 
WAGE -0.10 0.08 0.16 1.00 
TOTEMP 0.01 0.08 0.89 0.02 1. 00 
DER 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 1. 00 
CLR -0.00 0.34 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
C: SAMPLE WITH NO CHARGES IN URION STATUS:UNIORISED COMPANIES {sample size = 10S7} 
IRV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP DER CLR 
INV 1.00 
PROfIT 0.17 1. 00 
SALES 0.00 0.11 1.00 
WAGE -0.11 0.21 0.24 1.00 
TOTEMP 0.01 0.07 0.89 0.08 1.00 
DER 0.04 -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.10 1.00 
CLR -0.02 0.36 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 1. 00 
D: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS:HOR-UNIONISED COMPANIES {sample size = 707} 
IRV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEHP DER CLR 
INV 1.00 
PROFIT 0.25 1. 00 
SALES 0.01 0.07 1. 00 
WAGE -0.10 -0.05 0.03 1.00 
TOTEMP 0.04 0.12 0.91 -0.08 1. 00 
DER 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 1. 00 
CLR 0.03 0.31 0.09 0.04 0.08 -0.02 1. 00 
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E: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN URION STATUS AND URION DENSITY fIGURES AVAILABLE (sample = 811) 
IHV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP DENSITY DER CLR 
INV 1.00 
.! 
PROFIT 0.21 1. 00 
SALES 0.00 0.13 1. 00 
WAGE -0.09 0.22 0.29 1. 00 
TOTEMP 0.01 0.10 0.90 0.16 1. 00 
DENSITY -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.01 1. 00 
DER 0.11 -0.04 0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.07 1. 00 
CLR 0.01 0.36 0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 1. 00 
. -
TABLE 4.7 
CORRELATION HATRICES 
(including variables WAGEGR and SALESGR) 
A: TOTAL SAMPLE (sample size = 1900) 
IHV PROFIT SALES WAGE TO TEMP WAGEGR SALESGR DER CLR 
IRV 1.00 
PROFIT 0.16 1.00 
SALES -0.01 0.13 1. 00 
WAGE -0.09 0.07 0.06 1.00 
TOTEMP 0.00 0.14 0.90 -0.07 1.00 
WAGEGR -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.03 1.00 
SALESGR 0.34 0.23 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.03 1.00 
DER 0.03 -0.07 0.10 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.03 1. 00 
CLR 0.03 0.30 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
B: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS (sample size = 1560) 
!RV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP WAGEGR SALESGR DER CLR 
IRV 1.00 
PROFIT 0.20 1.00 
SALES -0.00 0.09 1.00 
WAGE -0.11 0.06 0.15 1. 00 
TOTEMP 0.01 0.08 0.90 0.01 1.00 
WAGEGR -0.08 0.00 -0.00 0.12 -0.01 1.00 
SALESGR 0.35 0.26 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 1. 00 
DER 0.03 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.02 1. 00 
CLR -0.01 0.34 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.06 1. 00 
1::;4 
c: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN ONIOH STATUS: ONIONISED COMPANIES (sample size = 931) 
INV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP WAGEGR SALESGR DER CLR IRV 1.00 
PROFIT 0.17 1. 00 
--SALES -0.00 0.11 1. 00 
WAGE -0.13 0.19 0.23 1.00 
TOTEMP 0.01 0.07 0.90 0.07 1. 00 
WAGEGR -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 1. 00 
SALESGR 0.48 0.20 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 1. 00 
DER 0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.06 1. 00 
CLR -0.02 0.37 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.06 1. 00 
D: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN URION STATUS: NOR-ONIONISED COMPANIES (sample size = 629) 
IHV PROfIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP WAGEGR SALESGR DER CLR 
INV 1. 00 
PROFIT 0.27 1. 00 
SALES 0.01 0.07 1.00 
WAGE -0.09 -0.07 0.01 1. 00 
TO!EMP 0.05 0.12 0.90 -0.09 1. 00 
iAGEGR -0.04 -0.01 0.31 0.20 0.02 1. 00 
SALESGR 0.22 0.32 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 1. 00 
DER 0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 1. 00 
CLR 0.01 0.31 0.09 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 1. 00 
E: SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN ORION STATUS AND UNION DENSITY FIGURES AVAILABLE (sample size = 720) 
IHV PROFIT SALES WAGE TOTEMP WAGEGR SALESGR DENSITY DER CLR 
I1iV 1.00 
PROFIT 0.22 1. 00 
SALES -0.01 0.12 1. 00 
WAGE -0.12 0.20 0.29 1. 00 
TOTEMP 0.01 0.09 0.90 0.15 1. 00 
WAGEGR -0.12 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 1. 00 
SALESGR 0.25 0.21 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.08 1. 00 
DENSITY -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 1. 00 
DER 0.12 -0.04 0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.06 0.04 -0.08 1. 00 
CLR 0.01 0.37 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.05 1. 00 
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APPENDIX 4A 
DEFINITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE INVESTMENT VARIABLE 
The empirical analysis presented m chapters 4 and 5 IS based on data on 
gross investment1 at its replacement value. This measure of investment has been 
computed usmg information from the Exstat databank. This appendix describes 
how the investment variable has been constructed on the basis of the technique 
described in Wadhwani and Wall (1986). 
When accounting data are used to construct a measure of investment, it 
appears inappropriate to compute investment simply by subtracting disposals (and 
related items) from additions (and related items) to the capital stock. The problem 
that arises is that both additions and disposals are recorded at their historical cost. 
As far as additions are concerned this cost can be regarded as the market price at 
current values. Disposals, on the other side, are recorded at the cost incurred in the 
past and this creates a problem, in the presence of inflation, if there is no knowledge 
of the year/s they refer to. As a result, the computation of an investment measure 
at replacement cost requires some adjustments to the accounting data, based on 
assumptions on the average life of capital assets. The adjusted level of investment at 
lit is acknowledged that, while a gross investment measure is employed in the empirical 
analysis, the theoretical model presented in Appendix SA deals, as is the case with Vander Ploeg 
(1987) and Dermy and Nickell (1992), with net investment. It should also be mentioned that the 
distinction between net and gross investment does not seem to have attracted enough attention 
in the existing literature. Dermy and Nickell, for instance, do not clarify in their data appendix, 
whether net or gross investment is employed in the empiricai analysis. 
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current values at time t, ltC, is defined as (see Wadhwani and Wall (1986, 48-50)) 
(4A.1) (AD t + NSCt ) - (DISP t + SDISP t ). pP t 
t-A 
where 
ADt= additions during period t 
NSCt= capital stock of new subsidiary companies acquired during period t 
DISP t= disposals during period t 
SDISP t= capital stock of subsidiary companies disposed of during period t 
P t= price of assets at time t 
A= average life of assets 
The variables AD t , NSC t , DISP t' and SDISP t in (4A.1) are available in the 
company account data information provided by the Exstat dataset (Exstat items 
CC3, CC5, CC4, and CC6 respectively2). The price of capital (= P t) has been 
computed using indices for the cost of capital at the industry level3 (mostly 2-digit 
SIC industries). As far as the average life of assets, A, is concerned, Wadhwani and 
Wall stress (1986, 48) that there are many ways to approximate it. The following 
definition has been adopted in the construction of the investment measure (life of 
assets is measured in years4): 
( 4A.2) 1 T ( PADAt_l A = T t~l PDCYR/ 
20ther movements in property (Exstat item CC9) have been treated as additions (if 
positive) or disposals (if negative). 
3The source for this variable is Price Indices For Current Cost Accounting (PINCCA, 
Business Monitor Series). 
4The limited infonnation available on the price of capital imposes an upper bound of six 
years on the average life of capital. 
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where 
PADA t = accumulated depreciation on property at time t, 
PDCYR t = current year property depreciation, 
and T is the number of observations available for each company5. 
PADA and PDCYR are also available in the Exstat dataset (items C85 and CC19, 
respectively). 
On the basis of ( 4A.1) Investment at replacement value at costant prices, It, 
is defined as6 
(4A.3) Po P (AD t + NSC t ) . p - (DISP t + SDISP t) . r 
t t-A 
with the base year (0) being 1980. 
The final step is to define the investment-sales ratio employed in chapters 4 
and 5, i.e. 
(4AA) I INV t = t ·100 Salest 
with Sales at constant prices (producer price deflator from British Business). 
5The assumption behind the definition of A is that, given the short time horizon 
considered, the average life of capital does not vary considerably from year to year. Wadhwani 
PADAt 
and Wall instead have At PDCYR· 
t 
6The "correction" for disposals in the formula reported in Wadhwani and Wall (1986, 
Po P t 50) should read -- instead of -P-- . 
P t - A t-A 
188 
APPENDIX 4B 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
INV Investment / Sales (*100) at the company level. Sales are from Exstat 
dataset (see below). Investment computed according to the Wadhwani and Wall 
technique (see Appendix 4A). 
SALES = Current value of sales (from Exstat, C3l) at the company level. 
SALESGR = Annual percentage growth of sales. Source as for Sales. 
TOTEMP = Total employment at the company level. Source is Exstat (C19). 
WAGE = Per capita average wage at the company level. Wage is defined as the 
ratio of total labour costs (from Exstat, C63) over total employment. 
WAGEGR = Annual percentage growth of per capita average wage. Source as for 
Wage. 
PROFIT = Pre Tax Profit / Sales at the company level. Source for profit is Exstat 
(C34). 
DENSITY 
survey. 
Union density (percentage) at the company level. Source is NIESR 
CLR = Cash - Liabilities ratio at the company level (from Exstat, Clll and C158). 
DER = Debt - Equity ratio at the company level (from Exstat). Debt is defined as 
Loan stock of parent company (C138) + Loan stock of subsidiary companies (C139) 
+ Other loans (C14l) + Bank loans and overdrafts (C148). Equity as Ordinary 
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capital (C123) + Deferred capital (C124) - Deferred tax (C134). 
CAPPGR = Annual percentage growth of the cost of capital at the industry level 
(mostly two-digit SIC sectors). Computed from Price Indices for Current Cost 
Accounting. 
APPENDIX4C 
DEFINITION OF ONE-DIGIT S.LC. SECTORS 
Sector 1: Energy and water industries. 
Sector 2: Extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels, manufacture of metals, 
mineral products and chemicals. 
Sector 3: Metal goods, engineering, and vehicle industries. 
Sector 4: Other manufacturing industries (including food, drink and tobacco, textile 
and clothing industries, paper and plastics industries). 
Sector 5: Construction 
Sector 6: Commercial services and distribution 
Sector 7: Public utilities. 
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APPENDIX4C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
WHOLE SAMPLE (n=2148) 
Vars. Mean SLDev. Min Max 
INV 1. 06 4.91 -27.45 124. 90 
PROFIT(x10) 0.65 0.75 -7.43 6.21 
SALES 345730 1052200 1173.00 13170000 
WAGE 10.09 3.63 2.61 28.54 
TOTEMP 6647 20703 26 242700 
DER 1. 07 18.37 0.00 847.00 
CLR 0.14 0.23 0.00 2.20 
SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS (n=1764) 
Vars. Mean SLDev. Min Max 
INV 0.93 4.22 -27.45 109.10 
PROFIT(x10) 0.61 0.73 -7.43 6.21 
SALES 253040 873500 1173 13170000 
WAGE 10.27 3.59 2.61 28.54 
TOTEMP 4113.6 12331 26 133800 
DER 1.13 20.26 0.00 847.00 
CLR 0.14 0.23 0.00 2.20 
SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS 
UNIONISED COMPANIES (n=1057) 
Vars. Mean SL Dev. Min Max 
INV 0.74 4.49 -15.26 109.10 
PROFIT (xl0) 0.59 0.66 -7.43 2.92 
SALES 302500 1014800 1451 13170000 
WAGE 10.01 3.38 2.61 25.87 
TOTEMP 5404 13765 52 133800 
DER 0.64 1. 93 0.00 38.37 
CLR 0.14 0.23 0.00 2.20 
SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS 
NON-UNIONISED COMPANIES (n=707) 
Vars. Mean SL Dev. Min Max 
INV 1.22 3.76 -27.45 52.48 
PROFIT(xl0) 0.63 0.82 -4.23 6.21 
SALES 175070 595760 1173 5949000 
WAGE 10.67 3.86 2.95 28.54 
TOTEMP 2148.40 9490.70 26.00 84150.00 
DER 1. 86 31. 91 0.00 847.00 
CLR 0.13 0.24 0.00 1. 87 
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SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS 
AND UNION DENSITY AVAILABLE (n=811) 
Vars. Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
INV 0.59 2.76 -15.26 40.94 
PROFIT(x10) 0.58 0.68 -7.43 2.92 
SALES 300050 1097100 1472 13170000 
WAGE 10.17 3.51 2.61 25.87 
TOTEMP 4933.8 13910 5.2 133800 
DENSITY 58.13 28.05 0.50 100.00 
DER 0.55 1. 50 0.00 25.05 
CLR 0.14 0.24 0.00 2.20 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(including variables WAGEGR and SALESGR) 
WHOLE SAMPLE (n=1900) 
Vars. Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
INV 1. 03 4.90 -27.45 124.90 
PROFIT(x10) 0.67 0.74 -7.43 6.21 
SALES 3565620 1094800 1173 13170000 
WAGE 10.41 3.63 2.61 28.54 
TOTEMP 6862.3 21068 26 242700 
WAGEGR 8.40 10.20 -34.71 105.80 
SALESGR 16.04 26.88 -90.49 280.20 
DER 0.67 1. 96 0.00 38.37 
CLR 0.14 0.24 0.00 2.20 
SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS (n=1560) 
Vars. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
INV 0.86 4.10 -27.45 109.10 
PROFIT(x10) 0.62 0.73 -7.43 6.21 
SALES 268830 919470 1173 13170000 
WAGE 10.59 3.58 2.61 28.54 
TOTEMP 4226.4 12791 26 133800 
WAGEGR 8.46 10.24 -34.71 105.80 
SALESGR 16.26 27.36 -90.49 280.20 
DER 0.66 2.11 0.00 38.37 
CLR 0.14 0.24 ·0.00 2.20 
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SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS 
UNIONISED COMPANIES (n=931) 
Vars. Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
INV 0.74 4.61 -15.26 109.10 
PROFIT(x10) 0.62 0.66 
-7.43 2.92 
SALES 326940 1074500 1451 13170000 
WAGE 10.36 3.35 2.61 25.87 
TOTEMP 5570.3 14378 57 133800 
WAGEGR 8.51 9.58 -34.71 90.51 
SALESGR 12.34 21.79 -41. 32 280.20 
DQR 0.66 2.04 0.00 38.37 
DLR 0.15 0.24 0.00 2.20 
SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS 
NON-UNIONISED COMPANIES (n=629) 
Vars. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
INV 1.13 3.19 -27.45 28.74 
PROFIT(x10} 0.64 0.82 -4.23 6.21 
SALES 182830 613740 1173 5949000 
WAGE 10.94 3.87 3.20 28.54 
TOTEMP 2237. 20 9665.40 26.00 84150.00 
WAGEGR 8.39 11.15 -25.95 105.80 
SALESGR 22.07 33.14 -90.49 239.50 
DER 0.65 2.22 0.00 33.48 
CLR 0.13 0.24 0.00 1. 87 
SAMPLE WITH NO CHANGES IN UNION STATUS 
AND UNION DENSITY FIGURES AVAILABLE (n=720) 
Vars. Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
IRV 0.57 2.63 -15.26 40.94 
PROFIT(xl0) 0.60 0.69 -7.43 2.92 
SALES 320690 1159000 1472 13170000 
WAGE 10.48 3.49 2.61 25.87 
TOTEMP 5067.2 14527 57 133800 
WAGEGR 8.18 9.01 -34.71 76.70 
SALESGR 11. 45 18.63 -41. 32 185.70 
DENSITY 57. 69 27.95 0.50 100.00 
DER 0.56 1. 57 0.00 25.05 
CLR 0.15 0.25 0.00 2.20 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF UNIONS ON INVESTMENT FOR BRITISH COMPANIES 
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main result of the theoretical models presented in chapters 2 and 3 can 
be summarised as follows. If a firm bargains over the wage with a labour union in 
an oligopolistic product market, then, ceteris paribus, the firm's ability to adopt a 
new, more productive technology is likely to be impaired. This negative result is 
more evident, the stronger the union bargaining power and the more firm specific 
the technology to be adopted by the firm. The result, while being subject to some 
important qualifications (see chapters 2 and 3), confirms, in a more general setting, 
the findings from Grout (1984), namely, the effectiveness of the union rent-seeking 
mechanism. 
The purpose of this chapter IS to provide an econometric analysis of the 
effects of unionisation on the propensity to invest for a sample of U.K. quoted 
companies during the eighties. The nature of the data allows an accurate analysis of 
the predictions stemming from the theoretical models. Some caveats, though, about 
the relationship between the theoretical and the empirical analysis are in order. 
The theoretical models in chapters 2 and 3 deal with the (discrete) choice of 
adoption of a new technology, while the empirical analysis refers to investment 
performance. The numerical results in section 3.3 have shown the extent to which 
the main findings obtained from the adoption models extend to a (static) model of 
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determination of continuous capital. Moreover, the empirical model of investment 
with adjustment costs and wage bargaining employed in this chapter (see Appendix 
5A), based on Denny and Nickell (1992), shares the basic feature of the adoption 
models of chapters 2 and 3. 
As far as the comparative statics properties of the models in chapters 2 and 
3 are concerned, most of the analysis concentrated on determining the effect of 
changes in union bargaining power in one of the two firms (or in both) competing in 
the product market on the choice of adoption of a newly introduced technology (or 
on the choice of the optimal quantity of capital, as in section 3.3). As such, the 
mam result summarised above could be restated as follows: If umon bargaining 
power mcreases, then, ceteris paribus, less investment is undertaken in equilibrium 
(or a new technology might now not be adopted which would have been before). 
Hence a proper or "direct test" of this prediction would involve analysing fims' 
in vestment performance against some "measure" of union bargaining power. 
Although some attempts have been made to "measure" umon bargaining 
power on the basis of the first order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem by 
making suitable assumptions on the properties of the bargaining process between the 
firm and the union (see, particularly, McDonald and Suen (1992)), these efforts do 
not seem convincing. As a consequence, the route taken in section 5.4 and elsewhere 
III the chapter is to focus on the straight comparison, as far as investment 
performance IS concerned, between unionised compames, I.e. compames where a 
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umon (or more than one) is recognised for the purpose of wage bargaining, and non-
unionised companies. The empirical analysis then builds upon the information 
available in the NIESR dataset to provide a more accurate account of the impact of 
additional industrial relations conditions on investment. To this purpose the 
companies in the sample have been divided in two groups: Those that have 
experienced some changes in union status during the period of interest and those 
that have not. In sections 5.4 to 5.8 only the latter are utilised in estimation1. The 
complete sample including companies affected by changes is then used in section 5.9. 
The first Issue addressed by the analysis IS whether there IS a significant 
"long-run" effect of union presence, l.e. umon recognition for the purpose of wage 
bargaining, on investment performance when controlling for the variables suggested 
by the empirical model of Appendix 5A. In this basic case umon and industrial 
relations conditions are entirely captured by the existence of one (or more than one) 
recognised union2 at the company level (section 5.4). 
There IS an increasing interest III the literature for the role of product 
market considerations in shaping the ability of unions to push up wages, and more 
generally, affect the performance of the firm. This issue appears of particular 
IThe descriptive statistics for recognised fIrms presented in chapter 4 also refer mainly 
to the subset of companies that have experienced no changes in union status. These basic 
statistics are briefly reassessed in section 5.3 to take also into account some workforce 
composition indicators not analysed in chapter 4. The list of variables used in the regression 
analysis is presented in Appendix 5C. 
2 An additional distinction will be also considered between compames where all 
establislunents have recognised unions and companies where recognition is not complete. The 
issue of the effects of multiunionism is, instead, not tackled .. 
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relevance here because of the explicit oligopolistic nature of the product market in 
the theoretical model. The data supplied by the NIESR provide detailed information 
for the analysis of the extent of the effects of product market competition on 
investment performance (section 5.5). Therefore the robustness of the findings of 
section 5.4 can be ascertained. The data refer to "static" competition, l.e. the 
number of rival firms at the time the survey was carried out, as well as "dynamic" 
competition, i.e. the changes in domestic and foreign competition faced by each 
company during the period of interest. 
Union recognition alone represents a partial picture of the industrial 
relations conditions III a gIven company. It IS therefore of interest to determine 
whether the results obtained are affected by the consideration of additional 
elements. Two features of industrial relations are specifically taken into account: 
a) The extent of unionisation at the company level, as measured by union density 
(section 5.6); 
b) The existence of closed shop schemes at the company level (section 5.7). 
The existing empirical literature for the U.K. suggests that the latter has no 
appreciable effect on investment and/or innovation performance3 . As far as union 
density is concerned, no clear-cut findings are available, although Denny and Nickell 
(1992) show that if a union is recognised than it benefits investment to have a high 
union density. It should also be noticed that where the previous remark about union 
3See the survey in section 1.7. 
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bargaining power IS of the utmost relevance IS III the interpretation of the results 
involving umon density conditional on recognition. In accordance with the non-
cooperative theory of wage bargaining, umon density cannot be thought of as a 
"proxy" or determinant of umon bargaining power. Indeed, by determining the 
inside option for the firm III the event of a strike, umon density contributes, 
together with union bargaining power itself, to determine the wage outcome (see the 
model in section 1.5). This is the stance taken in chapter 1. Accordingly, the results 
on the effects of union density on investment performance presented in section 5.6 
should not be interpreted as providing the "direct test", l.e. III terms of umon 
bargaining power, of the predictions mentioned above. It is to be remarked, though, 
that the opposite Vlew could be supported should the cooperative approach to 
bargaining theory be accepted (with the ancillary assumption that umon density 
alone is a valid proxy for union barganing power4). 
The next step of the analysis is to include in the sample also the companies 
that have experienced some changes in union status during the eighties in order to 
provide a more exhaustive picture (section 5.9). The most interesting issue here is to 
determine whether there IS a significant "short-run" impact on investment 
performance an sIng from derecognition (either partial or complete) which is most 
usually the form taken by changes in union status during the period. The extent of 
derecognition in the sample is by no means large, but still sufficient to carry out an 
4See Svejnar (1986) on the issue of determining explanatory variables for union power 
inside the cooperative approach. 
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accurate statistic analysis of its effects. The issue of the impact of changes in union 
status on the propensity to invest of U.K. companies is of clear relevance for the 
evaluation of the new industrial relations policies introduced by the British 
governments during the eighties. 
Finally, it should also be noticed that the theoretical models presented III 
chapters 2 and 3 deal exclusively with the effect of UnIons on innovation and 
investment performance through wage bargaining. In section 1.8 this channel has 
been labelled as the "indirect effect" of unionisation to be distinguished from the 
ability of UnIons to directly affect innovation and investment, for instance VIa 
workers' resistance to technical progress or other similar mechanisms which impose 
direct costs on the adoption of new technologies or capital equipment. For example, 
union power can be thought to affect the adjustment costs for the installation of 
new capital. The distinction between direct effects and effects through the wage is a 
relevant issue for the estimation process. A quantitative assessment of the direct 
and indirect union effects will be carried out in section 5.10. The main findings are 
summarised in section 5.11. 
5.2 THE INVESTMENT EQUATION 
A formal model of investment from which the estimated equations are 
derived is presented in Appendix 5A. The model follows Denny and Nickell (1992). 
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A standard intertemporal optimising decision over investment in the presence of 
adjustment cost is coupled with period by period wage bargaining between the firm 
and the union modelled according to the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution in a 
Right-to-Manage framework. The formal analysis of the model is developed in 
Appendix 5A. In the absence of strong guidance from the theory linear 
approximations are taken and the following empirical investment equation IS 
derived5 (leaving aside the concern with union variables for a moment): 
+ {34· EMPLOYMENTit + {3s· PCAP it + {36· DLRit + {37· DQRit 
(5.1) 
(subscript i refers to companies) 
Where, as introduced in the previous chapter, 
INV = Investment-Sales ratio (x100) 
WAGEGR = Annual percentage growth of per capita average wages. 
SALESGR = Annual percentage growth of sales (using current values) 
PROFIT = Pre tax profit/Sales 
EMPLOYMENT = Total employment at the company level 
PCAP = Price (index) of capital 
SFinancial indicators, i.e. the debt/equity and t~e cash/liabilities ratios, are added to 
the equation derived from the formal modeL 
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CLR = Cash - Liabilities Ratio 
DER = Debt - Equity ratio 
All variables but PCAp6 are defined at the company level. The a's are company 
specific effects. 
This represents a very standard approach to modelling investment (see III 
addition to Denny and Nickell (1992), Machin and Wadhwani (1991b), Hirsch 
(1990, 1992), Urga (1991)). 
In equation (5.1) the growth of sales and the profit variable are meant to 
capture the demand side, with profits being also relevant for the financing of new 
capital equipment. The growth of labour cost IS captured by the wage variable. 
Once agam it IS stressed that the wage m the data is defined as the ratio between 
total labour costs and the number of employees, hence it IS not the same as the 
bargained wage. The role of the employment variable is mainly to control for size 
effects. Finally, variables related to the financial situation of the company are also 
included in the equation 7. 
The questionnaire set up by the NIESR includes also information on the 
6Regression results presented below do not include PCAP, an industry level price of 
capital and investment index computed using the Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting 
(PINCCA), whose coefficient is always statistically not significant. 
7 Sources for all these variables have been given in Appendix 4B. See Appendix 5C for 
the definition of all the variables involved in the regression analysis for whom data are reported 
in this chapter. In section 4.2 it was also pointed out that a measure of the capital stock at the 
beginning of the period is not available (see the discussion about the application of the 
Wadwhani and Wall (1986) technique). It should also be recalled that as a result of the same 
technique some entries for the investment variable are negative (see descriptive statistics in the 
same chapter). 
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composition and characteristics of the workforce. This information proves very 
valuable for the analysis of investment performance because it can be reasonably 
assumed that workforce composition is related to the type of technologies employed 
by the firms. More specifically, the following indicators can be obtained: 
PTIM = Percentage of part-time employees in the company's total workforce. Part-
timers are defined as employees working less than 30 hours a week. 
SKIL Percentage of skilled manual employees. These are defined m the 
questionnaire as workers who reqUIre special training, involving formal certificates 
or qualification recognised by many employers as appropriate to their work. 
NMAN Percentage of non-manual employees, l.e. employees involved in clerical, 
administrative, secretarial, supervisory, professional or managerial tasks. 
FEM = Percentage of female workers. 
Only time varying variables at the company level have been analysed m the 
descriptive statistics presented above. 
Unlike all the variables appearing in equation (5.1), only the values at the 
time the questionnaire was carried out (July 1990) are known for the workforce 
composition indicators8 . Moreover, the inclusion of the workforce composition 
variables involves a reduction m the sample with respect to the data used for the 
analysis of the descriptive statistics in the prevIOUS chapter, SInce for a set of 
companies information is not available for some or, mostly, all of the four variables 
8Hence no question was asked about the change~ in the composition of the workforce 
during the eighties. 
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defined above. 
For the sake of the understanding of the estimation techniques used below it 
IS important to stress again the different nature of the workforce composition 
variables with respect to the regressors appearing in equation (5.1). The former are 
end of period values and, as such, these regressors are time invariant within each 
company. The latter are in contrast time varying9 . 
5.3 THE DATA: A REASSESSMENT 
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, this section IS aimed at 
providing some basic information and descriptive statistics, especially for the 
workforce composition variables, also in light of the change in the sample size with 
respect to the previous chapter. 
As in chapter 4 the starting sample will include all the companies that did 
not experIence any change III umon status (i.e. partial or complete move towards 
derecognition, or conversely, towards recognition). Once compames are deleted 
because of the lack of information on workforce characteristics, the sample 
comprIses 253 companies with 1322 observations over the period 1983-8910. This is 
9But see below for some comments on the financial measures CLR and DER. 
lOOne (unionised) company has been additionally deleted from the sample at this stage 
because of the unreliability of its investment/sales entries which proved to be suspiciously too 
high (all the values were far higher than 1) and such as to distort the statistical properties of 
the sample (the coefficient of skewness was 3.83 without this company and 13.91 when the 
company was included). 
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the sample used in the first set of estimations in section 5.4. The rest of this section 
provides some descriptive statistics with a particular emphasis on the analysis of 
workforce composition that has not been covered in the previous chapter. 
Table 5.1 provides the distribution of the firms In the sample by the 
number of time periods available (with a mInImUm of 2 to a maXImum of 7 
observations)l1. More than half the compames (138 out of 253) have 6 or 7 
available observations. Table 5.2 gIves the distribution of the compames by SIC 
sectors (see Appendix 4C for the definition of the sectors). Out of 253 companies, 
162 belonged to the manufacturing sector (SIC sectors 2, 3 and 4), with sector 4 
(including the food, drink, tobacco, textile, chothing and paper industries) being 
the most heavily represented. Some 28 % of the companies belonged to the 
commercial serVIces sector (sector 6). Table 5.2 also provides information on the 
number of companies recogmsIng a umon (or more than one) for the purpose of 
wage bargaining. This information IS also disaggregated by sector In the same 
table. 
About 56% of the compames are unionised. The percentage III the 
manufacturing sector is around 64 %, with unionisation reaching 3/4 of the 
available companies in sectors 2 and 4, whereas only about 28% of the companies in 
the commercial services sector are unionised. 
From the questionnaire carried out by the NIESR, it IS also possible to 
llRecords of observations need not be continuous over the years (see section 4.2). 
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determine the number of companies recogmsIng umons In all establishments, and 
not only In some (this variable is labelled RECALL In subsequent regressions.) 
Recognition is complete, in the sense now specified, in about 56 % of the unionised 
companies (see table 5.2), with the ratio being close to 1/2 in every sector, with the 
exception of sector 4, where it is about 2/3. 
Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 present basic descriptive statistics for the variables 
involved in the estimated equations. Table 5.3 shows some basic statistics for the 
workforce composition and unionisation variables. These represent the time 
invariant, but company specific, variables used in the estimation process. The 
statistics in table 5.3 refer to the group values (253 cases are used), while tables 5.4 
and 5.5 give results based on the pooling of all observations (1322 cases are used). 
The results differ, but only slightly, because of the unbalanced nature of the panel. 
The results on unionisation in table 5.3 simply repeat the findings discussed 
above. As far as the composition of the workforce is concerned, the mean (across 
companies) of the incidence of part-time workers out of the total workforce is about 
5 %12. The means for non manual, skilled and female workers are 46, 31, and 18 %, 
respectively. It can also be shown that, as expected, part-timers and non-manual 
workers are more easily found in the commercial services (with means of 9.5 and 
54.5%, respectively), while the incidence of skilled workers does not differ much 
across man ufact uring and services (these statistics are not reported). 
12The table reports means not weighted by company employment levels. 
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Table 5.3(A) also highlights a feature which will be relevant in the 
estimation process. While non manual and female workers are represented in every 
company's workforce (minimum is 1 % for both), there are some companies that do 
not employ any part-timers and some companies that do not employ any skilled 
workers. This subset of companies proves to be substantial. This can be checked by 
looking at the statistics for PTYES and SKIL YES. These two variables are 
dummies taking a value of 1 if the company was employing some part-time or 
skilled workers respectively (i.e. if PTIM>O and SKIL>O). It is easily seen from 
table 5.3(A) that 1/4 of the companies do not employ any part-timers, and almost 
15 % do not employ any skilled workers. 
Table 5.3(B) gIves the correlation matrix for the workforce composition 
variables. The proportion of female workers IS positively correlated with the 
percentage of part-timers, as would be expected, and with the percentage of non 
manual workers, while being negatively related to the presence of skilled employees. 
There is also evidence of a negative correlation between skilled and non manual 
workers. 
To complete this analysis means for unionised and non-unionised companies 
are reported in table 5.3(C). As far as workforce composition variables are 
concerned, unionised compames appear to employ relatively more skilled workers, 
and less female and non manual workers, while no striking difference appears as far 
as part-time workers are concerned. 
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Finally, two other dummy variables are added to the data. The rationale 
for this is the fact that both financial variables present a substantial grouping of 
observations around zero. As a consequence the following variables are defined: 
DCLR= 1 if CLR > 0, 0 otherwise 
DDER = 1 if DER >0, 0 otherwise. 
As table 5.4 shows, the Debt-Equity ratio (DER) has a value of zero for nearly 40% 
of the observations. The correspondent figure for the Cash- Liabilities ratio (CLR) is 
above 25 %. It should also be noticed that, unlike PTYES and SKIL YES13, DCLR 
and DDER are not necessarily time invariant at the company level. 
5.4 THE EFFECT OF UNION RECOGNITION ON THE PROPENSITY TO 
INVEST 
The results presented in this section, as well as in sections 5.5 to 5.S, refer 
to the sample of companies that did not experience any change in union status (in 
the sense introduced above) during the eighties. The basic estimated equation can be 
summed up as follows 
(5.2) 
13 And indeed unlike all variables whose statistics are reported in table 5.3(A). 
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where, as pointed out in section 5.2, 
x = (SALESGR, WAGEGR, PROFIT, EMPLOYMENT, DCLR, CLR, DDER, 
DER) 
represents the set of time varying (at the company level) explanatory variables, and 
Z = (PTYES, PTIM, SKIL YES, SKIL, NMAN, FEM) 
represents the set of workforce composition indicators. They are company specific as 
well, but time invariant (they are end of period values or related dummies). Finally, 
U will refer to unionisation measures (union recognition, the variable REC, to start 
with), all defined at the company level. Hence equation (5.2) adds the following set 
of regressors to equation (5.1) presented in section 5.2: 
a) dummies for financial indicators (DCLR and DDER), 
b) workforce composition indicators (the regressors in Z), 
c) unionisation measures (U). 
As a reference point for the ensumg analysis table 5.6 presents the 
estimation results from equation (5.2) omitting any unionisation regressor. Results 
are provided for the estimated equation without sector dummies first (first and 
second columns), and then with dummies (third and fourth columns)14. Sectors are 
defined as one-digit SIC aggregations (see above and appendix 4C). More on the 
issue of industry dummies will follow later. 
The coefficients In table 5.6 are obtained according to two alternative 
14Coefficients for industry dununies are not reported in the tables. 
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estimation techniques: 
(1) OLS on the pooled data without group dummy variables. This is labelled OLS 
in the tables. 
(2) Feasible GLS estimates for the Random Effects Model. These are labelled as 
FGLS in the tables15. 
Appendix 5B gIves technical details on the estimation procedures introduced 
The choice of Random Effects panel data techniques stems from the 
inability to use fixed effects modelling, due to the presence of time invariant (within 
companies) regressors, i.e. all the regressors in Z, and, more importantly, most of 
the unionisation measures used in the analysis (recognition, above all). 
The results III table 5.6 show quite vividly the positive effect of demand 
growth (as measured by company sales) as well as profitability on companies' 
propensity to invest. Since the dependent variable, INV, IS defined as 
(investment/sales)x100, the investment-sales ratio increases by roughly .00018, 
ceteris paribus, when sales growth increases by one point17. This result entails that 
an acceleration of sales growth of one percentage point affects the investment-sales 
ratio by around 2.5 % of its value, when evaluated around the sample mean. On the 
15The same pattern is followed throghout the chapter in the presentation of the results 
unless otherwise stated. 
16 A third estimation technique has been employed according to the suggestion in Hsiao 
(1986), see Appendix 5B. No results are reported for this technique. 
17Figures from the FGLS estimates without sector dummies are used. 
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other hand, an mcrease of one point in profitability, measured as a percentage of 
sales, would increase the investment performance as measured by INV by 083 . 
, , . ,l.e. 
by around 1/10 of the investment/sales ratio when evaluated at the mean. Finally, 
an increase in wage costs affects investment negatively (and significantly) with 
roughly the same order of magnitude as for sales growth. No effect of SIze (as 
proxied by total employment) on the investment-sales ratio is detected. 
As far as the financial variables are concerned the results show that the 
propensity to invest decreases as the cash/liabilities ratio (eLR) increases. On the 
other hand, a positive debt/equity ratio (cf. DDER) brings about higher investment, 
ceteris paribus, and this effect is positively dependent on the relative amount of debt 
(cf. DER). 
As far as the workforce composition measures are concerned, it is easily seen 
that the propensity to invest is positively and significantly affected by the incidence 
of skilled workers among the employees. This result can be seen to favour the view 
that technologically advanced companies, as proxied by a high percentage of skilled 
workers, invest relatively more. The results for female workers and, especially, part-
timers, seem, though, surprising when interpreted in a "technological" perspective. 
The coefficients for both categories of workers are positive and significant. No 
variable IS available In the dataset to provide a more in depth analysis of these 
results. Finally, the percentage of non-manual workers does not affect III a 
noticeable way the propensity to invest. 
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Inspection of the results in table 5.6 suggests the two following remarkable 
features. First, switching from OLS to FGLS estimates generally brings about only 
a slight change in the magnitude of the coefficients. Second, the inclusion of sectoral 
dummies does not affect the sign and the size of the coefficients in a noticeable way. 
It will be seen that these remarks also apply to most of the rest of the analysis. 
U nionisation is introduced into the picture by adding a recognition dummy 
(= REC) to the estimated equation. Results are presented in table 5.7. It is easily 
seen that the comments made above on the coefficients of the non-union variables 
still apply with the only modest exception of the female workers percentage which is 
now barely significant at the 10% level. 
According to the results of table 5.7 investment as a percentage of sales is 
lowered by almost half of a point (.45), ceteris paribus, if companies recognise a 
umon (or more than one). This result is not modified when sector dummies are 
included. The estimated coefficient for REC indicates a reduction of around 40% in 
the investment-sales ratio for unionised companies relative to the non-union mean. 
This negative union recognition effect is smaller than the raw union - non-union 
difference based on sample means (.62). At present no attempt is made to comment 
on the disaggregation of this result by sectors and across time. The reader is referred 
to section 5.8 for this analysis. 
As pointed out in the previous section the dataset also contains information 
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the results shown above. On the other hand, the route can be suggested of using the 
original three-digit values provided by the dataset. The trouble arising from this 
choice is that, as expected, the disaggregation turns out to be very fine with the 
drawback that for some cases industry dummies and company specific effects cannot 
be distinguished. This creates problems in the estimation process (the FGLS 
estimates cannot be obtained). 
It has then been decided to try to strike a happy medium by groupmg 
compames into two-digit SIC industries m such a way as to avoid the 
aforementioned problem and reach a suitable degree of disaggregation. This 
grouping procedure is obviously arbitrary, but it has been done to investigate the 
robustness of the estimation results presented above. 
Table 5.9 presents the results when these two-digit dummies are included in 
the equation. The list of the actual two-digit industries employed is given in the 
note following the table. Coefficients for the dummies are not reported. The results 
must be compared with the findings of tables 5.7 and 5.8. Two interesting results 
can be noticed. First, the coefficient for recognition is now reduced (from around 
- 0.45 to - 0.35) and it is statistically significant at the 10 % (not 5 %) level. 
Second the coefficients for both the incidence of female and part-time workers, , 
which were deemed as surprising before, are now not statistically different from 
zero. 
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5.5 UNIONISATION, PRODUCT MARKET CONDITIONS AND INVESTMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
It has been suggested that a rIgorous assessment of the impact of unionisation, or, 
more generally, industrial relations arrangements on firms' economic performance 
should incorporate some features relating to the product market conditions 
companies are faced with19. As far as union effects on wages are concerned, Stewart 
(1990) has stressed the relevance of the extent of product market competition in 
determining the ability of unions to raise wages. Stewart uses data from WIRS 1984 
to show that unions are unable to achieve any wage premium, ceteris paribus, if the 
firm they face operates in a competitive product market2o. Conversely if the firm 
has some degree of market power, the mean umon (recognition) - non-umon wage 
differential is, ceteris paribus, around 8-10 %21. Stewart also shows that when firms 
operate m international markets the ability of unions to raIse wages IS impaired. 
Finally, Machin (1991a) has stressed the relevance of product market conditions to 
the ability of unions to affect profitability. 
When the U.K. experience of the eighties is looked at, some analysts have 
19 As Booth stresses (1994, 58), it has been customary in the analysis of union effects to 
assume perfectly competitive product markets as well as closed shop conditions. See Dowrick 
(1989) for a model of union-firm wage bargaining under oligopoly. 
20Data refer to gross weekly pay for semi-skilled workers in the private sector. 
21Mishel (1986, 103) using U.S. data concludes that "union wage gains are greater 
where entry barriers, concentrated markets and low import competition give employers 
discretionary power". But see Stewart (1990) for some limit~tions of Mishel's analysis. 
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pushed the relevance of product market competition to such extent to claim that 
product market conditions have completely outweighed unionisation arrangements 
as a key determinant of companies' performance and success in the period. This 
stance is taken by Brown and Wadhwani (1990). They claim that "there has been a 
tendency to exaggerate the impact of trade unions on both wages and employment" 
(Brown - Wadhwani (1990, 68)). Moreover they suggest that "it has been 
competitive pressure that has forced employers to act and the stance they have 
adopted towards their trade unions has been of secondary importance" in such a 
way that "the driving force has been increased product market competition ... which 
has obliged employers to put their own houses in order" . 
Gregg and Machin (1992) in their analysis of the impact of unionisation on 
wage growth during the eighties share the view that product market competition 
has been the foremost factor. They conclude that "the majority of firms which 
experienced negative relative wage growth effects are those that faced an 
intensification of competition through the 1980's" (Gregg and Machin (1992, 66)). 
The purpose of this section is to assess the robustness of the findings on the 
effects of unionisation on companies' investment behaviour by drawing on the 
information on product market conditions available III the dataset. Two different 
pieces of information are considered. 
1. Information on the product market situation (more specifically, the number of 
competitors) at the time the NIESR questionnaire was carried out. This is analysed 
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in subsection 5.5.1. 
2. Information on the changes in the extent of competition from both domestic and 
foreign market rivals during the eighties. This is analysed in subsection 5.5.2. 
§5.5.1 The "Static" Analysis 
The NIESR dataset provides information about the number of direct 
competitors each company was facing in its major domestic product market (or 
markets). More precisely, it is known whether the company was facing more or less 
than five direct competitors, or no competitors at all. This information is available 
for all companies used in the previous section but one. 
Table 5.10 shows the distribution of companies (and observations) in terms 
of the extent of competition. About 85% of the companies were faced by more than 
five direct domestic competitors. Conversely, only 5 companies out of 252 were 
operating in monopolistic conditions. The following two dummy variables have been 
constructed and added to equation (5.2). MONOP takes a value of 1 if the company 
faces no competitors. FEWCO takes a value of 1 if the company faces less than five 
competitors (including the case of no rivals). The aim is to assess whether the extent 
of (static) product market competition affects the propensity to invest. Results are 
reported in table 5.11. 
There seems to be evidence that, ceteris paribus, compames facing a 
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restricted competitive pressure fare better III terms of investment performance22. 
Again it IS important to stress the limitation, III VIew of its static nature, of this 
indicator of product market conditions. The comments made above on the other 
regressors, and, particularly, on the sign and size of union recognition, still apply23. 
§5.5.2 The "Dynamic" Analysis 
The dataset also provides information as to whether compames faced 
increased or decreased competition during the eighties III their major product 
markets from both domestic and foreign rivals. As for much of the available 
information24, this question was spelled out with reference to two distinct time 
periods, namely 1980-84 and 1985-89. The sample size is restricted with respect to 
sub-section 5.5.1 because answers are not available for some companies25 . 
Table 5.12(A) shows that the share of compames III the sample that 
experienced an increase in competition from domestic rivals went up from around 57 
to 72 % moving from the first to the second half of the decade. This result stems 
from the percentage of companies unaffected by changes in competition falling from 
35 to 20 % in the same periods, with the share of firms faced with decreased 
22The coefficient for MONOP is not significant, but it should be taken into account 
that just a handful of companies fall in this category. 
23Interactions between product market conditions and recognition have not proved 
significant and results are not reported. 
24See particularly section 5.9. 
25It should also be noticed that the question on domestic competition received more 
answers than the one on foreign competition. Hence the diffe'rent sample size in the tables below. 
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competition being the same over time. It is also ea.sily seen from table 5.12(A) that 
about half the companies experienced increased competition in both periods. Related 
results for changes in foreign competition are presented m table 5.12(B). These 
results mIrror the ones for domestic competition with around half the companies 
expenencmg an Illcrease of rivalry during both periods and an mcrease m the 
percentage of companies faced by more foreign competition from 59 to 71 % over 
the two periods. 
The information on the changes III the strength of competition over time 
has been added to the estimation analysis by defining the following new variables. 
UKCOUP takes a value of 1 for all the years a given company has experienced an 
increase in domestic competition, i.e. either the years 1983-84 or 1985-89 or both26, 
if such change was experienced at all. UKCODO is defined by the same token for 
the case of decreased domestic competition. Definitions for increased and decreased 
foreign competition, FCOUP and FCODO respectively, follow the same pattern27. 
It is worthwhile noticing that these new regressors are not necessarily time invariant 
at the company level, since, as stressed in table 5.12, companies can fall in one 
category in a sub-period and in a different one in the other sub-period28. 
Table 5.13 presents estimation results when the regressors relating to 
26Since years 1980-82 are not included in the sample. 
27 See below for the reasons why UKCODO and FCODO do not appear in the tables. 
28The alternative route could be taken to define company specific (time invariant) 
dummies by using the disaggregation provided in tables 5.12, with 9 categories for UK 
competition and 6 for foreign competition. Estimation results have been obtained also using this 
method. They did not differ noticeably from the results pre~ented in tables 5.13 and 5.14. 
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domestic competition are added to equation (5.2). Tables 5.14 presents the results 
on foreign competition. Results including also interactions between domestic and 
foreign competition are not presented because they do not add any useful 
information. Estimation results including both the increase and decrease in 
competition from either domestic rivals (UKCOUP and UKCODO) or foreign rivals 
(FCOUP and FCODO) respectively, clearly show that the coefficients for UKCODO 
and FCODO are very imprecisely estimated, whatever the estimation technique. As 
a consequence these regressors have been dropped from the estimated equations 
presented here (only UKCOUP and FCOUP are used). 
The results show that the strengthening of competition from domestic rivals 
does not seem to affect, ceteris paribus, the companies' investment performance (the 
coefficient for UKCOUP in table 5.13 is not significant). On the other hand, this 
effect appears to be achieved by an increase in competition from foreign rivals, 
although this result is slightly less pronounced when sector dummies are added (see 
table 5.14). 
As was the case for the "static" analysis (see prevIOUS subsection), the 
magnitude of the umon effect on investment IS not noticeably altered by the 
inclusion of controls for product market conditions. 
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5.6 UNION DENSITY AND INVESTMENT 
The analysis of the effects of unionisation on investment carried out so far 
has been limited to the comparison between companies that recognise a union (or 
more than one) and those that do not. The purpose of this section and the next is to 
attempt to distinguish between unionised companies III terms of the differences III 
umon density (this section) as well as in terms of the presence of additional 
industrial relations arrangements such as closed shop schemes (next section). In both 
sections the analysis continues to concern the sample of companies that did not 
experIence any change (partial or complete) in umon recognition. In both cases, 
though, some companies will be lost with respect to the dataset used in section 5.4 
because of lack of answers. 
Union density represents an indicator of the extent of unionisation, but the 
discussion III section 5.1 has provided a warning towards the interpretation of 
density as a "measure" of bargaining power. In this section information on umon 
density conditional on recognition will be employed to assess if any valuable insight 
is added to the explanation of investment performance. No claim is made that the 
results obtained refer to the effect of union power on companies' investment 
behaviour. 
An important feature of the NIESR data IS that, unlike the umon 
221 
recognition variables in sections 5.2 to 5.5 (cf. REC and RECALL), union density is 
not necessarily time invariant at the company level since annual figures are 
available. Indeed, out of 122 recognised companies whose union density figures are 
provided, 57 (47%) experienced some variation in the extent of unionisation in the 
periods for which data are available29. More specifically, there has been an increase 
in union density in 13 companies (11%) and a decrease In 43 (35%) with 
unionisation staying unchanged in the remaining 6630. 
Table 5.15 gIves the distribution of umon density across firms USIng 
company means over time. For a more in depth analysis of the descriptive statistics 
on union density readers are referred to chapter 431 . 
The results of estimation when umon density conditional on recognition 
(variable DENSITY) is added to equation (5.2), with REC being omitted, are 
shown in table 5.16. DENSITY has a significantly negative coefficient. Investment, 
as a percentage of sales, is lowered by around .0059, ceteris paribus, by an increase of 
one point In unlOn density. Hence, the contraction brought about by a one point 
increase in density accounts for about .5% of the mean non-union investment-sales 
ratio32• 
The question IS now open as to whether non-linearities and/or 
290bviously the time periods in question may differ from company to company. 
30For one company the end period figure of density is the same as the initial value but 
some variation occurred in the meanwhile. 
31The companies analysed here represent a subset of those employed in chapter 4, 
because of the lack of information on workforce characteristics. 
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discontinuities exist In the effect of union density on investment performance. The 
existence of discontinuities and threshold effects In umon density has been 
established by the theoretical literature on endogenous umon membership III the 
presence of "social customs" (see Naylor (1989, 1990), Naylor-Cripps (1993), and 
Booth-Chatterji (1993)). For instance, Naylor (1990) shows that a "critical mass" of 
joiners needs to be reached in order to bring about unionisation in a "social custom" 
model with fixed wage. On the other hand, Naylor and Cripps (1993) show, by 
drawing on the non-cooperative approach to wage bargaining, that a threshold must 
be reached by union membership for the union to be able to raise wages above the 
outside option. Stewart (1990, 1991) has provided empirical evidence for the 
existence of such thresholds USIng data from WIRS 1984. The results are neatly 
summarised In Metcalf-Stewart (1992). Stewart shows that the wage premIUm 
associated with union recognition (between 7 and 10 %33, ceteris paribus) is obtained 
only when union density is above 95 %. Below this threshold the wage in unionised 
establishments IS III line, ceteris paribus, with non-unionised establishments. 
Moreover, Stewart shows that the existence of a pre-entry closed shop involving at 
least some of the workforce roughly doubles the wage differential with respect to 
comparable non-unionised establishments on top of the high density effect. No such 
32The reduction in investment, as a percentage of sales, for recognised comparues, 
relative to non-union firms, is around 1/3 of a point when evaluated at the mean density 
conditional on recognition (56.7 %). This amounts to a reduction of about 30% in the investment-
sales ratio relative to non-union companies. 
33Figures refer to semi-skilled workers in the private sector. 
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additional effect is instead detected for post-entry closed shops. 
After experimenting with the data on the basis of various assumptions, 
some evidence, but definitely not overwhelming, seems to suggest that the negative 
effect of union density on investment is mostly originated by companies with an 
intermediate extent of unionisation. Conversely, very highly and poorly (in terms of 
density) unionised companies both seem not to perform differently from firms that 
do not recognise unions. To substantiate this suggestion with numerical figures it 
can be claimed that the lower threshold IS situated around 25 % with the upper 
limit being established at around 90 %. 
Table 5.17 shows the estimation results when variables UD<25, which takes 
a value of 1 whenever the annual figure of union density is strictly below 25%, and 
UD>90, a dummy for values of union density (strictly) greater than 90 %, are 
added to REC in equation (5.2). The estimated coefficients for UD<25 and UD>90 
are positive, with the latter not very precisely estimated, and of such magnitude to 
counteract the effect on investment of the recognition coefficient. A series of 
experiments have been carried out by varymg the upper and, especially, the lower 
threshold for umon density m order to determine the extent to which the results 
presented above are sensitive to the definition of the boundaries. The mam 
suggestion seems to be preserved, albeit less clearly as the threshold moves upwards 
away from 25 % (see table 5.18 where the lower threshold for density is equal to 
224 
In terms of investment performance, therefore, a company facing a UnIon 
with a low density fares roughly the same, ceteris paribus, as a company facing no 
union. This result is in line with the theoretical and empirical findings that a 
threshold for density is needed for unions to be able to affect the wage. The data do 
not seem to support Denny and Nickell's (1992) view that if a union is recognised 
then it benefits investment to have a large density (see section 1.7), since "the 
management need deal only with union representatives rather than having to make 
separate arrangements for a substantial body of non-union workers" (Denny and 
Nickell (1992, 880-81)). This result seems to hold only for a high level of union 
density (above 90 %). It is only for a umon with high density that the rationale 
suggested by Denny and Nickell, or, alternatively, the internalisation by the union 
of the company's objectives, seems to apply. For intermediate values of density, 
investment performance is negatively affected by the extent of unionisation at the 
company level. 
5.7 CLOSED SHOP ARRANGEMENTS AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of this section is to assess whether the additional presence of 
closed shop arrangements in unionised companies has a separate effect on 
investment behaviour. For instance, if closed shop schemes entail restrictive work 
practices37, then a negative effect on investment or innovative activity could be 
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thought to anse. Machin (1991b), for instance, usmg data on Brl·tl·sh engineering 
firms over the period 1978-1982, finds some evidence for a negative impact of the 
closed shop on productivity for large firms. 
A closed shop scheme in the NIESR data is defined as the presence of "an 
arrangement with any trade union (or unions) that some or all of the workforce 
would normally be members of a trade union to get or keep their jobs,,38. 
On the basis of this information a new dummy variable has been defined, 
CLOSED, which takes a value of 1 for companies where such schemes exist (and 0 
otherwise). Out of 131 unionised companies39 closed shop arrangement existed in 32 
(24.4 %). Table 5.21 presents the distribution of union density for companies with a 
closed shop scheme40 (using group means for union density). It is easily seen that 
the existence of a closed shop is not necessarily related with a large union density 
at the company level. 
Estimation results for the equation with the CLOSED dummy added to 
recognition are presented III table 5.22. No effect of closed shops per se can be 
37 See Dunn-Gennard (1984) for a study of the closed shop in British industry. 
38Separate information is provided as to whether all workers are covered by the scheme 
or just some. This additional information did not prove useful and it is disregarded in this 
section. See Gregg -Yates (1991, 366-68) for the analysis of the presence of closed-shop schemes in 
the NIESR survey. 
39For consistency with the "static" nature of the analysis of the effects of union 
recognition presented above, companies that experienced changes in their closed shop 
arrangements (abolition, for instance) during the eighties have been dropped from the sample. 
40The percentages in table 5.21 do not represent the proportion of workers covered by 
closed shop schemes, but union density at the company level where such schemes exist. Note also 
that for three companies with closed shop information on un.ion density is not available. 
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detected. This result confirms the findings III Denny-Nickell (1992) and Latreille 
(1992) that closed shop arrangements have no significant separate effect on either 
investment or innovation (see section 1.7). 
The results of the prevIOUS section have provided some evidence that 
unionised compames with a high umon density (above 90 %) have a different 
investment performance, ceteris paribus, with respect to compames with an 
intermediate level of unionisation. It can be of some interest to assess whether this 
effect can be related to the presence of closed shop schemes involving a large section 
of the workforce. In table 5.23 CS>90 interacts the presence of a closed shop with a 
percentage of unionisation above 90%41. It IS easily seen that the differential 
behavior of companies with very large unionisation is not affected by controlling for 
the existence of a closed shop. 
5.8 DISAGGREGATION ACROSS TIME AND SECTORS 
This section presents some remarks on the disaggregation of the results 
across time and sectors. 
First, unreported annual cross-sections results have suggested a differential 
effect of union recognition on investment performance between the first and second 
41Needless to say the companies fulfilling the conditions defining this regressor are just 
a handful. Hence the results must be interpreted very cautiously. Only OLS estimates are 
reported for these equations. 
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half of the period of interest. This outcome IS confirmed in table 5.24 which 
separately reports the results for periods 1983-85 and 1986-89 (only FGLS estimates 
are reported)42. The coefficient for union recognition, albeit negative, IS much 
smaller and not significant III the second part of the eighties43. Moreover, wage 
growth turns out not to be significant in the first period, while part-time and female 
workers' percentages affect investment only in the second period. 
One of the features of the dataset used III this chapter is the range of 
groupsizes (from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 7). It could then be interesting 
to assess whether results are affected by the presence in the data of companies with 
an extremely small number of observations. This is achieved by deleting all 
companies whose groupsize is (strictly) below 6. The results of estimation (without 
sectoral dummies) and the disaggregation over time when only companies with 
either 6 or 7 observations are kept III the data are shown III table 5.25 (138 
compames and 883 observations survive). Unionisation still has a negative, albeit 
slightly reduced, effect, but the t-ratio IS now just below the critical value for 
significancy at the 10 % level when FGLS estimates are used. All comments made 
before still apply also with respect to the comparison between the two time periods. 
42The sample size differs from section 5.4 because companies are kept in the dataset 
only if at least two observations (and not just one) are available in either sub-period (or both). 
Hence the slight reduction in the number of companies and observations. 
43The null hypothesis of stability of all parameters (including the intercept and the 
sectoral dummies) over the two periods is accepted using the F-test at the 10 % significance level. 
The test statistics are F 16,1244 = 1.43 and F 22,1232 = 1.13 for the equations with and without 
dununies respectively. 
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Finally, table 5.26 provides a quick sketch of the disaggregation across 
sectors. Only OLS estimates are pfovided44• It is easily seen that results are not 
homogeneous with union recognition having a negative (and significant) impact only 
in sectors 3 (Metal Goods, Engineering and Vehicle Industries) and 6 (Commercial 
Services). 
5.9 CHANGES IN UNION STATUS AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 
The analysis carried out so far has concerned only the set of companies that 
did not undergo any change in union recognition during the eighties focusing mostly 
on the comparison between unionised and non-unionised firms. In this section the 
analysis IS extended to take into account changes III umon status, I.e recognition, 
during the period 1980-89. This IS made possible by the quite extensive range of 
information available from the NIESR dataset. As a result, a chance is provided to 
assess if the changes III the industrial relations arrangements during the Eighties 
have brought about any consequence III terms of companies' investment 
performance45• Although no direct link can be made between these changes in the 
extent of unionisation and the ongoing transformation of industrial relations and 
44For some sectors FGLS could not be estimated because one of the estimated variance 
components was negative (see Appendix 5B). Sectors 1 and 7 are omitted because of the 
insufficient number of observations. 
45See on this debate Brown-Wadhwani (1990), Metcalf (1993, 1994) and Blanchflower-
Fre~man (1994). 
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labour market legislation enacted by the British Government since 1979 th I 
, e resu ts 
described below can at least shed some light on some of the basic claims that 
motivate those policies. In particular, it is interesting to assess whether a reduced 
influence of trade UnIons (a move towards derecognition, for instance) is likely to 
lead to an increase in efficiency at the firm level, namely, in the case studied here~ 
an improved investment performance. 
Data from WIRS show that some derecognition has occurred m the 
eighties. The proportion of establishments with recognised UnIons for manual 
workers has fallen from 61 % III 1980 (and 62 % in 1984) to 48 % in 199046. The 
fall in private sector manufacturing has been from 69 % to 44%. Gregg and Yates 
(1991) using the full data from the NIESR survey on which this work is based find 
that 13 % of the companies that recognised (at least) a union in 1984 have 
derecognised. They also point out that complete derecognition has been rare. These 
data confirm more "anecdotal" evidence gathered by Claydon (1989). Claydon's 
view that derecognition was far more frequent in the second part of the eighties is 
supported by the studies quoted above47. Claydon also reported that derecognition 
tended to be "grade-specific", i.e. involving only particular grades or sections of the 
workforce within the organisation. Disney et al. (1994, 7) summarise their view by 
stressing that "existing evidence suggests that recognition is usually a once and for 
46 According to the computations in Disney et a1. (1993, 23). Recognition has fallen in 
the period also for non-manual workers. 
47Hall and McKay {1994} claim, on the basis of survey evidence, 
recognition has even increased after 1988. 
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that the extent of 
all decision made at some point early in the lifetime of the t bl' h es a IS ment. 
Recognition changes in existing establishments have remained uncomm . on even III 
the 1980 's" . 
The first part of this section will be devoted to a brief analysis of the extent 
of the changes in recognition in the available data. To this purpose it seems helpful 
to recall the procedure for gathering that information used in the NIESR 
questionnaire. 
If a company was recognising a union (or more than one) at the end of the 
period (1990), questions were asked to establish whether any of the following had 
happened over the years 1980-89. 
a) An increase In recognition, i.e an increase in the number of the company's 
establishments were a umon (or more) was recognised for the purpose of wage 
bargaining; 
b) a decrease in recognition, i.e a reduction in the number of establishments where 
unions were recognised but such that some establishments were still unionised at the 
end of the period; 
c) None of the above, i.e the company experienced no change in union recognition. 
Companies in categories a) and b) were not included in the sample used in the 
previous analysis. 
If a company falls In category a), I.e an increase In recognition was 
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experienced, it is also known whether this meant the company was .. 
recogmsmg 
unions for the first time (i.e a new recognition). 
As was the case with the change in domestic and foreign competition, all 
the information just detailed is available in the dataset with a separate reference for 
the sub-periods 1980-84 and 1985-89. For instance, if a company recognised a union 
for the first time in the period, it is then known in which of the two sub-periods the 
change took place. The exact year of the changes, though, is not known. The spread 
of the information over the two sub-periods is an important feature of the data to 
be kept in mind in the ensuing analysis. 
On the other hand, if a company was not recognising any union at the end 
of the period the following is then known: 
d) derecognition took place sometime over the period, i.e the company was indeed 
unionised at the beginning of the eighties; 
e) no change took place. 
Companies in category d) were not included III the sample used in the prevlOUS 
analysis. Again, it is possible to know whether derecognition, if any was 
experienced, took place in the first or in the second sub-period. 
Table 5.27 provides a summary of the information on the extent of the 
changes III umon recognition in the data. All figures refer to the number of 
companies falling in any specific category. The first column in the table refers to the 
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largest sample for which information about umon status and its changes was 
gathered (see the sample in chapter 4). The second column refers to the sample 
employed below in the estimation process48. The difference between the two sizes is 
accounted for by the companies dropped because no information was available on 
the workforce composition characteristics. 
The table first shows the number of companies recognised at the beginning 
and at the end of the period (RECBEG and RECEND, respectively)49. The 
unionisation rate IS almost unchanged at the end of the period at around 60%. 
Hence the fall III umon recognition mentioned above IS not mirrored III this 
particular sample, the reason probably being that figures III table 5.27 refer to 
compames and not establishments as III the WIRS survey. As a matter of fact, 
changes have taken place, as the rest of the table shows. It can be noticed, to start 
with, that the percentage of companies affected by changes, of whatever type, is just 
above 15 %. The total number of companies experiencing a decrease in union 
recognition is given by LESSREC which is made up by the sum of the companies 
where (complete) derecognition took place (DEREC) and of those where 
derecognition was only partial (PARDEREC) thereby affecting only some, but not 
all, of the establishments that were unionised at the beginning. It is easily seen that 
48The distribution by sectors is also reported in the table. 
49Beginning of period here always refers to 1980 and end of period to 1990. RECBEG is 
obtained from the number of companies recognised at the end (RECEND) minus the companies 
that newly recognised unions (NEWREC) plus the companies that ceased to recognise unions in 
the period (DEREC). 
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(complete) derecognition was not common at all (affecting only 10 a d ~ . 
n 'compames 
in the two samples) and that the decline in recognition, experienced by some 10 % 
of the companies, was mostly arising from partial derecognition. 
In table 5.27 changes are also disaggregated across the two sub-periods in 
order to highlight that most of the movement towards partial and complete 
derecognition took place between 1985 and 1989. 
Finally, the extent of the move towards increased recognition (see 
MOREREC which includes companies that were unionised at the beginning of the 
eighties as well as companies where new recognition was experienced) is about half 
as much as the opposite tendency towards derecognition (around 5%). This result is 
again mainly accounted for by an increase in the number of establishments involved 
rather than by new recognition (see NEWREC)50. Also in this case the bulk of the 
changes is concentrated in the second half of the eighties. 
The estimated equation has been reformulated to keep up with the changes 
in information now available. Instead of the unionisation variable employed above 
(REC), a dummy for recognition at the beginning of the period is introduced 
(RECBEG, as defined above where its opposite, RECEND, has been introduced as 
well). The estimated equation tries to capture the effect of decreased recognition (see 
variable LESSREC defined before) and, more specifically, whether a separate effect 
50 . .' ot It can be noticed that the number of companies that newly recogrused a uruon IS n 
too different from the number of those ceasing to recognise. 
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could be detected for a decrease in recognition that leads to n '" 
on-UlllOlllsatlOn at the 
end of the period (i.e complete derecognition, represented by variable DEREC). On 
the other hand it is interesting to assess the effect of increased re ·t· ( . b 
coglll IOn vana Ie 
MOREREC), and more specifically of new recognition (NEWREC, a change which 
modifies the union status of the companies with respect to the initial situation). 
The estimated equation can then be written as follows: 
or, more neatly, 
+ 83 • DERECit + 84 • MORERECit + 85 . NEWRECit (5.3) 
LESSREC takes a value of 1 in year t if in that year, or in any of the years 
before, the company experienced a decrease in recognition (complete or partial)51. 
Similarly MOREREC takes a value of 1 in year t if in that year, or in any of the 
years before, the company experienced an increase in recognition (including the 
event of a new recognition). Finally, DEREC and NEWREC are accordingly 
defined for the case of (complete) derecognition and new recognition, respectively. 
51As pointed out before the exact year of the changes is not known. Therefore the 
deftnition has to be worked out with reference to the two sub-periods 1980-84 and 1895-89. Since 
years 1980-82 are omitted, the definition implies that LESSREC (and any similarly defined 
regressor) can take a value of 1 in either periods 1983-84 and 1985-89 or only in the second. 
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This definition of the regressors stems from the assumption that h ' 
c anges In union 
status have a lasting effect on investment performance. To be more specific, if, for 
instance, a company changed its recognition arrangements in the first half of the 
eighties, it seems sensible to assume that the effect, if any exists on investment 
, 
would not die away in one or two years, but should persist for longer. This route is 
also taken in view of the lack of information on the exact date of the changes In 
union status. 
It should also be noticed that a consequence of the definition of the 
variables IS that regressors LESSREC, MOREREC, DEREC, and NEWREC need 
not be invariant at the company level. For example, if a company chose to 
(partially) derecognise unions in the period 1985-89, the value of LESSREC will 
switch from 0 to 1 moving from years 1983-84 to 1985-8952 . 
On the other hand, RECBEG is obviously unchanged over time, since a 
company was either unionised or non-unionised at the beginning of the period. 
As seen above, derecognitions have been more common in the sample (and 
ill the U.K. economy) than increases in recognition and therefore evidence on the 
effects of the former on investment is of greater interest. Firstly, equation (5.3) has 
been estimated omitting DEREC and NEWREC. Results are presented in table 
5.28. The coefficient for recognition at the beginning of the period is negative and 
52 "t' al over a The use of this type of definition seems to have a more mtUl lve appe 
'fi ' . , d fi ,. b 't temporal dimension in the effect company speCI IC tIme InVarIant e IrutlOn ecause I preserves a 
of the changes which is otherwise lost, 
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significant. This outcome confirms, also in the order of magnitude th I C 
, e resu ts lound 
in section 5.4 about the marginal effects of union recognl'tl'on 0 . 
n Investment 
performance. On the other hand, the coefficient for LESSREC "measures" whether a 
decline in recognition (either complete or partial) affects investment, ceteris paribus. 
The coeffiecient is statistically not different from zero. The same result is shared by 
the coeffiecient for increased recognition (MOREREC, either partial or new 
recognition). Tables 5.29 and 5.30 provide results when the information is added 
about whether decreased (or increased) recognition was partial or complete. First, 
DEREC is added to LESSREC in the equation in order to capture whether 
"complete derecognition" makes a difference in the results (table 5.29). Then 
NEWREC is also added to assess the differential effect of new recognition, so that 
equation (5.3) is fully estimated (see table 5.30). 
The results III table 5.28 have shown that there is no significant separate 
effect of derecognition on investment. But the picture changes when a distinction is 
made between partial and complete derecognition (see table 5.29). There is evidence 
of a positive and significant impact on investment for companies that have 
experienced partial derecognition53. The magnitude of this effect is such that their 
investment performance is, ceteris paribus, in line with the results of non-unionised 
companies (the positive coefficient for LESSREC entirely compensates for the the 
negative effect arising from recognition, see the coefficient for RECBEG). 
53Estimates improve for these coefficients when sector dununies are used. 
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Conversely, the investment performance of the companies that have abandoned 
union recognition during the period is significantly worse than that of the . 
compames 
with only partial derecognition. As a matter of fact, these companies represent the 
group that fared least well in terms of investment, ceteris paribus, during the period. 
The coefficient for DEREC shows that for these companies investment, measured as 
a percentage of sales, is, ceteris paribus, around one point smaller than for non-
unionised compames and half a point smaller than for unionised compames with 
unchanged status. However, the result for DEREC has to be considered very 
cautiously because of the very small number of companies (namely 7) falling in this 
54 category . 
Finally, the marginal effect on investment of increased recognition appears 
to be positive as we1l55 , but not precisely estimated. No better estimates are 
obtained when a distinction IS made between partial Increase In recognition and 
totally new recognition. 
As was done In section 5.8, equations have been re-estimated usmg the 
following sub-samples: 
(a) data for all companies with at least 6 available observations over the period 
1983-89; 
(b) data covering the period 1986-89, whatever the group size. 
54The same warning applies to the variable NEWREC below. 
55 As described above this effect operates here with respect both to companies n~n 
. .. ) d . . d (if it refers to a partIal 
uruonised at the beginning (if it refers to new recogrutIOn ~ Ullloruse 
increase). 
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Results for these regressions are not reported here. 
The results for ( a) and (b) share the feature that union regressors do not 
perform very well. RECBEG is never statistically different from zero at the 10% 
significance level when FGLS estimates are considered. This result comes as no 
surprise in the light of the evidence presented in the previous section, where it was 
pointed out that the negative impact of union recognition was dying away in the 
second part of the eighties. The estimate of the effect of recognition in the sample of 
firms with more than six observations, though, turns out to be less precise than in 
the previous section. All other union explanatory variables have no significant 
impact with the only exception of LESSREC in the estimation restricted to period 
1986-89. Decreased recognition, either partial or complete, seems to positively affect 
investment, ceteris paribus, with no significant evidence of the counteracting effect of 
total derecognition which was detected before56. 
5.10 THE "INDIRECT" EFFECT OF UNIONS ON INVESTMENT: AN 
ASSESSMENT 
The results on the effects of unions on investment presented in sections 5.4 
to 5.9 can be criticised for providing only a partial account. In particular, if the 
view is held that unionised firms pay higher wages than non-unionised firms, then 
56 . 1 d h ments (either abolition or Unreported results show that changes III case s op arrange 
reduction) do not have any impact, ceteris paribus, on investment. 
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the union effect on investment detected above may turn out to b d . 
e un erestlmated. 
In this section an attempt is made to evaluate the total effect of UnIons on 
investment by taking into account the impact of unionisation on the wageS7. The 
total effect on investment is then defined by58 
dl _ ~ + 81 8w 
dU - 8U 8w· 8U 
The results presented above show that the annual rate of growth of wages 
at the company level (WAGEGR) has a negative and significant impact on 
investment. This result IS consistent through the alternative specifications used III 
sections 5.4 to 5.9. It IS therefore interesting to evaluate the impact of UnIon 
recognition, to start with, on wage growth. No separate effect of unionisation on 
WAGEGR is obtained and, overall, the wage growth equations (not reported here) 
turn out to be very poor59. On such grounds no "indirect effect" of unions is 
determined. 
Attention has been turned to wage levels instead of rates of growth. In this 
case the wage equation is definitely improved. Table 5.3160 (see first and second 
57 The problems involved with the construction of the wage variable, defined as total 
wage costs over total employment, should be taken into account in the evaluation of the results. 
58For estimation purposes a recursive structure is assumed whereby investment does 
not enter the wage equation. 
59Results for these regressions are not reported. The null hypoyhesis of no joint 
. ·fi h .. ·1 t d irrespective of the SlgIll lcance of the regressors in the wage growt equatIOn IS easl y accep e , 
specification adopted, with both pooled OLS and the two-step estimates (see Appendix 5B on the 
latter). No results can be obtained using FGLS estimates since the estimated variance turns out 
to be negative (see Appendix 5B for this problem). 
60 All regressions in tables 5.31 and 5.32 include se~tor durnrrlies. 
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columns) shows that wage levels are positively affected ceteris paribus by demand 
side factors like profitability and sales. Size, as measured by total employment. has 
a negative effect. Unsurprisingly, increases in the percentage of part-time and female 
workers lower the wage. The reverse holds for the percentage of non-manual 
workers. No significant effect is associated with skilled workers. Most importantly, 
the coefficient for union recognition is not significant. Although additional attempts 
could be made to improve the wage equation, they are frustrated by the fact that 
the wage level, unlike wage growth, seems not to significantly affect the investment-
sales ratio (see variable WAGE in table 5.3261 ). Once again no significant "indirect 
effect" of UnIons IS identified. The result that the effect of unionisation on 
investment in the data seems to be confined to the direct impact analysed in section 
5.4 to 5.9 is confirmed also when union density conditional on recognition is taken 
into account. Union density given recognition has a positive impact on wage levels62 
ceteris paribus (see table 5.31, third and fourth columns), but no "indirect effect" of 
union is evident because the wage level, as above, fails to affect the propensity to 
invest (see table 5.32, third and fourth columns). 
61 ., . t' h been used but the the Alternative specificatIOns for the Investment equa Ion ave 
wage level is consistently not significant. 
62 .. . ., h . f ge growth instead, does not The mclUSIOn of unIon denSIty In t e regressIOn or wa , 
improve the fit. As above, results for this case are not reported. 
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5.11 CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented in this chapter show that there is evidence that union 
recognition has, ceteris paribus, a negative and significant effect on the propensity to 
invest of U.K. companies over the period 1983-89. This result is robust to the 
consideration of product market conditions as well as to the changes in the strength 
of both domestic and foreign competition during the period of interest. This 
negative effect, though, seems mainly concentrated in the first part of the period 
(namely, 1983-85). 
The results confirm the prediction of the thoretical models of chapter 2 and 
3. It is important to notice, though, that the attempt to distinguish between 
"direct" and "indirect" effects of unions is not successful. The evidence presented in 
this chapter points to the existence of, at least, a significant "direct" effect of 
unionisation. Better data on the wage variable (see footnote 58) are needed for a 
further investigation of the "indirect effect". 
The presence of closed shop arrangements has no separate effect on 
companies' investment. This result confirms the findings of prevlOus work (see 
Denny and Nickell (1992) and Latreille (1992)). 
The extent of unionisation at the company level, as measured by umon 
density conditional on recognition, has a negative effect on investment. This result 
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does not accord with the findings of Denny and Nickell (1992) discussed' . 
III section 
1.7. There is some evidence, but definitely not overwhelming, that this negative 
effect operates only for intermediate values of union density. As a result. recognised 
companies with either very low or very high union density do not seem to perform 
differently, ceteris paribus, from non-unionised firms. 
As far as the effect of changes In umon status during the eighties IS 
concerned, there IS evidence of a positive and significant effect of partial 
derecognition on investment performance. Hence, at least in the short-run, partial 
derecognition tends to award a premium in terms of investment with respect to 
comparable unionised firms with unchanged status. Conversely, complete 
derecognition is associated with poor outcomes in terms of investment, but this 
result should be treated cautiously because of the rather rare occurrence of this type 
of change in union status. 
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NOTE ON TABLES 
_ Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
_ Coefficient for EMPLOYMENT multiplied by 105 in all tables but 5.31 where it is 
multiplied by 103 . 
_ If sector dummies are used they refer to one-digit SIC industries in all tables but 
5.9. 
_ In tables 5.16, 5.19, 5.20, 5.31 and 5.32 union DENSITY figures have been divided 
by 100, hence the coefficient is multiplied by 100. 
_ In table 5.31 coefficient for SALES is multiplied by 105. 
245 
TABLE 5.1 .: 
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
Rumber of observations 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total Mean 
Number of companies 14 31 32 38 83 55 253 5.22 
Percentage 5.53 12.25 12.65 15.02 32.81 21. 74 
TABLE 5.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY S.I.C. SECTOR AND UNION STATUS 
MANUFACT. 
SIC Sector 1 2 3 4 2+3+4 5 6 7 Total 
Rumber of companies 2 30 57 75 162 15 72 2 253 
Percentage 0.79 11. 86 22.53 29.64 64.03 5.93 28.46 0.79 
Unionised companies 2 23 30 58 111 9 20 0 142 
Percentage 100.00 76.67 52.63 77.33 68.52 60.00 27. 78 0.00 56.13 
Complete recognition 1 12 14 39 65 4 10 0 80 
Percentage 50.00 52.17 46.67 67.24 58.56 44.44 50.00 56.34 
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TABLE 5.3 
(A) DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR WORKFORCE COMPOSITION AND UNION VARIABLES 
(Number of cases = 253) 
Mean Median St.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
REC 0.5612 1 0.4912 0 1 
RECALL 0.3162 0 0.4659 0 1 
PTIM 5.0356 2 10.392 0 74 
SKlL 17. 81 10 19 0 90 
NMAN 46.04 40 25.925 1 100 
FEM 30.163 28 20.028 1 90 
PTYES 0.143 1 0.4378 0 1 
SHLYES 0.8656 1 0.3417 0 1 
(B) CORRELATION MATRIX FOR WORKFORCE COMPOSITION VARIABLES 
(Number of cases = 253) 
Ptill Skil Nman Fell 
Ptim 1. 00 
Skil -0.13 1. 00 
han 0.03 -0.27 1.00 
Fem 0.42 -0.25 0.20 1. 00 
(C) COMPARISON BETWEEN UNIONISED AND NON UNIONISED COMPANIES 
(number of cases = 253) 
MEAN MEDIAN 
union no unIon union no union 
PTIM 4.91 5.12 1. 00 2.00 
SKIL 20.13 14.85 12.50 9.00 
NKAN 38.43 55.71 32.50 56.00 
FEM 21. 59 34.82 20.00 35.00 
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STAND. DEV. 
union no union 
11. 09 9.41 
19.09 18.54 
20.82 28.53 
20.11 19.26 
TABLE 5.4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (TOTAL SAMPLE) 
(sample size = 1322) 
Mean Median St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
~ 
INV 0.75 0.25 2.82 -27.45 40.94 
SALESGR 15.93 11.70 25.99 
-90.49 239.50 
WAGEGR 8.37 7.65 10.10 
-34.71 105.80 
PROFIT 0.06 0.05 0.74 -0.74 0.62 
EMPLOYMENT 3409 866 11732 38 133800 
CLR 0.14 0.04 0.24 0.00 2.20 
DER 0.60 0.06 1. 98 0.00 38.37 
DCLR 0.74 1. 00 0.44 0.00 1. 00 
DDER 0.61 1. 00 0.49 0.00 1. 00 
REC 0.58 1. 00 0.49 0.00 1. 00 
RECALL 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1. 00 
PTIM 5.43 2.00 11. 20 0.00 74.00 
SKIL 18.76 12.00 19.25 0.00 90.00 
NMAN 45.22 39.00 25.29 1. 00 100.00 
FEM 20.41 25.00 20.13 1. 00 90.00 
PTYES 0.76 1.00 0.42 0.00 1. 00 
SKILYES 0.89 1. 00 0.32 0.00 1. 00 
TABLE 5.5 
COMPARISON BETWEEN UNIONISED AND NON UNIONISED COMPANIES (MEANS) 
UNION NON UNION 
INV 0.489 1.112 
SALESGR 11. 565 21. 982 
WAGEGR 8.450 8.267 
PROFIT 0.058 0.062 
EMPLOYMENT 4682 1642 
CLR 0.143 0.134 
DER 0.604 0.588 
DCLR 0.752 0.725 
DDER 0.664 0.527 
PTIM 5.410 5.451 
SKIL 20.770 15.964 
NMAN 37. 960 55.273 
FEM 27.443 34.520 
PTYES 0.768 0.159 
SKILYES 0.972 0.165 
RECALL 0.568 
DENSITY 56.700 (f) 
n. obs. 768 554 
(*) 651 valid observations for union density. 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
sector dUllllies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.575 (1.50) 
0.019 (6.67) 
-0.018 (2.S5) 
8.326 (7.50) 
-0.245 (0.38) 
0.175 (0.97) 
-0.866 (2.49) 
0.270 {1.73} 
0.070 (1.84) 
-0.075 (0.40) 
0.026 (3.52) 
-0.439 (1.63) 
0.023 (5.62) 
-0.001 (0.10) 
0.011 (2.58) 
no 
0.146 
8954.7 
TABLE 5.6 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.571 (1.35) 
0.018 (6.17) 
-0.017 (2.42) 
8.309 (6.88) 
-0.241 (0.33) 
0.199 (1.00) 
-0.889 (2.42) 
0.286 (1.65) 
0.074 (1.87) 
-0.068 (0.33) 
0.025 (3.12) 
-0.454 (1.52) 
0.023 (S.09) 
-0.001 (0.11) 
0.011 (2.37) 
no 
0.146 
8957.3 
249 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.695 (1.74) 
0.019 (6.49) 
-0.018 (2.55) 
8.619 (7.67) 
-0.251 (0.38) 
0.202 (1.11) 
-0.851 (2.44) 
0.293 (1.85) 
0.064 (1. 70) 
-0.045 (0.24) 
0.023 (3.00) 
-0.404 (1.49) 
0.023 (S.50) 
-0.001 (0.22) 
0.010 (2.29) 
yes 
0.151 
8901. 7 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.692 (1.57) 
0.018 (6.04) 
-0.017 (2.44) 
8.315 (7.05) 
-0.246 (0.34) 
0.226 (1.13) 
-0.876 (2.38) 
0.308 (1.76) 
0.069 (1. 76) 
-0.038 (0.18) 
0.022 (2.66) 
-0.421 (1.40) 
0.023 (5.00) 
-0.001 (0.23) 
0.010 (2.13) 
yes 
0.153 
8904.2 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
HMAN 
FEM 
REC 
sector dummies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.327 (0.83) 
0.018 (6.08) 
-0.018 (2.52) 
8.388 (7.57) 
-0.060 (0.09) 
0.198 (1.10) 
-0.853 (2.46) 
0.305 (1.95) 
0.068 (1. 79) 
-0.075 (0.40) 
0.027 (3.64) 
-0.303 (1.11) 
0.023 (5.57) 
-0.002 (0.72) 
0.010 (2.27) 
-0.451 (2.74) 
no 
0.151 
8903.4 
TABLE 5.7 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.318 (0.73) 
0.017 (5.69) 
-0.017 (2.41) 
8.101 (6.96) 
-0.048 (0.06) 
0.223 (1.13) 
-0.877 (2.40) 
0.321 (1.85) 
0.072 (1.83) 
-0.067 (0.33) 
0.026 (3.24) 
-0.313 (1.04) 
0.023 (5.05) 
-0.002 (0.69) 
0.010 (2.09) 
-0.465 (2.56) 
no 
0.151 
8905.5 
250 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.394 (0.94) 
0.018 (6.15) 
-0.018 (2.53) 
8.507 (7.58) 
-0.095 (0.14) 
0.220 (1.21) 
-0.867 (2.48) 
0.319 (2.01) 
0.064 (1. 70) 
-0.043 (0.23) 
0.025 (3.28) 
-0.296 (1.07) 
0.024 (5.61) 
-0.002 (0.56) 
0.009 (1.95) 
-0.415 (2.31) 
yes 
0.155 
8865.3 
, 
., 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.380 (0.82) 
0.017 (5.75) 
-0.017 (2.42) 
8.210 (6.97) 
-0.083 (0.11) 
0.245 (1.22) 
-0.890 (2.42) 
0.334 (1.91) 
0.069 (1. 75) 
-0.036 (0.17) 
0.025 (2.94) 
-0.306 (1.01) 
0.024 (5.10) 
-0.002 (0.54) 
0.009 (1.80) 
-0.434 (2.18) 
yes 
0.154 
8867.4 
Estim. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
REC 
RECALL 
sector dummies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.323 (0.82) 
0.018 (6.04) 
-0.018 (2.52) 
8.393 (7.58) 
-0.139 (0.21) 
0.197 (1.10) 
-0.857 (2.47) 
0.299 (1.91) 
0.069 (1.81) 
-0.085 (0.46) 
0.026 (3.53) 
-0.311 (1.14) 
0.023 (5.63) 
-0.002 (0.77) 
0.010 (2.42) 
-0.309 (1.54) 
-0.243 (1.25) 
no 
0.152 
8892.7 
TABLE 5.8 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.315 (0.72) 
0.017 (5.66) 
-0.017 (2.41) 
8.103 (6.96) 
-0.127 (0.17) 
0.223 (1.13) 
-0.881 (2.41) 
0.315 (1.82) 
0.072 (1.84) 
-0.078 (0.38) 
0.026 (3.15) 
-0.321 (1.06) 
0.023 (5.10) 
-0.002 (O.H) 
0.010 (2.23) 
-0.322 (1.46) 
-0.244 (1.14) 
no 
0.152 
8894.8 
251 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.376 (0.89) 
0.018 (6.12) 
-0.018 (2.53) 
0.850 (7.57) 
-0.170 (0.25) 
0.222 (1.22) 
-0.872 (2.50) 
0.313 (1.97) 
0.065 (1. 71) 
-0.054 (0.29) 
0.024 (3.18) 
-0.301 (1.09) 
0.024 (5.67) 
-0.002 (0.60) 
0.009 (2.07) 
-0.276 (1.31) 
-0.248 (1.27) 
yes 
0.156 
8854.2 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.362 (0.78) 
0.017 (5.73) 
-0.017 (2.42) 
8.201 (6.97) 
-0.158 (0.21) 
0.246 (1.23) 
-0.895 (2.44) 
0.328 (1.88) 
0.069 (1.77) 
-0.046 (0.22) 
0.024 (2.85) 
-0.311 (1.02) 
0.024 (5.15) 
-0.002 (0.58) 
0.009 (1.91) 
-0.293 (1.26) 
-0.249 (l.15) 
yes 
0.155 
8856.3 
Estill. Tech. 
COllpanies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
REC 
RECALL 
two-digit dummies 
Note: 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.408 (0.78) 
0.017 (5.94) 
-0.017 (2.50) 
8.543 (7.55) 
-0.553 (0.83) 
0.255 (1.40) 
-0.807 (2.31) 
0.220 (1.37) 
0.063 (1.67) 
-0.081 (0.41) 
0.012 (1.50) 
-0.138 (0.(9) 
0.021 (4.80) 
-0.002 (0.61) 
0.007 (1.42) 
-0.343 (1.82) 
.yes 
0.179 
8607. 5 
TABLE 5.9 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.394 (0.70) 
0.017 (5.61) 
-0.017 (2.42) 
8.311 (1.09) 
-0.543 (0. 75) 
0.274 (1.40) 
-0.830 (2.28) 
0.233 (1.35) 
0.067 (1. 72) 
-0.075 (0.35) 
0.012 (1.37) 
-0.149 (0.49) 
0.021 (4.48) 
-0.002 (0.60) 
0.007 (1.34) 
-0.355 (1.74) 
yes 
0.179 
8608.7 
The following two-digit industry dummies have been defined 
DUMMY THREE-DIGIT SIC SECTORS INCLUDED 
D14 140 
D21 210 
D22 223 224 
D23 231 
D24 240 241 242 243 
D25 251 255 256 257 
D31 310 311 312 313 
D32 320 322 323 326 
D33 330 
D34 340 341 342 343 
D35 351 352 353 
252 
OLS 
253 
1322 
-0.387 (0.74) 
0.011 (5.92) 
-0.011 (2.50) 
8.537 (1.55) 
-0.632 (0.94) 
0.259 (1.43) 
-0.811 (2.32) 
0.218 (1.36) 
0.064 (1.69) 
-0.096 (0.48) 
0.011 (1.45) 
-0.144 (0.51) 
0.021 (4.87) 
-0.002 (0.66) 
0.007 (1.50) 
-0.212 (0.91) 
-0.237 (1.20) 
yes 
0.180 
8597.9 
247 
258 
316 
328 
344 
329 
345 
.,:" FGLS 
253 
1322 
-0.313 (0.66) 
0.011 (5.65) 
-0.017 (2.42) 
8.302 (1.08) 
-0.621 (0.86) 
0.218 (1.42) 
-0.834 (2.29) 
0.230 (1.33) 
0.061 (1.13) 
-0.089 (0.42) 
0.011 (1.32) 
-0.155 (0.51) 
0.021 (4.54) 
-0.002 (O.65) 
0.001 (1.42) 
-0.223 (0.95) 
-0.238 (1.12) 
yes 
0.180 
8599.1 
D36 361 362 364 
D37 370 371 372 
041 412 413 414 416 418 
042 420 422 423 424 426 427 ~ 428 429 D43 431 432 435 436 437 438 439 044 442 
D45 451 453 
D46 464 465 467 
D48 480 481 483 
D49 491 494 495 
D50 500 
D61 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 D62 622 
D63 630 
D64 640 641 643 645 646 648 
D65 651 654 656 
D66 661 662 665 667 
D67 671 
D72 723 
The following two-digit dummies defined above are used in the regressions of table 5.9: 
D14, D25, D31, D32, D33, D34, D35, D50, D61, D72 
together with the following aggregations of two-digit dummies: 
D2124 = D21+D22+D23+D24 
D3637 = D36+D37 
D4142 = D41 +D42 
D4344 = D43+D44 
D4546 = D45+D46 
D4849 = D48+D49 
D6264 = D62+D63+D64 
D6567 = D65+D66+D67 
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TABLE 5.10 
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACCORDING TO PRODUCT MARKET CONDITIONS 
(NUMBER OF COMPETITORS) 
Number of NUllber of 
companies observations 
NO COMPETITORS 5 2 26 
FEW COMPETITORS (between 1 and 5) 33 13 162 
MANY COMPETITORS (more than 5) 214 85 1129 
TOTAL 252 100 1317 
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Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
rEWCO 
MONOP 
REC 
sector dUlllLies 
R2 
ISS 
OLS 
252 
1317 
-0.357 (0.90) 
0.017 (5.90) 
-0.016 (2.37) 
8.366 (7.61) 
-0.042 (0.06) 
0.196 (1.10) 
-0.935 (2.71) 
0.302 (1.93) 
0.068 (1.82) 
-0.109 (0.59) 
0.027 (3.76) 
-0.241 (0.88) 
0.023 (5.55) 
-0.002 (0.86) 
0.009 (2.28) 
0.377 (1.67) 
-0.391 (0.70) 
-0.450 (2.76) 
no 
0.149 
8680.5 
TABLE 5.11 
FGLS 
252 
1317 
-0.350 (0.80) 
0.016 (5.52) 
-0.015 (2.26) 
8.091 (6.99) 
-0.033 (0.04) 
0.222 (1.12) 
-0.956 (2.63) 
0.321 (1.85) 
0.072 (1.85) 
-0.103 (0.50) 
0.027 (3.35) 
-0.250 (0.83) 
0.023 (5.01) 
-0.003 (0.82) 
0.010 (2.09) 
0.377 (1.51) 
-0.396 (0.64) 
-0.464 (2.57) 
no 
0.149 
8682.5 
255 
OL5 
252 
1317 
-0.461 (1.10) 
0.017 (5.93) 
-0.017 (2.38) 
8.539 (7.67) 
-0.059 (0.09) 
0.220 (1.22) 
-0.944 (2.72) 
0.319 (2.02) 
0.064 (1. 71) 
-0.077 (0.42) 
0.025 (3.36) 
-0.232 (0.84) 
0.023 (5.55) 
-0.002 (0.71) 
0.009 (2.00) 
0.391 (1.72) 
-0.359 (0.63) 
-0.395 (2.21) 
yes 
0.153 
8641. 2 
FGLS 
252 
1317 
-0.448 (0.97) 
0.016 (5.55) 
-0.015 (2.27) 
8.249 (7.05) 
-0.049 (0.06) 
0.245 (1.23) 
-0.964 (2.64) 
0.337 (1.93) 
0.069 (1.76) 
-0.072 (0.35) 
0.025 (3.01) 
-0.242 (0.79) 
0.023 (5.03) 
-0.002 (0.68) 
0.009 (1.84) 
0.391 (1.55) 
-0.365 (0.58) 
-0.413 (2.09) 
yes 
0.153 
8643.3 
TABLE 5.12 
, 
-., 
(A) DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACCORDING TO CHANGES IN DOMESTIC COMPETITION 
UP 
Period ROCHANGE 
1980-84 
DOWN 
TOTAL 
UP 
118 (50.42%) 
615 
47 (20.08%) 
235 
4 (1.70%) 
16 
169 (72.22%) 
Period 1985-89 
NO CHANGE 
9 (3.84%) 
56 
28 (11.96%) 
153 
9 (3.84%) 
44 
46 (19.65%) 
DOWN 
6 (2.56%) 
33 
6 (2.56%) 
31 
7 (2.99%) 
36 
19 (8.11%) 
TOTAL 
133 (56.83%) 
81 (34.61%) 
20 (8.69%) 
234 
lote: For each category figures refer to the number of companies (and relative percentage) 
and to the number of observations 
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Estim. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
HMAN 
FEM 
UKCOUP 
REC 
sector dummies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
234 
1219 
-0.309 (0.71) 
0.019 (6.02) 
-0.017 (2.32) 
8.612 (7.30) 
0.165 (0.24) 
0.137 (0.73) 
-0.751 (2.0l) 
0.218 (1.32) 
0.057 (1.43) 
-0.082 (O.H) 
0.029 (3.87) 
-0.366 (1.26) 
0.025 (5.76) 
-0.002 (0.82) 
0.007 (1.65) 
0.142 (0.84) 
-0.446 (2.57) 
no 
0.155 
8465.2 
TABLE 5.13 
FGLS 
234 
1219 
-0.294 (0.62) 
0.018 (5.68) 
-0.016 (2.25) 
8.351 (6.77) 
0.172 (O.23) 
0.155 (0.76) 
-0.762 (1.94) 
0.231 (1.28) 
0.064 (1.54) 
-0.077 (0.35) 
0.029 (3.50) 
-0.377 (1.18) 
0.025 (S.28) 
-0.003 (O.79) 
0.008 (1.53) 
0.142 (0. 77 ) 
0.458 (2.42) 
no 
0.155 
8466.8 
258 
OLS 
234 
1219 
-0.448 (0.97) 
0.019 (6.08) 
-0.017 (2.31) 
8.823 (7.39) 
0.191 (0.28) 
0.165 (0.87) 
-0.750 (1.99) 
0.239 (1.43) 
0.051 (1.28) 
-0.037 (0.18) 
0.027 (3.43) 
-0.351 (1.20) 
0.026 (S.73) 
-0.002 (0.63) 
0.006 (1.27) 
0.185 (1.0.8) 
-0.380 (1.99) 
yes 
0.160 
8416.1 
FGLS 
234 
1219 
-0.427 (0.8S) 
0.018 (5.76) 
-0.016 (2.24) 
8.556 (6.87) 
0.198 (0.26) 
0.183 (0.89) 
-0.762 (1.94) 
0.251 (1.38) 
0.058 (1.41) 
-0.033 (0.15) 
0.027 (3.13) 
-0.362 (1.13) 
0.026 (5.28) 
-0.002 (0.62) 
0.006 (1.20) 
0.185 (0.99) 
-0.397 (1.91) 
yes 
0.160 
8417.6 
Period 
1980-84 
(B) DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACCORDING TO CHANGES IN FOREIGN COMPETITION 
UP 
NOCHANGE 
DOWN 
TOTAL 
UP 
123 (55.90%) 
661 
33 (15.00%) 
163 
2 (0.90%) 
13 
158 (71. 81%) 
Period 1985-89 
NO CHANGE 
5 (2.27%) 
26 
55 (25.00%) 
275 
o 
60 (27.27%) 
DOWN 
2 (0.90%) 
7 
o 
o 
2 (0.90%) 
TOTAL 
130 (59.09%) 
88 (40.00%) 
2 (0.90%) 
220 
Note: For each category figures refer to the number of companies (and relative percentage) 
and to the number of observations 
257 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
rcoup 
REC 
sector dummies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
220 
1145 
0.062 (0.14) 
0.015 (5.16) 
-0.020 (2.65) 
8.257 (7.28) 
-0.159 (0.25) 
0.003 (0.01) 
-0.520 (1.45) 
0.253 (1.53) 
0.074 (1.88) 
-0.171 (0.90) 
0.045 (4.01) 
-0.501 (1.65) 
0.016 (3.63) 
-0.002 (0.72) 
0.004 (0.91) 
0.348 (2.01) 
-0.425 (2.41) 
no 
0.131 
1196.1 
TABLE 5.14 
FGLS 
220 
1145 
0.069 (0.15) 
0.015 (5.04) 
-0.019 (2.66) 
8.203 (1.12) 
-0.159 (0.24) 
0.006 (0.03) 
-0.526 (1.44) 
0.256 (1.50) 
0.075 (1.90) 
-0.110 (0.86) 
0.045 (3.95) 
-0.506 (1.61) 
0.016 (3.53) 
-0.002 (0.11) 
0.004 (0.89) 
0.351 (1.98) 
-0.429 (2.31) 
no 
0.131 
7196.7 
259 
OLS 
220 
1145 
-0.056 (0.11) 
0.015 (5.11) 
-0.019 (2.65) 
8.359 (1.23) 
-0.190 (0.29) 
0.015 (0.08) 
-0.535 (1.48) 
0.260 (1.55) 
0.072 (1.84) 
-0.14 5 (0. 16 ) 
0.044 (3.99) 
-0.483 (1.51) 
0.016 (3.65) 
-0.002 (0.49) 
0.004 (0.91) 
0.293 (1.60) 
-0.315 (1.93) 
yes 
0.133 
1180.2 
FGLS 
220 
1145 
-0.047 (0.09) 
0.015 (4.98) 
-0.019 (2.65) 
8.294 (7.06) 
-0.189 (0.28) 
0.018 (0.09) 
-0.542 (1.47) 
0.264 (1.52) 
0.143 (1.86) 
-0.144 (0.73) 
0.044 (3.85) 
-0.481 (1.53) 
0.016 (3.54) 
-0.002 (0.49) 
0.004 (0.88) 
0.298 (1.57) 
-0.381 (1.90) 
yes 
0.133 
7180.3 
TABLE 5.15 
DISTRIBUTION OF UNION DENSITY ACROSS COMPANIES 
RANGE FOR DENSITY (d) NUMBER OF COMPANIES RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%) 
d<=10% 9 7.37 
10%<d<=25% 18 14.75 
25%<d<=50% 19 15.57 
50%<d<=75% 39 31. 96 
75%<d<=90% 25 20.49 
90%<d<100% 9 7.37 
d=100% 3 2.45 
total 122 
260 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
DENSITY 
sector dummies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.301 (0.71) 
0.018 (5.97) 
-0.018 (2.42) 
8.199 (7.05) 
-0.072 (0.10) 
0.250 (1.29) 
-0.921 (2.50) 
0.266 (1.57) 
0.115 (2.25) 
-0.083 (0.41) 
0.026 (3.36) 
-0.448 (1.52) 
0.027 (5.82) 
-0.003 (0.84) 
0.010 (2.19) 
-0.576 (2.27) 
no 
0.154 
8673.0 
TABLE 5.16 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.292 (0.63) 
0.017 (5.59) 
-0.017 (2.32) 
7.960 (6.54) 
-0.063 (0.08) 
0.273 (1.29) 
-0.946 (2.45) 
0.281 (1.51) 
0.118 (2.25) 
-0.077 (O.35) 
0.025 (3.02) 
-0.461 (1.43) 
0.027 (5.33) 
-0.003 (0.80) 
0.010 (2.04) 
-0.589 (2.12) 
no 
0.154 
8674.5 
261 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.361 (0.79) 
0.018 (5.88) 
-0.018 (2.44) 
8.425 (7.11) 
-0.090 (0.13) 
0.261 (1.33) 
-0.947 (2.55) 
0.284 (1.66) 
0.111 (2.16) 
-0.047 (0.23) 
0.024 (3.04) 
-0.430 (1.45) 
0.027 (5.80) 
-0.002 (0.72) 
0.009 (1.92) 
-0.582 (2.13) 
yes 
0.158 
8636.0 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.352 (0.71) 
0.017 (5.52) 
-0.017 (2.35) 
8.170 (6.60) 
-0.080 (0.10) 
0.284 (1.33) 
-0.971 (2.49) 
0.298 (1.59) 
0.114 (2.17) 
-0 . 041 (0. 19 ) 
0.024 (2.74) 
-0.443 (1. 36) 
0.027 (5.32) 
-0.002 (0.70) 
0.009 (1.79) 
-0.597 (1.99) 
yes 
0.158 
8637.6 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PUES 
PUM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
KMAN 
FEM 
REC 
UD>90 
UD<25 
sector dUBllLies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.299 (0.70) 
0.017 (5.64) 
-0.019 (2.50) 
8.275 (7.11) 
0.054 (0.80) 
0.235 (1.22) 
-0.905 (2.(6) 
0.291 (1. 71) 
0.103 (2.02) 
-0.026 (0.13) 
0.025 (3.23) 
-0.419 (1.41) 
0.026 (5.76) 
-0.003 (0.89) 
0.010 (2.20) 
-0.571 (2.95) 
0.623 (1.64) 
0.598 (2.04) 
no 
0.158 
8631. 9 
TABLE 5.17 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.284 (0.61) 
0.016 (5.30) 
-0.018 (2.40) 
8.042 (6.61) 
0.069 (0.09) 
0.258 {1.22} 
-0.932 (2.42) 
o . 305 {1. 64 } 
0.107 (2.04) 
-0.021 (0.09) 
0.025 (2.90) 
-0.429 (1.32) 
0.026 (5.27) 
-0.003 (0.88) 
0.010 (2.05) 
-0.590 (2.80) 
0.634 (1.52) 
0.625 (1.99) 
no 
0.158 
8633.4 
262 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.347 (0.75) 
0.018 (5.65) 
-0.019 (2.53) 
8.447 (7.14) 
0.011 (0.01) 
0.244 (1. 25) 
-0.934 (2.52) 
0.302 (1.75) 
0.099 (1.94) 
0.007 (O.03) 
0.023 (2.85) 
-0.431 (1.38) 
0.027 (5.78) 
-0.003 (0.79) 
0.009 (1.93) 
-0.557 (2.65) 
0.619 (1.62) 
0.672 (2.23) 
yes 
0.162 
8595.2 
, 
., 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.327 (0.65) 
0.017 (5.32) 
-0.018 (2.43) 
8.198 (6.63) 
0.025 (0.03) 
0.266 (1.25) 
-0.960 (2.47) 
0.314 (1.67) 
0.103 (1.96) 
0.013 (0.06) 
0.023 (2.57) 
-0.425 (1.29) 
0.027 (5.30) 
-0.003 (0.78) 
0.009 (1.80) 
-0.579 (2.53) 
0.619 (1.50) 
0.706 (2.17) 
yes 
0.162 
8596.8 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIH 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
KMAN 
FEM 
REC 
UD>90 
UD~30 
sector dUllllies 
OLS 
-1--' 
233 
1205 
-0.363 (0.85) 
0.018 (5.69) 
-0.019 (2.46) 
8.351 (1.18) 
0.069 (0.10) 
0.253 (1.30) 
-0.903 (2.45) 
0.300 (1. 76) 
0.108 (2.12) 
-0.044 (0.22) 
0.026 (3.35) 
-0.423 (1.42) 
0.027 (5.87) 
-0.002 (0.74) 
0.010 (2.21) 
-0.560 (2.78) 
0.630 (1.64) 
0.371 (1.46) 
no 
0.157 
8646.6 
TABLE 5.18 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.355 (0.77) 
0.017 (5.36) 
-0.018 (2.36) 
8.122 (6.68) 
0.078 (0.10) 
0.275 (1.30) 
-0.930 {2.41} 
0.314 (1.69) 
0.112 (2.14) 
-0.038 (0.17) 
0.026 (3.03) 
-0.433 (1.33) 
0.027 {5.39} 
-0.003 (0.72) 
0.010 (2.06) 
-0.572 (2.60) 
0.627 (1.51) 
0.373 (1.34) 
no 
0.157 
8648.0 
263 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.418 (0.91) 
0.018 (5.68) 
-0.019 (2.50) 
8.547 p.22} 
0.045 {O.06} 
0.269 (1.37) 
-0.935 (2.52) 
0.309 (1.79) 
0.104 (2.03) 
-0.015 (0.07) 
0.024 (2.95) 
-0.415 (1.38) 
0.028 (5.89) 
-0.002 (0.62) 
0.009 (1.94) 
-0.557 {2.54} 
0.636 (1.66) 
0.455 (1. 73) 
yes 
0.160 
8609.8 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.408 (0.82) 
0.017 (5.36) 
-0.018 (2.40) 
8.302 (6.73) 
0.056 (0.07) 
0.291 (1.36) 
-0.959 (2.(7) 
0.323 (1. 72) 
0.108 (2.06) 
-0.009 (0.04) 
0.024 (2.68) 
-0.426 (1.30) 
0.028 (5.42) 
-0.002 (0.61) 
0.010 (1.82) 
-0.571 (2.39) 
0.632 (1.52) 
0.456 (1.58) 
yes 
0.160 
8611.3 
Estill. Tech. 
COllpanies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PrIES 
PTIM 
SilLYES 
SIlL 
NHAN 
FEM 
DEH<25 
25sDENS90 
DEH>90 
sector dUMmies 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.312 (0.73) 
0.018 (5.81) 
-0.019 (2.52) 
8.207 (7.07) 
0.058 (0.08) 
0.247 (1.27) 
-0.899 (2.44) 
0.274 (1.61) 
0.102 (1.99) 
-0.052 {0.26} 
0.024 {3.11} 
-0.480 (1.63) 
0.027 {5.96} 
-0.003 (0.86) 
0.010 (2.26) 
2.104 {1.15) 
-0.786 (2.82) 
0.121 (0.30) 
no 
0.160 
8619.2 
TABLE 5.19 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.302 (0.65) 
0.017 (5.48) 
-0.018 (2.42) 
7.985 (6.58) 
0.065 (0.08) 
0.268 (1.27) 
-0.925 (2.40) 
0.286 (1.54) 
0.106 (2.02) 
-0.047 (0.22) 
0.024 (2.78) 
-0.495 (1.54) 
0.027 (5.48) 
-0.003 (0.84) 
0.010 (2.11) 
2.339 (1.19) 
-0.793 (2.61) 
0.109 (0.25) 
no 
0.160 
8620.7 
264 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.378 (0.83) 
0.018 (5.74) 
-0.019 (2.55) 
8.448 (7.15) 
0.016 (0.02) 
0.254 (1.29) 
-0.923 (2.49) 
0.286 (1.67) 
0.098 (1.90) 
-0.017 (0.08) 
0.022 (2.72) 
-0.465 (1.56) 
0.028 (5.94) 
-0.003 (0.79) 
0.010 (2.00) 
2.423 (1.30) 
-0.781 (2.61) 
0.128 (0.31) 
yes 
0.164 
8578.1 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.368 (0.75) 
0.017 (5.42) 
-0.018 (2.45) 
8.213 (6.66) 
0.023 (0.03) 
0.273 (1.28) 
-0.947 (2.44) 
0.297 (1.59) 
0.102 (1.94) 
-0.013 (0.06) 
0.022 (2.45) 
-0.481 (1.48) 
0.028 (5.48) 
-0.003 (0.77) 
0.010 (1.88) 
2.631 (1.32) 
-0.789 (2.43) 
0.116 (0.26) 
yes 
0.163 
8579.6 
Estim. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
DEN~30 
30<DENS90 
DEN>90 
sector dummies 
OL5 
233 
1205 
0.349 (0.82) 
0.018 (5.73) 
-0.019 (2.49) 
8.271 (7.12) 
0.045 (0.06) 
0.265 {1.37} 
-0.909 (2.47) 
0.292 (1. 72) 
0.107 (2.10) 
-0.041 {0.20} 
0.026 (3.36) 
-0.444 (1. 50) 
0.027 (5.92) 
-0.002 (0.77) 
0.010 (2.17) 
-0.652 (0.55) 
-0.823 (2.95) 
0.091 (0.22) 
no 
0.158 
8638.3 
TABLE 5.20 
FGL5 
233 
1205 
-0.342 (0.74) 
0.017 (5.41) 
-0.018 (2.39) 
8.050 (6.63) 
0.051 (0.06) 
0.287 {1.36} 
-0.935 {2.B} 
0.306 (1.65) 
0.111 (2.12) 
-0.034 (O.15) 
0.026 (3.04) 
-0.455 (1.41) 
0.027 (5.H) 
-0.003 (0.75) 
0.010 (2.03) 
-0.697 (0.55) 
-0.834 (2.75) 
0.075 {0.17} 
no 
0.158 
8639.6 
265 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.411 (0.90) 
0.018 (5.70) 
-0.019 (2.52) 
8.489 (7.17) 
0.019 (0.02) 
0.278 (1.42) 
-0.938 (2.53) 
0.305 (1. 77) 
0.103 (2.01) 
-0.011 (0.05) 
0.024 (2.99) 
-0.433 (1.45) 
0.028 (5.95) 
-0.002 (0.66) 
0.009 (1.91) 
-0.357 (0.29) 
-0.828 (2.76) 
0.093 (0.22) 
yes 
0.161 
8600.0 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.402 (0.81) 
0.017 (5.38) 
-0.018 (2.42) 
8.250 (6.69) 
0.026 (0.03) 
0.299 (1.41) 
-0.962 (2.48) 
0.317 (1. 70) 
0.107 (2.04) 
-0.005 (0.02) 
0.024 (2.72) 
-0.444 (1.37) 
0.028 (5.48) 
-0.002 (0.64) 
0.009 (1.80) 
-0.415 (0.31) 
-0.842 (2.59) 
0.075 (0.17) 
yes 
0.161 
8601. 3 
._ If 
TABLE 5.21 
DISTRIBUTION OF UNION DENSITY FOR COMPANIES WITH CLOSED SHOP SCHEMES 
RANGE fOR DENSITY (d) NUMBER OF COMPANIES 
d<=10% 3 
10%<d<=25% 6 
25%<d<=50% 4 
50%<d<=75% 6 
75%<d<=90% 6 
90%<d<100% 3 
d=100% 1 
total 29 
266 
I 
" 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILIES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
REC 
CLOSED 
sector dUlLmies 
R2 
rss 
OLS 
242 
1260 
-0.368 (0.90) 
0.018 {5.95} 
-0.017 (2.39) 
B.295 (7.29) 
0.060 {O.OB} 
0.249 (1.33) 
-0.927 (2.55) 
0.329 (2.02) 
0.068 (1. 74) 
-0.079 (O.H) 
0.027 (3.45) 
-0.310 (1.10) 
0.024 (5.35) 
-0.002 (0.82) 
0.010 (2.27) 
-0.492 (2.69) 
0.238 (0.97) 
no 
0.154 
8798.4 
TABLE 5.22 
FGLS 
242 
1260 
-0.357 (0.80) 
0.011 (5.51) 
-0.016 (2.30) 
8.048 (6.75) 
0.076 (0.09) 
0.271 (1.33) 
-0.955 (2.50) 
0.345 (1.93) 
0.072 (1. 78) 
-0.014 (0.35) 
0.027 (3.10) 
-0.319 (1.03) 
0.024 (4.B8) 
-0.003 (0.79) 
0.010 {2.ll} 
-0.50B (2.55) 
0.242 (0.89) 
no 
0.154 
8800.2 
267 
OLS 
242 
1260 
-0.490 (1.12) 
0.018 {5.94} 
-O.OlB (2.42) 
B.447 (7.32) 
0.055 (0.07) 
0.260 (1.34) 
-0.931 (2.55) 
0.349 (2.12) 
0.065 (1.65) 
-0.062 (0.32) 
0.025 (3.05) 
-0.297 (1.05) 
0.024 (5.29) 
-0.002 (0.73) 
0.010 (2.14) 
-0.433 (2.14) 
0.195 (0.77) 
yes 
0.157 
8771. 5 
FGLS 
242 
1260 
-0.411 (l.00) 
0.011 {5.55} 
-0.017 (2.32) 
8.179 (6.71) 
0.070 (0.08) 
0.282 (1.36) 
-0.960 (2.50) 
0.365 (2.01) 
0.069 (1.11) 
-0.056 (0.26) 
0.025 (2.74) 
-0.306 (0.98) 
0.024 (4.82) 
-0.003 (0.71) 
0.010 (1.99) 
-0.452 {2.04} 
0.202 (0.72) 
yes 
0.157 
8773.3 
Estill. Tech. 
COllpanies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
REC 
UD<30 
UD>90 
CS>90 
sector dUlLmies 
R2 
rss 
-;' 
OLS 
226 
1165 
TABLE 5.23 
-0.339 (0.78) 
0.017 (5.58) 
-0.018 (2.37) 
8.339 (7.04) 
0.146 (0.19) 
0.277 (1.39) 
-0.954 (2.52) 
0.316 (1.81) 
0.11 (2.11) 
-0.081 (0.39) 
0.027 (3.28) 
-0.43 (1.42) 
0.027 (5.73) 
-0.003 (0.91) 
0.01 (2.24) 
-0.574 (2.77) 
0.422 (1.58) 
0.627 (1.61) 
no 
0.157 
8590.7 
OLS 
226 
1165 
-0.34 (0.78) 
0.017 (5.58) 
-0.018 (2.39) 
8.378 (7.07) 
0.143 (0.19) 
0.271 (1.36) 
-0.955 (2.52) 
0.314 (1.80) 
0.11 (2.11) 
-0.089 (0.43) 
0.027 (3.30) 
-0.427 (1.41) 
0.027 (5.76) 
-0.003 (0.86) 
0.01 (2.21) 
-0.573 (2. 76) 
0.422 (1.58) 
0.821 (1.69) 
-0.487 (0.66) 
no 
0.158 
8587. 4 
268 
OLS 
226 
1165 
-0.284 (0.65) 
0.018 (5.68) 
-0.018 (2.33) 
8.259 (6.97) 
0.094 (0.12) 
0.277 (1.39) 
-0.962 (2.53) 
0.302 (1.73) 
0.114 (2.18) 
-0.109 (0.53) 
0.027 (3.25) 
-0.426 (1.41) 
0.027 (5.63) 
-0.003 (1.03) 
0.011 (2.25) 
-0.506 (2.48) 
0.36 (1.36) 
0.249 (0.42) 
yes 
0.156 
8608.9 
Estim. Tech. 
Period 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
KMAN 
FEM 
REe 
sector duuies 
R2 
rss 
FGLS 
1983-85 
186 
507 
0.239 (0.33) 
0.022 (4.26) 
0.001 (0.01) 
6.448 (2.97) 
0.353 (0.31) 
0.391 (1.22) 
-0.972 (1.49) 
0.173 (0.62) 
0.003 (0.07) 
-0.106 (0.32) 
0.019 (1.51) 
-0.469 (0.92) 
0.021 (2.81) 
-0.008 (1.44) 
0.008 (1.0S) 
-0.711 (2.39) 
no 
0.114 
3187.7 
TABLE 5.24 
FGLS 
1983-85 
186 
507 
0.041 (0.05) 
0.022 (4.14) 
0.000 (0.00) 
6.662 (2.98) 
0.3S6 (0.30) 
0.466 (1.40) 
-0.987 (1.49) 
0.173 (0.60) 
-0.001 (0.02) 
-0.090 (0.26) 
0.014 (1.12) 
-0.430 (0.82) 
0.021 (2.79) 
-0.008 (1.36) 
0.008 (0.93) 
-0.626 (1.92) 
yes 
0.178 
3172.2 
269 
FGLS 
1986-89 
236 
769 
-0.660 (1.08) 
0.017 (4.41) 
-0.029 (3.10) 
8.601 (5.54) 
-0.569 (0.57) 
0.107 (0.38) 
-1.073 (2.15) 
0.270 (1.09) 
0.275 (3.45) 
-0.025 (0.08) 
0.032 (2.72) 
-0.354 (0.83) 
0.025 (3.90) 
0.001 (0.10) 
0.013 (1.98) 
-0.240 (0.94) 
no 
0.157 
5279.1 
FGLS 
1986-89 
236 
769 
-0.644 (0.99) 
0.017 (4.50) 
-0.029 (3.08) 
8.706 (5.52) 
-0.682 (0.67) 
0.097 (0.34) 
-1.121 (2.21) 
0.267 (1.05) 
0.278 (3.47) 
0.046 (0.15) 
0.032 (2.56) 
-0.378 (0.87) 
0.027 (4.04) 
0.001 (0.25) 
0.012 (1.70) 
-0.255 (0.90) 
yes 
0.163 
5241. 9 
Estill. Tech. 
Period 
COllpanies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NHAN 
FEM 
REC 
sector dUlLmies 
OLS 
1983-89 
138 
883 
0.104 (0.19) 
0.021 (5.H) 
-0.033 (3.57) 
8.572 (5.45) 
-0.357 (0.51) 
0.065 (0.30) 
-0.926 (1.89) 
0.182 (0.94) 
0.232 (3.48) 
-0.137 (0.58) 
0.031 (3.94) 
-0.423 (1.11) 
0.019 (3.99) 
-0.001 (0.35) 
0.004 (0.95) 
-0.372 (1.84) 
no 
0.14 7 
5545.9 
TABLE 5.25 
FGLS 
1983-89 
138 
883 
0.149 (0.22) 
0.018 (4.59) 
-0.031 (3.44) 
8.645 (4.85) 
-0.350 (0.39) 
0.101 (0.37) 
-1.014 (1.88) 
0.186 (0.76) 
0.244 (3.39) 
-0.14 6 (0.49) 
0.031 (3.09) 
-0.445 (0.92) 
0.019 (3.19) 
-0.001 (0.33) 
0.005 (0.75) 
-0.398 (1.56) 
no 
0.146 
5550.4 
270 
FGLS 
1983-85 
138 
391 
0.991 (1.15) 
0.017 (2.71) 
-0.023 (1.92) 
5.353 (2.11) 
0.101 (0.08) 
0.191 (0.54) 
-0.452 (0.61) 
0.131 (0.40) 
0.027 (0.29) 
-0.145 (0.38) 
0.020 (1.54) 
-0.578 (0.93) 
0.010 (1.29) 
-0.007 (1.13) 
0.005 (0.60) 
-0.619 (1.79) 
no 
0.109 
2267. 8 
FGLS 
1986-89 
138 
492 
-0.452 (0.58) 
0.021 (4.01) 
-0.046 (3.32) 
11.157 (4.97) 
-1.040 (1.05) 
0.003 (0.01) 
-1.406 (1.95) 
0.222 (0.79) 
0.464 (4.51) 
-0.106 (0.30) 
0.037 (3.23) 
-0.295 (0.53) 
0.025 (3.60) 
0.002 (0.35) 
0.005 (0.77) 
-0.338 (1.18) 
no 
0.204 
3131. 2 
Estill. Tech. 
Sector 
COllpanies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGEGR 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
KHAN 
FEM 
REC 
OLS 
2 
30 
171 
-2.425 (2.83) 
0.016 (3.12) 
-0.027 (2.43) 
0.982 (4.27) 
-0.211 (0.45) 
0.066 (0.18) 
-0.235 (0.36) 
0.283 (0.99) 
0.048 (0.41) 
-0.748 (2.12) 
-0.001 (0.01) 
0.706 (1.08) 
0.021 (1.67) 
0.01 (1.02) 
0.026 (1.96) 
0.606 (1.52) 
0.332 
278.8 
TABLE 5.26 
OLS 
3 
57 
297 
0.307 (0.36) 
0.017 (3.96) 
-0.009 (0.71) 
0.518 (3.80) 
0.218 (0.06) 
-0.011 (0.03) 
-0.061 (0.10) 
0.238 (0.85) 
0.076 (0.73) 
0.265 (0.81) 
-0. 013 (0.19) 
-0.262 (0.45) 
0.013 (1.81) 
-0.005 (0.79) 
0.008 (0.74) 
-0.912 (2.82) 
0.248 
1211. 3 
OLS 
4 
75 
378 
-1.594 (1.58) 
0.024 (2.90) 
-0.015 (0.92) 
0.936 (2.70) 
-0.001 (0.90) 
-0.166 (0.40) 
-0.633 (1.03) 
0.113 (0.30) 
0.62 (4.38) 
-0.047 (0.11) 
0.077 (3.52) 
-0.409 (0.65) 
0.015 (1.60) 
0.008 (0.93) 
0.007 (0.90) 
0.725 (1.51) 
0.180 
3433.1 
Note: see Appendix 4B for the definition of SIC sectors 
271 
OLS 
5 
15 
18 
5.535 (2.73) 
0.003 (0.43) 
-0.029 (1. 76) 
0.91 (2.47) 
-9.135 (0.40) 
0.512 (0.95) 
-1.809 (1.17) 
-0.201 (0.39) 
-0.128 (0.56) 
1.203 (1.70) 
-0.044 (0.85) 
-4.918 (2.63) 
-0.009 (0.64) 
-0.041 (2.14) 
-0.023 (0.54) 
1.33 (1.85) 
0.541 
127.9 
OL5 
6 
72 
381 
0.092 (0.12) 
0.016 (2.86) 
-0.015 (1.14) 
1.157 (3.61) 
-0.289 (0.14) 
0.653 (1.73) 
-2.585 (1.95) 
0.129 (O.37) 
-0.012 (0.24) 
0.275 (O.61) 
0.013 (1.01) 
-0.528 (1.03) 
0.036 (3.80) 
-0.011 (1.72) 
0.008 (O.71) 
-0.863 (2.35) 
0.196 
3142.6 
TABLE 5.27 
DISAGGREGATION OF COMPANIES ACCORDING TO THEIR UNION STATUS IN THE EIGHTIES 
ALL % ESTIMATION % SIC1 SIC2 SIC3 5IC4 SICS 5IC6 SIC, SAMPLE 
TOTAL 359 294 3 34 66 87 17 82 5 
NO CHANGE 300 83.6 249 84.7 2 28 57 75 13 72 2 
RECBEG 222 61. 8 177 60.2 3 27 37 69 11 27 3 
RECEND 219 61. 0 176 59.9 3 27 36 68 11 29 2 
LESSREC 40 11.1 29 9.9 1 5 6 7 3 5 2 
DEREC 10 2.8 7 2.4 0 0 3 2 0 1 1 
- 1980-84 4 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
- 1985-89 6 5 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 
PARDEREC 30 8.4 22 7.5 1 5 3 5 3 4 1 
- 1980-84 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
- 1985-89 25 17 1 4 2 4 2 3 1 
- Both 3 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
MOREREC 19 5.3 16 5.4 0 1 3 5 1 5 1 
- 1980-84 5 4 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 
- 1985-89 11 9 0 1 1 3 0 3 1 
- Both 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
NEWREC 1.9 6 2.0 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 7 
- 1980-84 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 4 
0 2 0 
- 1985-89 3 3 0 0 0 1 
272 
Estill. Tech. OLS 
Companies 294 
Observations 1551 
CONSTANT -0.320 (0.83) 
SALESGR 0.018 (6.36) 
WAGEGR -0.018 (2.61) 
PROFIT 9.667 (9.43) 
EMPLOYMENT -0.350 (0.83) 
DCLR 0.240 (1.40) 
CLR -0.947 (2.90) 
DDER 0.320 (2.11) 
DER 0.079 (2.06) 
PTYES 0.018 (0.10) 
PTIM 0.038 (5.73) 
SIILYES -0.306 (1.13) 
SKIL 0.022 (5.36) 
NMAN -0.002 (0.90) 
FEM 0.004 (1.03) 
RECBEG 
-0.455 (2.77) 
LESSREC 0.262 (1.03) 
MOREREC 0.365 (1.08) 
sector dummies no 
R2 0.163 
rss 10992.9 
TABLE 5.28 
FGLS 
294 
1551 
-0.315 (0.73) 
0.017 (5.92) 
-0.017 (2.52) 
9.322 (8.55) 
-0.334 (0.70) 
0.263 (1.36) 
-0.961 (2.77) 
0.343 (2.02) 
0.082 (2.07) 
0.024 (0.12) 
0.038 (5.05) 
-0.314 (1.03) 
0.022 (4.79) 
-0.002 (0.80) 
0.004 (0.93) 
-0.464 (2.53) 
0.228 (0.83) 
0.398 (1.06) 
no 
0.162 
10996.6 
273 
OLS 
294 
1551 
-0.339 (0.83) 
0.018 (6.44) 
-0.018 (2.61) 
9.782 (9.41) 
-0.203 (0.46) 
0.253 (1.46) 
-0.981 (2.97) 
0.320 (2.10) 
0.076 (1.98) 
0.039 (0.22) 
0.037 (5.36) 
-0.309 (1.13) 
0.023 (5.46) 
-0.002 (0.77) 
0.003 (0.72) 
-0.441 (2.50) 
0.338 (1.31) 
0.377 (1.12) 
yes 
0.165 
10960.6 
FGLS 
294 
1551 
-0.330 (0.72) 
0.017 (5.98) 
-0.017 (2.52) 
9.417 (8.52) 
-0.193 (0.39) 
0.275 (1.42) 
-0.992 (2.83) 
0.343 (2.00) 
0.080 (2.01) 
0.048 (0.22) 
0.036 (4.72) 
-0.318 (1.03) 
0.023 (4.87) 
-0.002 (0.68) 
0.003 (0.67) 
-0.453 (2.29) 
0.297 (1.06) 
0.411 (1.09) 
yes 
0.165 
10965.0 
--..¥ -" 
Estill. Tech. OLS 
Companies 294 
Observations 1551 
CONSTANT -0.319 (0.83) 
SALESGR 0.018 (6.36) 
WAGEGR -0.018 (2.63) 
PROFIT 9.623 (9.40) 
EMPLOYMENT -0.381 {O.90} 
DCLR 0.237 (1.38) 
eLR -0.966 (2.96) 
DDER 0.321 (2.12) 
DER 0.078 (2.03) 
PTYES 0.008 (0.04) 
PTIM 0.031 (5.63) 
SKILYES -0.298 (1.10) 
SKIL 0.022 (5.36) 
NMAN -0.002 (0.84) 
FEM 0.004 (1.05) 
RECBEG -0.451 (2.75) 
LESSREC 0.499 (1. 71) 
DEREC 
-1.081 (1.94) 
MOREREC 0.311 (1.12) 
sector dUlLmies no 
R2 0.165 
rss 10965.8 
TABLE 5.29 
FGLS 
294 
1551 
-0.314 (0.73) 
0.017 (5.93) 
-0.017 (2.S3) 
9.277 {8.52} 
-0.363 (0.77) 
0.260 (1.35) 
-0.916 (2.82) 
0.344 (2.02) 
0.081 (2.05) 
0.014 (0.07) 
0.037 (4.97) 
-0.306 (1.10) 
0.022 (4.80) 
-0.002 (0.15) 
0.004 (0.95) 
-0.460 (2.51) 
0.466 (1.52) 
-1.012 (1.18) 
0.409 (1.10) 
no 
0.164 
10969.4 
274 
OLS 
294 
1551 
-0.331 {0.81} 
0.018 (6.(4) 
-0.018 (2.62) 
9.744 (9.38) 
-0.263 (0.59) 
0.249 (1.44) 
-0.999 (3.03) 
0.321 (2.ll) 
0.074 (1.94) 
0.029 (0.17) 
0.036 (5.30) 
-0.308 (1.13) 
0.023 (5.(5) 
-0.002 (O.13) 
0.003 (0.73) 
-0.431 (2.45) 
0.577 (2.01) 
-1.096 (1.93) 
0.384 (1.14) 
yes 
0.167 
10933.9 
FGLS 
294 
1551 
-0.322 {0.70} 
0.017 {5.99} 
-0.017 (2.52) 
9.379 (B.SO) 
-0.252 (0.51) 
0.270 (1.39) 
-1.005 (2.88) 
0.343 {2.01} 
0.078 {1.97} 
0.034 (0.17) 
0.036 (4.69) 
-0.317 (1.03) 
0.023 (4.87) 
-0.002 (0.6S) 
0.003 (O.6S) 
-0.444 (2.25) 
0.536 (1.73) 
-1.086 (1. 76) 
0.418 (1.11) 
yes 
0.167 
10938.1 
Estill. Tech. OLS 
Companies 294 
Observations 1551 
CONSTANT -0.310 (0.81) 
SALESGR 0.018 (6.38) 
WAGEGR -0.018 (2.63) 
PROFIT 9.614 (9.39) 
EMPLOYMENT -0.333 (0.77) 
DCLR 0.233 (1.36) 
CLR -0.987 (3.01) 
DDER 0.316 (2.08) 
DER 0.078 (2.03) 
PTYES 0.011 (0.06) 
PTIM 0.038 (5.66) 
SKILYES -0.312 (1.15) 
SKIL 0.022 (5.38) 
NHAN -0.002 (0.89) 
FEM 0.004 (LOS) 
RECBEG 
-0.433 (2.60) 
LESSREC 0.491 (1. 74) 
DEREC 
-1.078 (1.94) 
MOREREC 0.214 (0.49) 
NEiREC 0.394 (0.57) 
sector dummies no 
R2 0.165 
rss 10963.4 
TABLE 5.30 
FGLS 
294 
1551 
-0.305 (0.71) 
0.017 (5.93) 
-0.017 (2.53) 
9.266 (8.51) 
-0.319 (0.66) 
0.256 (1.33) 
-0.994 (2.85) 
0.339 (1.99) 
0.081 (2.05) 
0.017 (0.09) 
0.037 (4.99) 
-0.319 (1.04) 
0.022 (4.81) 
-0.002 (0.79) 
0.004 (0.95) 
-0.443 (2.38) 
0.459 (1.50) 
-1.069 (1. 77) 
0.261 (0.54) 
0.368 (0.48) 
no 
0.165 
10967.2 
275 
01S 
294 
1551 
-0.312 (0.78) 
0.018 (6.45) 
-0.018 (2.62) 
9.733 (9.37) 
-0.224 (0.50) 
0.245 (1.42) 
-1.017 (3.07) 
0.316 (2.08) 
0.074 (1.94) 
0.032 (0.18) 
0.037 (5.32) 
-0.320 (1.17) 
0.023 (5.46) 
-0.002 (0.77) 
0.003 (0.73) 
-0.417 (2.33) 
0.570 (1.98) 
-1.092 (1.92) 
0.244 (0.55) 
0.341 (0.50) 
yes 
0.167 
10932.1 
FGLS 
294 
1551 
-0.312 (0.68) 
0.017 (5.99) 
-0.017 (2.52) 
9.364 (8.48) 
-0.216 (0.43) 
0.267 (1.37) 
-1.020 (2.90) 
0.339 (1.98) 
0.079 (1.98) 
0.037 (0.19) 
0.036 (4.70) 
-0.328 (1.06) 
0.023 (4.88) 
-0.002 (0.68) 
0.003 (0.67) 
-0.430 (2.14) 
0.529 (1. 70) 
-1.082 (1.75) 
0.289 (0.59) 
0.319 (0.42) 
yes 
0.167 
10936.5 
Dependent Var. 
Estill. Tech. 
Companies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALES 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
REC 
DENSITY 
sector dummies 
Note: see page 245. 
WAGE 
OLS 
253 
1322 
9.430 (22.53) 
0.188 (9.26) 
3.684 (3.40) 
-0.114 (7.32) 
-0.711 (3.60) 
-0.102 (12.36) 
-0.037 (0.12) 
-0.003 (0.63) 
0.053 (H.8l) 
-0.028 
0.288 
yes 
0.421 
10204.0 
(5.79) 
(1.50) 
TABLE 5.31 
WAGE 
FGLS 
253 
1322 
9.455 (11.58) 
0.279 (10.79) 
2.865 
-0.175 
-0.709 
-0.101 
-0.074 
-0.003 
0.052 
-0.025 
0.371 
yes 
0.401 
10576.3 
276 
(2.76) 
(7.88 ) 
(1. 81) 
(6.20) 
(0.12 ) 
(0.32) 
(7.30) 
(2.66) 
(0.98) 
WAGE 
OLS 
233 
1205 
9.220 (20.72) 
0.191 (7.98) 
3.703 (3.32 ) 
-0.121 (6.71 ) 
-0.671 (3.23) 
-0.105 (12.57) 
0.017 (0.05 ) 
-0.006 (1.23) 
0.055 (14.32) 
-0.029 (5.79) 
0.891 
yes 
0.437 
9460.1 
(3.14) 
WAGE 
fGLS 
233 
1205 
9.511 (10.92) 
0.282 (lO.20) 
2.430 (2.29) 
-0.180 (7.65) 
-0.705 (1.71) 
-0.104 (6.25) 
0.037 (0.06) 
-0.004 (0.47) 
0.052 (6.87) 
-0.027 (2.72) 
0.494 
yes 
0.411 
9894.0 
(0.90 ) 
Estim. Tech. 
COllpanies 
Observations 
CONSTANT 
SALESGR 
WAGE 
PROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
DCLR 
CLR 
DDER 
DER 
PTYES 
PTIM 
SKILYES 
SKIL 
NMAN 
FEM 
REC 
DENSITY 
sector dummies 
OL8 
253 
1322 
-0.316 (0.66) 
0.018 (6.15) 
-0.028 (1.13) 
8.641 (7.66) 
-0.071 (0.10) 
0.254 (1.40) 
-0.867 (2.48) 
0.324 (2.04) 
0.069 (1.80) 
-0.060 (0.32) 
0.023 (2.89) 
-0.281 (1.02) 
0.023 (5.57) 
-0.001 (0.08) 
0.008 (1. 70) 
-0.420 (2.33) 
yes 
0.151 
8900.3 
TABLE 5.32 
FGL8 
253 
1322 
-0.296 (0.56) 
0.017 (5.73) 
-0.027 (1.04) 
8.335 {7.03} 
-0.058 (0.08) 
0.279 (1.39) 
-0.897 (2.43) 
0.340 (1.93) 
0.073 (1.86) 
-0.053 (0.25) 
0.023 (2.58) 
-0.292 (0.95) 
0.024 (5.04) 
-0.001 (0.12) 
0.008 (1.58) 
-0.438 (2.19) 
yes 
0.151 
8902.4 
277 
OLS 
233 
1205 
-0.309 (0.60) 
0.018 (5.91) 
-0.028 (1.04) 
8.531 (7.17) 
-0.092 (0.13) 
0.292 (1.49) 
-0.941 (2.53) 
0.290 (1.68) 
0.119 (2.33) 
-0.057 (0.28) 
0.022 (2.64) 
-0.418 (1.40) 
0.027 (5.74) 
-0.001 (0.25) 
0.008 (1.69) 
-0.549 (2.00) 
yes 
0.154 
8671. 7 
FGLS 
233 
1205 
-0.284 (0.50) 
0.017 (5.52) 
-0.028 (1.00) 
8.270 (6.64) 
-0.083 (0.10) 
0.316 (1.46) 
-0.972 (2.48) 
0.304 (1.61) 
0.123 (2.34) 
-0.052 (0.23) 
0.022 (2.36) 
-0.433 (1.32) 
0.027 (5.24) 
-0.001 (0.27) 
0.008 (1.58) 
-0.566 (1.88) 
yes 
0.154 
8673.4 
APPENDIX 5A 
This appendix describes the model from which an estimat d '. 
e equatIOn lIke 
(5.1) can be derived. The model is based on Denny and Nickell (1992)1. A firm 
facing a downward-sloping demand curve for its product is assumed to choose a 
stream of investment using intertemporal optimisation under adjustment costs. The 
firm's investment decision is taken in the knowledge that the wage will then be 
determined in each period as the result of bargaining between the firm and the 
umon along the labour demand curve ("Right-to-Manage" model). Hence a two-
stage structure is preserved as in the models presented in sections 1.3 to 1.5. \\' age 
bargaining is described by the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution. It is 
important to stress that the main purpose of this appendix is to set out a theoretical 
framework, based on Denny and Nickell (1992), for the definition of the estimated 
equations in the chapter rather than to provide specific predictions arising from the 
model. 
Wage bargaining is analysed first. As described in section 1.2 the objective 
function for wage bargaining when the Generalised Nash Bargaining Solution is 
adopted can be written as2 
1 See also Urga (1991). 
2 . ., . hId whereby disagreement pay-The cooperatIve or aXIOmatic approach IS ere emp oye 
h k (0 production and the offs are represented by the outside options for the firm and t e wor ers n 
alternative wage, respectively). 
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(5A.l) v = [U(w,L) - U(w)]a .[p. F(K,L) - w. L](l-a) 
where 
U( . ) == union's objective function, F(K,L) = production function, 
a == union bargaining power (0 < a < 1), w = wage, K = capital stock, 
L == employment, w = alternative wage, p = output price 
As a result the bargained level of the wage will depend on the quantity of 
capital, which is treated as fixed when wage bargaining takes place, the union 
bargaining power, and the alternative wage, i.e. 
(5A.2) w = w(K,a,w) 
with L determined along the labour demand curve. 
The production function is assumed to be 
(5A.3) Y = F(K,L) 
where Y == output. 
Adjustment costs are given by 
(5AA) C (I, a, PKlp) 
where 
I = investment, p Kip = price of investment (relative to the general price level). 
Denny and Nickell (1992) assume that 
(5A.5) 8C 82C 8C 8C ~ 0 if I ~ 0 £ll > 0, -2- > 0, {) <0, PK 
u 81 a 8( p ) 
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--
(5A.1) 
where 
U( . ) == union's objective function, F(K,L) = production function, 
Q' == union bargaining power (0 < 0:' < 1), w = wage, K = capital stock, 
L == employment, w = alternative wage, p = output price 
As a result the bargained level of the wage will depend on the quantity of 
capital, which is treated as fixed when wage bargaining takes place, the union 
bargaining power, and the alternative wage, i.e. 
(5A.2) w = w(K,O:',w) 
with L determined along the labour demand curve. 
The production function is assumed to be 
(5A.3) Y = F(K,L) 
where Y = output. 
Adjustment costs are given by 
(5A.4) e (I, 0:', PK/P) 
where 
I = investment, PK/P = price of investment (relative to the general price level). 
Denny and Nickell (1992) assume that 
(5A.5) ae a2e > 0 ae <0, ae ~ 0 if I ~ 0 ill > 0, al2 'aO:' a(PK) 
p 
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It is worth noticing that in (5AA) C( . ) includes not onl . . 
Y lnvestment wIth 
the assumption of convexity of adjustment costs, but also the co t f . 1 
s 0 capIta, and, 
especially, union bargaining power. Hence unions are assumed to af'C t· lec mvestment 
choices directly (and negatively in Denny and Nickell's approach) through their 
impact on adjustment costs (see the discussion in section 1.8). 
The demand function is defined by 
(5A.6) 
assuming 1] = 1](Y) 
where 
1/ = elasticity of demand, Y = demand shift parameter. 
The problem of the firm at time 0 is 
(5A.7) 
subject to (5.A8) . dK K = - = I - 8 . K and 
- dt 
(for the sake of semplicity time indices are dropped) 
where 
w = w(K,a,w) 
b = rate of capital depreciation, and r = discount rate (both are fixed parameters). 
From (5A.3) and (5A.6) 
(5A.9) p = F(K,L)-I/T]. P . yIlT] 
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It is worth noticing that in (5AA) C( . ) includes not onl . . Y mvestment wIth 
the assumption of convexity of adjustment costs, but also the cost f . 1 
a capIta, and, 
especially, union bargaining power. Hence unions are assumed to aCC t' 
uec mvestment 
choices directly (and negatively in Denny and Nickell's approach) through their 
impact on adjustment costs (see the discussion in section 1.8). 
The demand function is defined by 
(5A.6) Y = (pip )-7] . Y 
assuming ry = ry(Y) 
where 
1] = elasticity of demand, Y = demand shift parameter. 
The problem of the firm at time 0 is 
(5A.7) 
subject to (5.A8) . dK K = - = I - 8 . K and 
- dt 
(for the sake of semplicity time indices are dropped) 
where 
w = w(K,a,w) 
8 = rate of capital depreciation, and r = discount rate (both are fixed parameters). 
From (5A.3) and (5A.6) 
(5A.9) 
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so that the objective function becomes 
mr J 0+00 e-rt .[ p . F(K,L)<. yl/ry -w· L - C(I,a,p Kip )~It 
where E = 1 - 1/7]. 
The labour demand curve is obtained by maximising the profit with respect 
to 1. The FOC for this maximisation is given by 
(5A.10) 
which using (5A.8) can be rewritten as 
(5A.ll) 
The maximisation problem of the firm (5A.7) is a typical optimal control 
problem. Let the Hamiltonian be 
(A is the socalled costate variable) 
Assuming perfect foresight the Hamiltonian conditions are given by 
(5A.13) _e-rt . 8C + A = 0 81 
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e-rt . {p . E • F(K,L)-l/'1 . F K(K,L) . yl/'1+ p . E • F(K,L)-l/'1. F L(K,L) . oL . yIlT) + 
oK 
w. oL _ ow 'L}- )..·8 = -~ (5A.14) 
- oK oK 
reminding that w w(K,a,w) and that employment is chosen along the labour 
demand curve. 
Rearranging (5A.14) yields 
but from (5A.ll) p. E • F L(K,L) = w so that (5A.14) becomes 
(5A.15) 
From (5A.13) ).. = e-rt . ~? . Differentiating with respect to time and assuming 
that ~? is independent on time yields 
(5A.16) ~ = - r . e -rt . ~? 
Thus (5A.15) becomes 
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i.e. (5A.17) 
The outcome of wage bargaining, w = w(K,a,w), is assumed to obey 
(5A.18) 8logw _ 8logK = ,(a,w) 
(see Denny and Nickell (1992) for this assumption) 
so that (5A.17) can be rearranged as follows 
(5A.19) 
and using (5A.18) and (5A.ll) 
(5A.20) 
Hence 
(5A.21) 
283 
Assuming that the expression in square brackets can be' l'fi d 
sImp I Ie as 
<I> ( ~, a, w ) gives as final condition 
(5A.22) 
Denny and Nickell (1992) parameterise ~?( . ), E, and <1>(.) as follows 
(5A.23) 
(K)b b b 4l = B3 · L 5. a 6. W 7 
Taking logs yields the empirical counterpart of equation (14). By solving for logI 
1 ( ) b6 - h2 1 logl = b
l
' logB2 + logB3 - log(r+c5) - 10gB! + b
I 
. loga + hI . logp + 
b3 b 4 - b 5 JK) h7 -(5A.24) - -b • log(p Kip) + b' logY + b' I°Y\.L + b' logw 
1 1 1 1 
which represents Denny and Nickell's empirical model. 
Alternatively, linear approximations of (5A.24) can be taken so as to give 
an equation like (5.1). 
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APPENDIX 5B 
This appendix provides a brief description of the estimatl·on t h . c 
ec mques lor 
panel data used in the chapter. In light of the presence of time invariant regressors 
at the company level (see, for instance, union recognition), Fixed Effects estimation 
is not feasible and Random Effects, together with pooled OLS, are mostly used. The 
main aim of this appendix is to detail, without proofsl , how the Feasible G LS 
estimator for the Random Effect Model is computed. A mention is also given to an 
alternative estimator proposed by Hsiao for the case where some regressors are time 
invariant. This latter technique has been been used only when it has proved 
impossible to obtain FGLS estimates (see below for the negative estimated variance 
problem), although results based on it are not reported in the chapter. 
The empirical model used throughout the chapter can be written as follows 
(5B.l) i = 1, ... , N 
where Y represents the investment measure, X is a vector of Kx time-varying (at 
the individual level) regressors, e.g. profitability, sales, employment, etc., and Z is a 
vector of Kz time invariant regressors, 
·t·on workforce e.g umon recogm 1 , 
1 . f I data estimators see Hsiao For proofs and a detailed anaysis of the propertIes 0 pane 
(1986), Baltagi (1995), Judge et ale (1985, ch. 13), Greene (1991, 1993), Sclunidt (1992), and 
Hausman and Taylor (1981). 
2 .. ( ) I' t . n presence, is subsumed in Zi U i' a separate regressor In equatIOn 5.2 re atmg, 0 uruo 
in equation (5B.l). 
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characteristics, etc. Let Kx + Kz = K. The a's are individual fixed effects F' II 
. ma y. 
t· is an indipendently and identically distributed random variable wl'th 
st mean 0 and 
variance (J" 2. N is the number of firms in the sample. The number of b t' 
t 0 serva Ions 
for each firm is T i , i = 1, ... N, and it is not restricted to be the same across firms. 
Hence the panel is unbalanced. 
1. If no regressor is time invariant (K z = 0), i.e. if all regressors belong to 
X, then the Within, or Least Squares Dummy Variables estimator can be computed. 
It is easily shown that this amounts to the estimation of (3 from the following OLS 
regresslOn 
(5B.2) 
T· 
- 1 t 
where Yi = T' L: Y it 
i t=l 
and 
Hence the Within estimator, 13
w 
say, is obtained using the deviations from 
the group means in an OLS regression. The fixed effects, ai' are then estimated as 
follows 
(5B.3) i = 1, ... N 
. . . t (K > 0) . e if they are individual If some regressors are tIme mvanan z ' 1. • 
specific so that X· = X· Vt the Within estimator cannot be computed. Two routes 
, tt t' 
can then be taken. 
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2 Hsiao Two-Step Estimator. Hsiao (1986, 50-52) suggests estim t· . 
. a mg a model lIke 
(5B 1) by firstly obtaining Within estimates for j3 as under 1 0 'tt' h . 
. , ml mg t e tIme 
invariant regressors, Z, from the regression. To estimate -y OLS can then be applied 
to 
(5BA) y.-x.·j3~ =Z··",+T. 1 1 W 1 I I i = 1, ... N 
The fixed effects are then estimated in a way analogous to (5B.3). 
3. When individual specific regressors are included the Random Effects Model can 
still be used. Model (5B.l) can be reformulated as follows 
assuming that 
(5B.6) E{E .. a·) = 0 It J \j t, i, j 
( ) \..I t ~ s, 1 ~ J. E Eit· E js = 0 v I I 
It has been shown3 that by appropriate transformation of (5B.5) GLS can 
be applied. This procedure amounts to estimating with OLS the following regression 
error 
(5B.7) 
3See any of the references in footnote 1. 
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where ()= 
CT 2 
t: (5B.8) 
with o} and CT 0:2 as defined in (5B.6). The factor (1/Q) in (5B.8) refers to the sizp 
of the individual groups. This correction is needed given the unbalanced nature of 
the panel. Q is defined as (see Greene (1991, 312)) 
(5B.9) 1 N (1) Q = -. I: -
N i=l Ti 
If the panel is balanced, i.e. T i = T Vi, i = 1, ... N, Q = i. 
The varIances CT/ and CT0:2 , and thus (), are not known and need to be 
estimated in order to carry out the estimation of (5B.7). This provides the Feasible 
GLS (FGLS) estimator. Estimates of CT / and CT 0: 2 are obtained as follows: 
(5B.10) 
(5B.ll) 
N . ) 
where N* = I: T i (the total number of available observatlOns 
i=l 
2 •. . ·d I from the regression Hence fr t: is estimated usmg the withm-group reSI ua s 
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that omits all the individual specific regressors Z, while the estimation of (j 2 
o IS 
based on the sum of squared residuals from the between-group estimation, i.e the 
OL5 regression with sample N carried out using the group means of each regressor 
(including the time invariant ones). Once fr / and fro? have been obtained, e can be 
estimated and the OL8 regression in (5B.7) can be carried out. It is important to 
notice that the nature of the computation of fr 0 2 does not rule out a negative 
result. Although some techniques have been proposed to remedy the problem4, a 
negative estimated variance component is interpreted as failure of the technique. 
525)). 
1 to zero (see Judge et aI. (1985. 
4For instance the negative estimate can be set e,qua 
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APPENDIX 5C 
LIST OF VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
See Appendix 4A and sections 5.2 and 5.3 for additional information and sources. 
All variables are defined at the company level. Superscript * denotes a dummy (0 or 
1) variable. Superscript + denotes a time invariant regressor. 
INV = Investment - Sales ratio (xIOO). 
SALES = Current value of sales. 
SALESGR = Annual percentage growth of sales. 
EMPLOYMENT = Total employment. 
WAGE = Per capita average wage (i.e. total labour costs over total employment). 
WAGEGR = Annual percentage growth of per capita average wage. 
PROFIT = Pre Tax Profit / Sales. 
CLR = Cash - Liabilities ratio. 
DCLR * = Positive cash-liabilities ratio (i.e. CLR > 0). 
DER = Debt - Equity ratio. 
DDER* = Positive debt-equity ratio (i.e. DDER > 0). 
PTIM+ = Percentage of part-time workers. 
PTYES*+ = Company employing some part-time workers (i.e. PTIM>O). 
SKIL + = Percentage of skilled workers. 
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SKILYES*+ = Company employing some skilled workers (i.e. SKIL>O). 
FEM+ = Percentage of female workers. 
NMAN+ = Percentage of non-manual workers. 
REC*+ = Union recognition in some or all establishments. 
RECALL *+ = Union recognition in all establishments. 
DENSITY = Union density (percentage). 
UD>X* = Union density greater than X % (UD<X, UD < X, and UD ~ X are 
similarly defined). 
DEN>X = UD>X * DENSITY (DEN<X, DEN < X, and DEN ~ X are similarly 
defined). 
CLOSED*+ = Existence of closed shop arrangements. 
CS>X* = CLOSED * UD>X. 
FEWCO*+ = Company facing less than five competitors in the product market. 
MONOP*+ = Company facing no competitors in the product market. 
UKCOUP* = Increased domestic competition in the product market. 
FCOUP* = Increased foreign competition in the product market. 
RECBEG*+ = Union recognition at the beginning of the period (1980). 
LESSREC* = Company experiencing derecognition (partial or complete). 
DE * .. I d ·t· (no establishment IS REC = Company expenencIng comp ete erecogm IOn 
currently unionised) 
MOREREC* = Increase in the number of establishments recognising unions. 
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NEWREC* = Company recognising unions for the first time. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide some new It . 
resu s concernmg the 
effect of unions on investment and innovation. The issue has been tackled on both 
the theoretical and the empirical level. 
In the Introduction three channels through which unionisation can affect 
innovation and investment were mentioned. If the impact through work rules and 
restrictive practices is left aside, the effect of unions crucially depends on the relatiye 
importance of the "rent-seeking" mechanism stressed by Grout (1984) as opposed to 
the traditional "substitution effect" between capital and labour. 
The theoretical model of innovation adoption in the presence of unions, 
wage bargaining and oligopolistic product markets developed in chapter 2 clearly 
shows the effectiveness of the "rent-seeking" argument. The main result is that an 
environment in which both unions are relatively strong (i.e. they have a high and 
similar umon bargaining power as defined by the Generalised Nash Bargaining 
Solution) will, ceteris paribus, harm innovation III both firms. Conversely, thp 
presence of relatively weak umons will be conducive to the adoption of new and 
more productive technologies. If instead there is enough spread between the two 
unions, in terms of their bargaining power, so that only one firm is able to innovate~ 
. . ' h' h d pts the technology It is always the firm faced wIth the weaker umon w IC a 0 . 
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(provided the two UnIons have the same relative concern over employment and 
Pay). Hence the "rent-seeking" effect, which works through h' h Ig er wage demands 
stemming from the increased rents accruing from innovation h 
, as a powerful effect 
on a firm's choice of technical change. 
The results summarised above are based on the assumption that the 
perceived trade-off between wage and employment is the same across unions. If this 
is not the case, it is possible that the firm facing the more powerful union will be 
the only one to adopt the new technology. This outcome arises when the umon 
facing the firm m question cares relatively more about employment than the 
"rival" umon. This result shows that environments where unions value the defense 
of employment more than pay rises tend to favour innovation. 
The theoretical results outlined above show that union strength is to some 
extent detrimental to innovation, but no policy conclusions should be rushed on this 
basis. This point IS made particularly clear by noticing that there are cases where 
the innovation would not be adopted by any firm, ceteris paribus, under competitive 
(non-unionised) labour markets, but in which one firm would innovate in a 
unionised labour market. 
The extensions of the analysis considered in chapter 3 corroborate the 
findings of the model. In particular, the presence of implicit collusion among firms 
. . . . . t' ibus since bargained III the product market tends to facIhtate mnovatlOn, ce ens par , 
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wages decline with the degree of collusion. Some attention h 1 b . 
as a so een paId to the 
generalisation of the model so as to allow for the choice of th . 1 . e capIta stock Instead 
of the choice between innovating and sticking to the existin t h 1 g ec no ogy. The 
numerical results obtained in this case depend on the assumption th 
s on e parameter 
values and claims of generality for these findings cannot be mad Th· e. IS caveat 
notwithstanding, the main prediction of the adoption model, i.e. the negative effect 
of union power on the capital level, is confirmed. At the same time no support is 
found for the interesting results put forward by Moene (1990) according to which 
increases in union power do not tend, as widely believed, to bias the choice of 
techniques in a capital-intensive direction. 
The econometric analysis presented in chapter 5 appears to provide some 
evidence that union recognition involves ceteris paribus a lower propensity to invest 
for the sample of U.K. non-agricultural quoted companies over the period 1982-1989 
used in this work. This result broadly confirms the findings of Denny and r\ickell 
(1992), the most influential work available to date on the subject in the U.K., but 
based on industry data. A few qualifications, though, need to be made concerning 
this result. 
h ·d t" of product market The result appears to be robust to t e conSI era IOn 
conditions, i.e. the extent as well as the changes in the degree of competition, both 
domestic and foreign, over the period. On the other hand, the negative effect of 
f h . d analysed and tends recognition is more prominent during the first part 0 t e peno 
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to die away at the end of the eighties. The effect of unions also seems likely to be 
rather non-homogeneous across industries. This sectoral disagg t' , 
rega Ion IS worth v of 
additional analysis. 
As is the case with other studies, no separate effect on investment can be 
linked with the presence of closed shop arrangements. A more intriguing Issue IS 
represented by the effect of umon density conditional on recognition. for which 
annual data are available for a substantial number of unionised companies, Union 
density has a negative effect on investment. This work therefore reverses Denny and 
Nickell's findings. However, there is some evidence that this negative effect is 
mainly driven by compames with an intermediate range of unionisation, Firms 
where density is either very high (above 90 % approximately) or very low (belo\\' 
25-30 %) have an investment performance which is not very different from similar 
non-union firms. More data and more work on the issue are certainly desirable. 
A very topical Issue m the analysis of the effects of unions during the 
eighties concerns the impact of changes in unions status, mostly derecognition, on 
firm performance, This thesis sheds some light on the matter by showing that there 
, . ' h' h d 'ded to IS some evidence (but definitely not overwhelmmg) that compames w lC eCl 
partially derecognise unions over the period have benefitted in terms of investment 
c ., Th' t does not characterise perlOrmance cetefls paflbus over the short-run. IS ou come 
those companies which have completely derecognised: the very limited number of 
such cases, however, imposes caveats on the judgement of this result. 
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To conclude, the empirical analysis seems to support, with some 
qualifications, the predictions, cast III terms of the innovation adoption modf'l. 
concerning the impact of union strength on innovation and investment. ~Iore data 
eeded in order to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" union effect.;; on ~n -
investment. In general, further empirical work should concentrate on data which 
match more closely the construction of the theoretical model in order to establish 
the robustness of the results obtained in this thesis. 
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